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This study on trade policy in West Germany is part of the Kiel Insti-
tute's research program analyzing the longer-run pattern of structural
change. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, as well as
a resurgence of interest in trade policy as a form of industrial policy,
enhances the topicality of the subject. The study presents a systematic
quantification of the effects of protection policy in West Germany.
This policy promotes very few industries, of course at the expense of all
other activities. Subsidies and quotas under the control of the national
government are the main instruments. Trade policy is shown to be par-
ticularly protective where special pressure groups have emerged that are
not subject to the discipline of the comprehensive interest representation
so characteristic of West Germany. Protective policy is generally directed
at industries suffering from competition of cheaper foreign sources of
supply. It is often explicitly designed to slow down the exit of redun-
dant firms; it appears to go hand in hand with depressed rates of labor
productivity growth, particularly in small firms. Under these conditions,
external liberalization would certainly enhance welfare; it would do so
even more, and would effectively promote employment, if it went along
with an internal liberalization, particularly of the labor market.
The project was directed by Frank D. Weiss, who carried out the work
on tariffs, effective assistance and on political economy, and who also
prepared the final draft. The substantive work on subsidies was under-
taken by the late Karl Heinz Juttemeier. Gernot Klepper carried out the
research on the history of German trade policy; Bernhard Heitger and
Frank D. Weiss analyzed the consequences of trade policy; and Grant
Kirkpatrick, who maintained the Institute's general equilibrium model, is
responsible for the liberalization simulations. At the start of the project,
Doris Witteler equally contributed to this study.
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Juergen B. Donges
for his continual encouragement and for his critical comments on the
penultimate draft. In addition, they acknowledge stimulating discussionsXII
with many colleagues at the Kiel Institute. Bernhard Klein and Fiona
Short deserve gratitude for their meticulous editorial guidance, and
Helga HuS and Petra Walter for the efficient and cheerful typing of the
manuscript.
The core of the research work was financed by a grant from the Alfried
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Stiftung, whose generosity the Kiel
Institute gratefully acknowledges.
Kiel, August 1988 Herbert GierschDie Gedanken sind zollfrei.
Aber man hat doch Scherereien.
Karl Kraus
I. Introduction
1. The period between the onset of the Tokyo Round multilateral tariff
reductions and the Uruguay Round has been turbulent for the interna-
tional economy and for international economic policymaking. Sharp swings
in industrial countries' terms of trade, the steady emergence of a new
group of countries exporting industrial products and following in the
footsteps of Japan and the appearance of apparently persistent differ-
ences in current external accounts of many countries, accompanied by
successive waves of disinflation policy, all contributed to a widespread
malaise from which relief was often sought, and sometimes granted, in
the form of protection from foreign suppliers. For a time, in the mid-
1970's, it looked as if the world economy would slide once more, as
during the Great Contraction, into substantial increases in foreign trade
protection, and so intensify and prolong the structural and adjustment
pressures from which most established industrial countries were suffer-
ing. Appropriately, the period has been called "the era of the new pro-
tectionism" . It witnessed a broadening of restrictions in the international
textile and clothing trade, the imposition of substantial restrictions in
the steel industry, and eventually international skirmishes fought with
pasta and veal, automobiles and machine tools. Subsidies increased in
many countries, and a bewildering array of often temporary trade
barriers was imposed selectively on individual products and countries.
2. The era poses a paradox, however. International trade did not break
down, as during the 1930's. The European Community (EC) expanded
from six to ten, and then to twelve member states. The European Com-
munity signed a free-trade agreement on industrial products with the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The Tokyo Round of multilateraltariff reductions did succeed in bringing down nominal tariffs. More re-
cently, the United States signed a bilateral free-trade treaty with
Canada. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade barrier reductions got
underway with a broadened agenda compared to previous rounds, and
with at least a promise to desist from further practices inconsistent with
GATT principles.
3. Under these conditions it is important to gain an understanding of
what the trade policy of a country widely considered to have liberal
trading interests has been, how that policy has come about, and, in
view of the ongoing Uruguay Round, how it is likely to evolve in the
near future. The first important step in this direction is systematic
quantification of trade policy measures actually applied. While much
evidence - quantitative and anecdotal - about trade policy in West Ger-
many exists, not enough of it is systematic, so that it is difficult to
confront hypotheses about the causes and consequences of trade policy
with the relevant facts.
4. From outside Europe, it might appear that studying trade policy in
one country, when that country is a member of the EC, is a pointless
task. Appearance deceives. Trade policy, except tariff policy, even in
fields of activity which formally fall under Community auspices, is over-
whelmingly a matter of national prerogative. But tariff policy has become
quantitatively less important over time and is subject to yet wider inter-
national agreement. In agriculture, one of two industries formally con-
trolled from Brussels, national price levels differ significantly among
countries, and roughly half of subsidies to agriculture are paid for by
the national government in West Germany's case. In the coal and steel
complex, the first economic activity to come under international auspices
in the present EC, essentially a system of rules has been established
which permit national governments to carry out their own policy in such
a way as to minimize consequent costs for other member states. Similar-
ly, national governments set import quotas under the multifiber agree-
ment (MFA) themselves. The EC merely acts as formal intermediary be-
tween member states and nonmember states. Finally, each community
member can invoke Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome and exclude the
good in question from common treatment altogether. There is doubtlesstension between Community institutions and national governments for
control over various aspects of policy. When the chips are down, na-
tional governments win.
5. The trade and trade policy problems of the last decade and a half
have gone hand in hand with a resurgence of interest in the theory of
trade policy. Two parallel sets of research interests and results have
emerged, one concerned with the causes of trade policy measures, the
other concerned with the consequences of such measures. The political
economy approach to trade policy seeks to find the causes of trade po-
licy in interest group formation and interaction with government. Trade
policy is attributed to rent-seeking behavior on the part of interest
groups and rent-granting behavior on the part of government. West Ger-
many is a particularly well furnished laboratory for examining the rele-
vance of these ideas, because an influential, almost institutionalized set
of distinctive interest groups is in place. The industrial policy approach
to trade, on the other hand, seeks effects of trade and industrial policy
measures in the presence of economies of scale, and hence, non perfectly
competitive markets. Here, too, West Germany is an appropriate labora-
tory for evaluating these ideas because many different kinds of policy
measures are in place and have been changed differentially across in-
dustries over the last decade and a half.
6. Particularly since the era of the new protectionism ended and the un-
easy trade policy truce emerged, interest in the costs of protection has
waved and interest in the potential benefits of protection (under strictly
circumscribed conditions to be sure) has waxed. One reason for the
switch in emphasis might be the paucity of harder quantitative evidence
on the extent of protective measures. Applied studies of whole economies
typically estimated the costs of protection attributable to the one instru-
ment - the tariff - whose relative and absolute importance had declined
to near insignificance. Typical estimates of the costs of protection have
been on the order of one half to one percent of GNP. Such orders of
magnitude will understandably reduce excitement about the cost of
distortions engendered by trade policy. Consideration of subsidies and
other nontariff barriers (NTB's) alters such conclusions.7. Equally importantly, other significant institutional conditions have
usually been ignored. In macroeconomics, recognition has been growing,
though of course there is no unanimity, that there may be something
particular about labor market conditions in Europe. This special feature
has often been subsumed under "labor market rigidity" or "real wage
rigidity". While this study does not address the issue directly, the con-
sequences of such institutions for the effect of trade liberalization can
be simulated. This is done with a general equilibrium model of the West
German economy. It turns out that the flexibility of the real wage is
crucial in determining the outcome of trade liberalization. Such a policy
would be for more effective if coupled with an internal liberalization.
8. The next chapter quantitatively maps out what trade policies are in
fact undertaken on an industry-by-industry basis. The evidence is sy-
stematized by implementing Corden's [1966] concept of effective protec-
tion. The estimates include the effects of tariffs, subsidies, and the im-
portant NTB's. Then the causes of those policies are examined. Chapter
III seeks to relate various categories of subsidies to policy intentions
and policy institutions. Chapter IV adopts a political economy framework
for explaining total assistance to industry in Germany. Institutions which
seem to worsen policy outcomes are identified. Some of the elements
which are recognized as driving trade policy, such as foreign policy
considerations and ideology, are difficult to examine on an interindustry
basis. Therefore, Chapter V adopts a historical perspective on German
tariffs to show that these two forces were very important in determining
policy outcomes. Afterwards the consequences of present day trade po-
licies are subjected to scrutiny. Chapter VI focuses on the role of trade
policy in codetermining the interindustry pattern of specialization, or
competitiveness, and seeks systematic relationships between changes in
interindustry protection and some of the apparent objects of policy.
Then, in Chapter VII the effects of trade liberalization on employment
and income are simulated under alternative labor market institutions.
Finally, the study ends with a brief summary of results, a discussion of
possible further research, and some conclusions for shaping policy.II. Effective Assistance to Industries in West Germany - A Quantification
for the Mid-1970's and Mid-1980's
9. Soon after the successful completion of the Kennedy Round of multi-
lateral tariff costs, the world economy was hit by the great supply shock
of the first oil price hike in 1973. One general response to the ensuing
structural dislocation and aggregate contraction consisted of increased
protection from foreign competition for some affected industries or indi-
vidual activities. This occurred both in the United States and in the EC,
including West Germany. For a time, it seemed as though a general
surge in protection was either already underway, or was at least immi-
nent. Thus, the period of the 1970's has been called the "era of the new
protectionism". Yet, it was during this period that the Tokyo Round of
trade negotiations got under way and was completed. Nominal tariffs at
least on industrial products were reduced. The period as a whole, right
up until the present, reveals the imposition of a bewildering array of
specific and general trade policy measures, some temporary, some at
least semipermanent. It is therefore difficult to characterize the period
descriptively in a systematic way, much less to map out the consequenc-
es of policy for trade and welfare, or investigate the causes of trade
policy, or to gain an informed opinion about the prospects for the ongo-
ing Uruguay Round of trade barrier reductions. As a prelude to such
analysis, trade and industrial policy for the period must be systematic-
ally quantified. While individual sectors have been studied for various
countries or regions, this task has not been undertaken for any of the
larger industrial countries as a whole.
1. Measurement Concepts
10. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to quantify trade policy meas-
ures for the recent past in a systematic way. To this end, Corden's
[1966] concept of effective protection is implemented for two points in
time - one about the mid-1970's, or before the onset of the TokyoRound, and one about the mid-1980's, when the last of the agreed tariff
cuts was completed. The reason for using Corden's almost quarter-cen-
tury-old concept is that it is the simplest general equilibrium formulation
of protection, and so is parsimonious with respect to information require-
ments. Put slightly differently, the data collection effort can be targeted
to obtain good characterizations of nominal protection (1) and preserve a
certain amount of interindustry detail. In addition, these results can be
compared with the results of past periods and other countries obtained
by other investigators. Not least, the concept is fairly straightforward.
11. The point of the effective rate concept is to capture the effect of
protection of output on the size of an economic activity when inputs used
in the production of that output are also protected (2). Put differently,
actual value added of an activity is compared to value added if there







where a., is the material input/output coefficient, i.e. the share of input
i in output j at domestic prices and t. is the nominal ad valorem tariff
rate or its equivalent.
The numerator measures value added at domestic prices, and the denomi-
nator measures value added at world prices. There, gross output is de-
flated by the output tariff, and the input shares are deflated by the
corresponding input tariffs. The measures are exact under the assumpt-
ions that foreign output is in perfectly elastic supply (relative prices are
fixed) and that the elasticity of substitution among material inputs is
zero.
(1) Chapter VII takes the opposite route - a general equilibrium formula-
tion without the strict confines of the effective rate concept is ap-
plied, but at the cost of some interindustry detail.
(2) See the exposition in Corden [1971, pp. 35-44].12. The concept can be adapted to express the change in net value ad-
ded attributable to the protective system, rather than the gross value
added [Hiemenz, Rabenau, 1973]. This means taking account of the
effect of the tariff structure on the value of depreciation of capital
goods. Then [1] becomes:
n n
1 - I a. . - E A. .
where A., is the share of depreciation of the i-th capital good in gross
value added of sector j. In practice, total depreciation in each sector is
deflated by an unweighted average tariff for six investment goods.
13. Not all production is sold behind tariff walls; some is exported and
sold at world market prices. Assuming that the share of value added in
gross output that is exported is identical to the share of value added in
gross output that is sold behind tariff walls makes the required adjust-
ment to the formula for the effective rate of assistance straightforward.
The share of gross output (unity), instead of being deflated by l+t., is
deflated by l+t. adjusted for the share of gross output sold behind tariff
walls d., so that [2] becomes:
1 - E a. .
[3] ERP. =





Here, d., the share of output sold behind tariff walls, is not the share
of production sold domestically only, but rather the share of production
sold in the EC. For tariffs this argument is straightforward, because all
EC countries share the same tariff schedule.
14. Since a major aim of this study is to include the effects of NTB's in
the quantification, and since it is widely appreciated that individual ECmember countries can apply for national treatment of certain goods ac-
cording to Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome, the question of how to
treat German exports of such goods to the EC countries imposing separ-
ate national treatment arises immediately, and must be settled in princ-
iple at the outset. There is good reason to believe that the nominal rate
of protection of the corresponding goods in the countries applying nat-
ional treatment rises only to the level of the least protective member
state (1). The reason is easy to see: free intercommunity trade in sub-
stitute goods drives down nominal protection to the lowest level imposed
by any one community country. But by all accounts, West Germany is
the country that exempts goods from community treatment least, as
Table 1 shows. Hence, nominal protection in the other community coun-
tries would tend to be driven down to the German level. In summary,
the effective protection calculations can be undertaken using German
nominal rates, explicit and implicit.































































































































































Source: Dicke et al. [1987].
(1) This argument has been advanced by Hamilton [1986],15. Production subsidies are easy to integrate into this framework. Given
fixed output and input prices, a production subsidy increases gross out-
put of the industry receiving the subsidy proportionately. Hence, the
numerator of [1] changes; value added at domestic prices becomes:
n
1 + s.- Z a..
D i=i ID
[4] ERA. = — - 1
j . n a. .
where s. is the subsidy per unit of gross output in industry j [Corden,
1971, p. 42]. This s., the rate of subsidy of gross output, is measured
at distorted domestic prices, and has been called the "producer subsidy
equivalent" [OECD, 1987]. In analogy to the rate of nominal tariff pro-
tection, it may also be called the "nominal rate of subsidization". The
combined effective protect of tariffs and subsidies, called an Effective
Rate of Assistance, can be expressed as the sum of the effective rate of
tariff protection and an effective rate of subsidization:
[5] ERA. = ERP. +
3
 3
Multiplying the numerator and denominator of the last term by gross out-
put leads to the convenient formulation:
[6] ERA. = ERP. + (Subsidy j/Value added at world prices j)
which is equivalent to:
[7] ERA. = ERP. + (Subsidy j/(Value added at domestic
prices j/ERP.))
and will be used to tabulate the results.10
The fixed coefficients formulation ensures that subsidies on gross output
will not affect prices, but only quantities. The input-output coefficients
themselves are not affected. In economic terms, the recipient of the sub-
sidy increases his gross output by the full amount of the subsidy (free
entry), but the value added created in that process is distorted by tar-
iffs, just as the initial value added has been. It must be deflated by the
effective rate of tariff protection.
16. In the presence of nontraded goods tracing out the incidence on val-
ue added of tariffs and subsidies is complicated slightly, even under a
fixed-coefficient technology.
Two extreme simplifying assumptions have been made. Either one can as-
sume with Balassa [1971] that nontraded goods are supplied perfectly
elastically, or one can assume with Corden [1971] that they are supplied
perfectly inelastically. If they are supplied perfectly elastically, indus-
tries of nontraded goods merely pass on their increased costs attribu-
table to tariffs on inputs. Therefore, their effective protection is zero.
If nontraded goods are supplied perfectly inelastically, the size of value
added in these industries will be affected by tariffs on their inputs and
tariffs on traded outputs using them as inputs. Thus, nontraded inputs
used intensively in the production of a traded input which is protected
by a high nominal tariff will expand; the nontraded input is protected as
well. To capture this effect, Corden [1971] lumps nontraded goods with
value added.
17. The formula actually used to carry out the calculations is:
z
1 - E a. .
4-1
 13
[8] ERA. = — 1
j , n a. . z n a, . z z a , Yz+r- - 2 TS- - £ a. .[ (w.+ z .nfV Z a_(w + I ^ 1-HJjtj i=ll+t± i=n+1 i: i l+t ^
1
 k11
The variables t., d., and a., have been described above. In the Balassa
formula nontraded goods are treated just like traded goods with a zero
tariff rate on them. Thus, the summation index i = l,...,z runs over all
goods. In the Corden formula, traded and nontraded goods are treated
differently. The summation index i = l,...,n runs across the traded
goods; the index i = n + l,...,z runs across the nontraded goods. The
value added components of nontraded goods are designated w., and are
subtracted from gross output. The summation index k runs over traded
inputs into nontraded inputs, and m is the second round: i.e. nontraded
inputs into traded inputs, which go into nontraded inputs. This formula
was taken from Donges et al. [1973], but the impact of differential in-
direct taxes was dropped. In the present study, this is shown as sub-
sidies. Further discussion of the derivation of the two formulas may be
found in Balassa [1971, Appendix 1].
2. Quantitative Restrictions and their Implicit Tariffs
18. At first glance, the task of quantifying trade restrictions adopted in
West Germany or the EC since the mid-1970's appears unmanageable. A
bewildering array of border measures have been adopted, modified, and
even dropped with extraordinary frequency. Nevertheless, it has turned
out that the attempt to do so has revealed systematic properties of pro-
tection policy which have made the task meaningful and relatively
straightforward. The initial idea was to collect a catalog of all border
measures operative in the EC which affect West Germany and calculate
nominal tariff equivalents for each of them. The measures would have to
be distinguished by type - mere quotas which lead to an observed dis-
crepancy between domestic and import price, and voluntary export re-
straints and price undertakings which lead to no such discrepancy, or at
least not one observable at the border.
19. The first step in systematizing protection afforded by border NTB's
was to collect - on a tariff-line-by-tariff-line basis - all measures op-
erative in West Germany in 1982, be it through the EC, or through nat-
ional prerogative. They have been classified into quantity restrictions12
(quotas and voluntary export restraints - VER's) and price limitations
(antidumping duties and price undertakings) and are shown in Table 2.
The NTB's found were not weighted by imports for the well understood
reason that particularly restrictive barriers receive little weight under
such a scheme. A glance at the table reveals how concentrated by indus-
try the measures are.
If one leaves out unilateral German measures still in effect which are
aimed against imports from the Centrally-Planned Economies (CPE's), and
bears in mind that the restrictions in the ceramics industry, restricting
imports from Japan, has been lifted, one is left with a remarkably short
list of industries affected:
- coal mining;
- iron and steel; and
- textiles and clothing.
Coal mining, and textiles and clothing have long been exempted from
uniform trade treatment, and steel began to be exempted (again) in the
mid-1970's. Since 1981 the EC has negotiated bilateral voluntary export
restraints (VER's) in steel covering 75-80 percent of EC imports in 1984
[Anjaria et al. , 1985]. It is well known that agriculture and food pro-
cessing are exempt from normal trading rules, and that domestic prices
are kept above world market prices by policy intervention (1). Thus,
agriculture and food processing have to be added to the list of indus-
tries highly protected by nontariff measures.
20. This selection of industries does not at first glance correspond well
with other widely-publicized measures to restrict international trade.
Thus, in 1981 a bilateral VER was negotiated limiting Japanese automobile
exports to the German market to 110 percent of the 1980 level
[Bronckers, 1983]. In addition, since 1983 voluntary restraints on Jap-
anese exports to the EC have been negotiated for seven additional pro-
duct groups (video cassette recorders, color television sets, cathode ray
(1) See, e.g. Rodemer [1980] for a presentation of the mechanism and
consequences of EC agricultural policy.Bibliofhek
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glass and glass products
musical instruments, toys, sporting
goods, jewellery
wood products(c)




Voluntary Export Restraints.- (b) Mostly <





















































Source: BMF [1982]; Commission [various issues]; Zeitschrift fur Zolle
und Verbrauchssteuern [various issues],
tubes, numerically-controlled machine tools, radio receiving and trans-
mission equipment, and quartz watches [Anjaria et al., 1985].
21. But meanwhile, these VER's have been lifted [Financial Times,
1985]. At the same time, the EC has unilaterally raised the tariff rate on
video cassette recorders from 8 percent to 14 percent, effective from
January 1, 1986. In fact, new registrations of Japanese cars in West14
Germany in 1986 amounted to about 25 percent of the market. Aside from
the automobile case for a short period of time, only the VER on video
cassette recorders seems to have been particularly effective from the
outset [Hindley, 1986]. Japanese exports of video cassette recorders to
the EC dropped from 5 million units in 1982 to about 1.8 million units in
1985, less than the 2.3 million allowed.
22. Ignoring the temporary restrictions, some of which were or became
redundant, and ignoring those industries where very few tariff lines
were affected by border measures, generating or collecting estimates of
the implicit nominal protection (implicit tariff due to quota or price meas-
ure plus explicit tariff) was fairly straightforward. In most cases pub-
lished or unpublished estimates could be drawn upon, which were extra-
polated to the observation years using German import price developments
for goods from EC countries and from third countries, when those pro-
tective devices actually used lead to a difference of border prices. This
applies to agriculture, food processing, and coal. The steel industry and
textiles and clothing are generally protected by VER's on third count-
ries. Here, ad hoc procedures were used. For the steel industry, a
trade association estimate of the price difference between domestic and
third country export markets was available; it was extrapolated with
prices published officially. The clothing estimates for the mid-1980's were
taken directly from Hamilton [1986], who calculated nominal clothing pro-
tection for a host of countries based on his estimates of the rent
accruing to Hong Kong producers on account of the Multifiber Arrange-
ment. Roningen and Yeats' [1976] estimate of EC protection in clothing
was used for the early period. Textile protection was estimated with unit
values of German imports from EG countries, which were compared to
unit values of imports from major LDC textile suppliers. It was assumed
that the MFN was as restrictive in textiles as in clothing. The ratio of
unit value was therefore multiplied by the clothing estimates of the MFA
NTB. The results of these collections, calculations and consolidations are
shown in Table 3.
23.The movement of some of the implicit nominal protection rates may oc-
casion surprise. It should be noted that agricultural protection varies
from year to year to preserve a target level of prices at home in the15
Table 3 - Estimates of ad valorem Tariff-Equivalent of Border Trade Bar-
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Source: Calculated from Anderson, Tyers [1986], Dicke [1977]; Hamilton
[1986]; Roningen, Yeats [1976]; Bundesministerium fur Ernah-
rung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten [various issues]; Statistisches
Bundesamt [j],
face of the vagaries of the world market. More surprising might be the
slight decline observable in clothing protection. But this is consistent
with the evolution of world demand [Witteler, 1986a; Hamilton, 1986].
Since the MFA quotas are defined in physical units, their protective
effect will be lower when demand is low. The implied slight liberalization
of MFA III compared to MFA II was intended; it was recognized that de-
mand growth was low [Cline, 1987, p. 154].
Deardorff and Stern [1985] have criticized the use of what they call
"price measures" of the effect of NTB's, namely estimated nominal tariff
equivalents, at the conceptual level. They claim that such equivalents do
not adequately capture the effect of quota induced trading-up in quality,
and emphasize particularly that the effects of quotas on the elasticity of
demand for imports is not captured at all. All this is perfectly true, but
applies equally to tariffs once one leaves a world of perfectly homogene-
ous commodities. Deardorff and Stern perhaps ask too much of the data.
The nominal tariff equivalents used here are probably nearer the true
values for NTB's in these sectors than the alternative value of zero.
24. The results of this tabulation of nominal protection in industries as-
sisted by substantial NTB's are striking and useful in two respects, no
matter how crude the estimates may be. Firstly, the numbers are large16
by the standards of tariffs in industrial countries. This means that even
committing substantial estimation errors leads to more precise description
and analysis than omitting the effects of NTB's altogether. Secondly, in
contrast to (almost) all tariffs in the industrial countries, movement of
protection is in both directions.
3. Nominal Tariffs
25. The pattern of nominal tariffs in industrial countries has been exten-
sively studied and the changes in the level and pattern of those tariffs
implemented during the Tokyo Round are also well understood [see,
e.g., Deardorff, Stern, 1984]. A major goal of the Tokyo Round was to
reduce the variability of tariff rates, that is to lower high rates pro-
portionately more than low rates. In contrast, the goal of the prior
Kennedy Round had been a proportional reduction in tariff rates. The
so-called "Swiss formula" was to be used to achieve the reduction of




where t. and t. are the pre and post-Tokyo Round tariff rates respect-
ively and "a" is an arbitrary fixed number. It was set at 16 (percent)
for the EC. However, this formula was not strictly adhered to. Except-
ions to the rule were permitted if countries compensated their trade
partners with further tariff reductions in other sectors.
26. Because of the exceptions to the rule complete enumeration of aver-
age tariff levels by industry are required for the pre and post-Tokyo
Round periods; simple extrapolation will not do. Such estimates, covering
almost all of German industry and almost completely compatible with the
German input-output classification of industry have been produced by17
Werner, Willms [1984] (1). For present purposes they need to be reag-
gregated slightly and supplemented; the results are shown in Table 4
and confirm that nominal tariff protection has come down through the
Tokyo Round, though there do appear to be some systematic biases in
the reduction. Goods of interest to developing countries LDC's experi-
enced lower duty reductions than other goods [see, e.g., Werner,
Willms, 1984]. In addition, the well-known phenomenon of tariff esca-
lation may have been exacerbated during the Tokyo Round, particularly
in areas where the developing countries are exporters [see, e.g.,
Balassa, Michelopoulos, 1985; Werner, Willms, 1984], This seems to be
the case in some consumer electronics and footwear fields, though not in
cotton textiles, where tariffs are not the important form of protection.
27. Less widely appreciated is another peculiarity of the EC tariff struc-
ture, the - selectively used - tariff exemption. The tariff exemption is a
zero duty for specific users of the import. In the EC tariff code this is
widely applied in the aircraft industry. The tariff code lists by name
large commercial airliners, the producers of which need pay no tariff on
many inputs they use. In the effective rate calculations, the tariff rate
on inputs going into aircraft production will be set at zero, even though
this does not capture the situation completely adequately. It is not the
aircraft production process as a whole which benefits from the zero dut-
ies inputs, but rather only a specific process - namely the final assemb-
ly of large commercial aircraft. Now, large commercial airlines are not
assembled in West Germany so that the rate of effective tariff protection
measured here is probably too high. But the Airbus is assembled in
France, subject to the same tariff code. Interestingly, the Airbus en-
gines have been American imports. These make up about 30 percent of
the value of the airplane. Thus, the effective tariff protection of Airbus
assembly would appear to be quite high. A similar case is the zero duty
rate on microchips used in macroframe computers. Here, too, a merely
.apparent liberality of the tariff code serves to increase the effective
protection of a selected production process further upstream. This will
(1) That study eschews a strict input-output formulation of effective
tariff protection. By giving up some exactness in the definition of
value added, it gains slightly more interindustry detail.18
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be captured in the effective rate calculations by setting the tariff on
deliveries of the electronic data processing industry to itself at the rate
of zero.
4. Subsidies and Efiective Rates of Assistance
28. Two problems - one of principle and one of practice - stand in the
way of integrating subsidization into the effective protection framework.
The issue of identifying the subsidy base is the problem of principle.
Subsidies are granted on various bases: gross output, material inputs,
or primary inputs. These will affect the size of value added in each in-
dustry in different ways. For example, a subsidy on gross output will
increase domestic value added by the share of value added in gross out-
put (at distorted domestic prices). A subsidy on intermediate input use
would, in a general formulation, lead to more intense use of the subsi-
dized input through the substitution effect, and to greater value added
in the intermediate goods producing industries, as well as to some in-
crease in value added in the subsidized industry, through the dissipa-
tion of the subsidy in producing more output. A direct subsidy of any
of the primary factors will shift primary factor proportions towards the
subsidized factor, and increase value added indirectly through substitu-
tion away from intermediate inputs and directly through subsidy dissipa-
tion. If one takes the Leontief fixed coefficient technology seriously,
however, substitution effects are absent, and all subsidies are passed on
in the form gross output increases. Hence, it is legitimate, though res-
trictive, to attribute subsidies to gross output, and work out the effect-
ive rates on that basis (1).
29. As a practical problem, the definition of subsidies in the national ac-
counts is incomplete. While a category "subsidies to business" is disting-
uished, for present purposes net current transfers, and gross transfers
to business on capital account need to be added. In addition, the subs-
(1) This strong assumption is given up in the smooth technology general
equilibrium formulation in Chapter VII.20
idy equivalent of the change in receivables, i.e. the difference between
market and preferential interest rate loans to the business sector is
clearly a subsidy. Moreover, transfer payments to persons, if the recip-
ients are sufficiently restricted in spending their receipts, would have
the same effect as direct subsidization of gross output. Differential dis-
criminatory direct tax rates also have the same effect as direct subsidies
if they are conditional on income being earned in specific industries.
Differences in indirect tax rates could have been accommodated in the
effective protection framework: differential indirect tax rates lead to
price differences for using sectors and hence influence the effective rate
of protection. In the calculations to be undertaken here, they were allo-
cated to subsidies. As a practical matter this is important mainly for the
agriculture/food processing complex because a preferential rate of indi-
rect taxation applies there. The tax break on agriculture was allocated
to food processing. The rest of the economy is a hardly affected because
of the small deliveries of this complex to other industries.
30. No institution in West Germany, public or private, systematically col-
lects the requisite data. The national accounts, while showing transfers
to the business sector on capital account, do not show tax revenue fore-
gone through concessionary tax rates, which vary among industries and
firms. Biannual official government reports [Deutscher Bundestag, a] do
include tax relief, and list about 300 different federal programs, but
these are generally incomplete in scope and suffer from periodic changes
in the definition of subsidies (1), apparently based on intention, rather
than on effect.
31. To overcome these problems, the budgets of all subsidy-granting in-
stitutions, including the Federal Government, the eleven state (Lander)
governments, a sample of municipalities, the para-fiscal institutions, and
the state-owned banks - encompassing the government sector in the nat-
ional accounts - were compiled. (Government-owned operating enterrises
belong to the business sector.) From the budget documents and ancillary
sources of information, particularly from government ministries, the gov-
ernment expenditure side of the national accounts was reconstructed in
(1) For a critique, see OECD [1983, pp. 120 ff.].21
such a way that every item classed as a subsidy could be allocated to an
industry. The items included are (official) subsidies to businesses, net
current transfers to businesses, selected transfers to persons, gross
transfers to businesses on capital account (1), and the subsidy equiv-
alent of the change in receivables. Tax exemptions were taken from the
official subsidy reports, supplemented by some own estimates, and added
to the above items to obtain total subsidies (2).
32. The inventory showed that German subsidization policy encompasses
roughly 10 000 different budgetary items, which added up to DM120 bil-
lion in 1984, far more than is documented by the official subsidy reports
of the Federal Government. Table 5 shows subsidy totals for various
measuring concepts. The totals shown here include subsidies to housing.
The bulk of these subsidies consist of transfer payments to households,
which are tied to spending on rent. Hence, they increase the size of the
housing sector unambiguously. Nevertheless, the effect of the protective
system on the housing sector will not be further analyzed. The reason is
not so much because a greater sized housing sector is a result of an ob-
vious social policy - even social policies can and do induce inefficiency if
the policy is not carried out in optimal form. Rather, in spite of housing
subsidies alone inducing an unambiguous expansion in the housing sec-
tor, modelling their gross effect goes beyond the scope of this study:
Germany had nation-wide rent control from 1973 to 1985. The beginning
of that period saw inflation rates that most likely swamped any change in
equilibrium relative prices. Hence, this sector is ignored, except in one
or two descriptive tables in the chapter on the coherence of subsidiza-
tion policy. The producer subsidy equivalent (Corden's "s") for the eco-
nomy as a whole, measured at distorted domestic prices, rises somewhat
according to two of the measurement concepts used - the national
accounts, and the one adopted in this study. Official reports tend to
understate the rise in subsidies, because of omissions and because of the
neglect of subsidy equivalents of state guaranteed loans. The ratio of
subsidies to value added is reported here as a description device to fix
(1) Transfers from businesses to government on capital account are
small, and are nondiscriminatory, being mostly payments for prop-
erty development in lieu of taxes.
(2) For a more detailed description of the procedure adopted, see
Juttemeier [1984].22
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(a) Business sector, housing and private nonprofit institutions. -
(b) Subsidies plus capital transfers. - (c) Subsidies/gross output at
domestic prices. - (d) At domestic prices. - (e) Financial assistance
plus tax exemptions.
Source: Calculated from Deutscher Bundestag [a]; Statistisches Bundes-
amt [h]; see also the government budgets in bibliography and
para. 31
orders of magnitude. It has no normative significance beyond the state-
ment that if there were no border measures restricting trade, the
figures given would correspond to effective protection according to both
the Balassa and Corden methods. The interindustry distribution of sub-
sidies is shown in Table 6 for 1974 and 1984. The table sheds some light
on subsidization policy. With the exception of a handful of industries,
manufacturing activities are hardly subsidized at all, and the average
rate of subsidization has scarcely increased. Subsidization policy is
rather directed to agriculture, mining, transportation and selected non-
traded goods.23
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Source: Calculated from Statistisches Bundesamt [h]; see Table 5.
33. Now all the ingredients for calculating effective rates of assistance
have been assembled. First, however the rates of effective tariff protec-
tion alone are calculated, and displayed in Table 7. They show no sur-
prises. In Table 8, then, the vectors of effective implicit and explicit
tariff protection, effective subsidization, and their sum, the effective
rate of assistance are shown (1). The pattern of protection which
(1) Partial results covering most of the industrial sector have been pre-
viously published in Weiss [1988] and Donges, Schmidt et al.
[1988]. The vectors of effective explicit and implicit tariff protection
(EIT 1978 and 1985) underlying all these calculations are identical.
They are published here for the first time because it had been
feared that the eventual inclusion of the additional NTB's in agricul-
ture, food, and beverages would radically change the results. Their
inclusion changed only the two sectors themselves much. Effective25
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Source: Calculated from Table 4 and from Statistisches Bundesamt [d]
and [i].26
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Effective Implicit Tariff Protection; ES = Effective Subsidization;
Assistance. - (a) inputs at world prices approximately equal value
nominal protection rates just above actual rates yield negative
put tariffs set at zero. - (c) All input tariffs
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1 intermediate inputs approximately equal gross
Source: Calculated from Tables 4, 5 and 6 and from Statischisches Bun-
desamt [d; i].27
emerges reveals some notable features, both over time, and in compari-
son to tariff protection alone. (Agriculture, food and beverages, and to-
bacco were left out of the tariff calculations to begin with because it was
expected that meaningless results would emerge if the NTB's were not
included.) Only a handful of industries really benefit from the protection
and promotion system. These are:
- agriculture, forestry, fisheries
- coal mining
- iron and steel
- shipbuilding
- aircraft, aerospace
- textiles and clothing
- food and beverages
- tobacco
- railways, and ^
- health and velin-ary service.
The usual mercantilist protective structure is still distinctly noticeable in
the various raw material processing chains, but the levels of protection
that these industries (e.g. wood, pulp, wood products) receive is
dwarfed by those industries protected by NTB's. It is also quite remark-
able how two parts of the steel complex are treated in such different
ways: the NTB's in steel caused effective protection in cold rolling mills
subsidization (ES), calculated as the volume of subsidies (Table 6)
divided by EIT net value added was cleaned up for 1974, and up-
dated from 1982 to 1984. The absolute subsidies for 1974 used here
differ slightly from those used heretofore. Moreover, net value
added figures inadvertently referred to 1972 in the previous calcula-
tions. The results of the changes are minor except in petroleum re-
fining and aircraft, where value added fluctuated widely in the early
1970's. Hence, the effective rates of assistence shown here for 1974-
1978 are almost identical to those given previously. In the coal
mining sector clerical errors were corrected. Implicit nominal protec-
tion in steel, to which many sectors are highly sensitive, was left at
zero in 1978, even though it had risen to 17 percent by that year,
to reflect the "pre-Tokyo Round" levels of protection that prevailed
in the early to mid-1970's better.28
to become negative, and except for the compensation through subsidies,
negative in structural engineering. The one upstream industry that re-
ceived enough subsidies to overcompensate for the steel NTB was ship-
building. As with textiles and clothing, all this essentially amounts to
support for declining industries. There is hardly a sign of a policy for
promoting successful or potentially successful industries by means of
subsidies. Electronic data processing could perhaps have been so charac-
terized in the mid-1970's, but certainly no longer. The only other bene-
ficiary in the industrial sector is aircraft and aerospace, and that is
essentially subsidization of one product - the Airbus. Possible causes
and consequences of this pattern of protection will be analyzed in the
coming chapters.29
III. The Coherence of Subsidization Policy
34. Subsidization policy is gradually becoming the more significant part
of overall German trade policy, as was shown in the last chapter. Tariffs
are changed infrequently and have been declining generally. Nontariff
border measures tend to be temporary, and if not, the industries pro-
tected or promoted by them tend to be the ones subsidized as well. In
addition, subsidies can be changed at the national level fairly easily from
year to year. For this reason, subsidization by itself is subjected to
some scrutiny in this chapter. The aim is to find characteristics of sub-
sidization policy, or a typology of subsidies, that remain relatively
stable. Firstly, the overall pattern of subsidization policy is briefly
described, along with the sources of financing. Then, the interindustry
evolution of subsidization policy is analyzed, comparing announced policy
intentions with the actual distribution of funds. Finally, a typology of
subsidization is forwarded which draws upon some durable features of
the German subsidization system. Throughout, an answer is sought to
the question whether a coherence in subsidization policy can be found.
It turns out that such coherence is hard to find.
1. The Overall Pattern of Subsidization Policy
35. Subsidies increased noticably through the 1970's (Table 5). After the
first oil-price crisis several programs were introduced which were meant
to foster the restructuring process of the German economy. These pro-
grams expired at the beginning of the 1980's and subsidization policy
stabilized at a higher level. After 1981 subsidies increased again. In
June 1982 the Federal Government introduced a large, temporary, cycli-
cally motivated investment-bonus program which cost DM4.1 billion in
1984 and DM2.2 billion in 1985. After the change of government in
October 1982, various forms of tax relief (e.g. for agriculture and
housing) were introduced, which resulted in decreased tax revenues of
about DM7 billion in 1984. Moreover, and this was a break in trend, the
government started to subsidize the iron and steel industry to a much30

























































Source: See Table 5.
greater extent than before. As far as the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) is concerned, its expenditures are meanwhile increasing such that
the whole system of agricultural support might become financially unvi-
able. Altogether, from 1981 to 1984 subsidies rose by an annual rate of
5.2 percent whereas total government spending increased by 2.7 per-
cent [Jiittemeier, 1984].
36. Governments provide a large range of subsidies. For important sub-
groups, the sums are shown in Table 9. There are basically two forms a
subsidy can take - tax exemption and financial assistance - with numer-
ous variations within each form. Tax relief constitutes lost government
revenue; this accounts for roughly one third of the total volume of sub-
sidies, the biggest part consisting of deductions of certain items from
the tax base (e.g. specific write-off regulations). Financial assistance31
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and Coal Equalization Fund. -
Source: See Table 5.
stands for cash-transfers from public budgets. By far the most import-
ant single item consists of current transfers.
37. One of the more striking features about German subsidization policy
is its pronounced decentralization. Table 10 shows the institutional
setting for the main sources of both tax exemptions and financial assist-
ance. But the picture is more complex because at each government level
nearly every ministry is involved in the process. The central govern-
ment, for example, consists of 17 ministries, each granting some kind of
assistance. Moreover, there are many state-owned credit institutions,
whose task is to assist governmental subsidy policy by granting prefer-
ential loans [Juttemeier, Schatz, 1983].32
38. When it comes to the assignment of responsibility and policy formu-
lation, however, the role of the Federal Government is by far the most
important. Beyond its own budget, central government has a significant
influence on the level and structure of other authorities' subsidies as
well:
- Programs of the parafiscal funds are executed outside the federal ad-
ministration, but the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs determines
their volume and structure (1).
- The annual budgets of the Labor Office, which include for present
purposes make-work programs with and without sectoral targets, are
approved by the Federal Government and are supervised by the
Minister of Labor.
- The volume and structure of the CAP of the EC are fixed by the
Minister of Agricultural Affairs and his colleagues from other member
countries. Note that CAP expenditures constitute less than half of
subsidies to agriculture (cf. Table 6).
- With regard to tax policy, the constitution of the Federal Republic
provides that most taxes are levied cooperatively between the federal
and state levels. Nevertheless, experience shows that there are rarely
any cases of tax exemptions which were not initiated at the federal
level. The system of taxation and exemption is largely a federal
matter.
- Fiscal federalism is not consistently adhered to on the expenditure side
of budgets either. Apart from cooperative duties enumerated in the
constitution (Gemeinschaf tsauf gaben), the Federal Government often
(1) The ERP (European Recovery Program)Fund is a special property of
the Federal Government. Its assets originally stem from Marshall aid
granted to Western European countries after World War II. While the
German Federal Government repaid the aid in US dollars by 1961,
private recipients of US deliveries had to make DM payments to the
Federal Government. Thus, the ERP Fund represents the DM coun-
tervalues of US aid, and is today a revolving fund. In 1952 the
assets of the ERP Fund accounted for roughly DM5 billion and at
present for about DM10 billion. The fund is at the disposal of the
Federal Government and it is used mostly for structural adjustment
policies. The Coal Equalization Fund which in public is better known
as "coal penny" is financed through an extra levy on the consump-
tion of electricity. The revenues are used to subsidize the input of
domestic coal in electric power plants.33
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gets state governments to participate in special federal subsidy pro-
grams (subject to approval of the Bundesrat (Upper House)), such as
in the program for coal, steel, shipyards, and countercyclical and
general structural measures.
On the whole, cautious calculations indicate that the Federal Government
is directly responsible for roughly four fifths of all subsidies
[Juttemeier, 1984, pp. 36 ff.].
39. The volume of subsidies may be regarded as an index manifesting
the perceived correction requirements of the government. Table 11 shows
the main fields of operation grouped according to the UN classification
system of government functions.
- The biggest part is spent for sector-specific programs, like agri-
culture, coal mining, the iron and steel industry, shipyards, all means
of transportation, and tax relief for public banks.34
- The social security function comprises a variety of measures such as
general employment schemes of the Labor Office and the promotion of
new small businesses but also selective aid programs for farmers,
miners, construction workers, tenants, and to private nonprofit in-
stitutions. (The figures in the table exclude non discriminatory
schemes.)
- The amounts of regional and research related programs are roughly
equal. Both policy functions often provide subsidies in sectorally
rather unspecific ways.
Over the years, the shares of the different functions do not vary much.
Due to new programs, however, sector-specific programs (agriculture,
steel) have increased significantly since 1981.
2. The Interindustry Pattern of Subsidization
40. Breaking down subsidies by broad sectors (Table 12) reveals that
the service sector receives most subsidies (roughly one third) while sub-
sidies for the goods producing sector are increasing most. But nominal,
and (approximately) effective subsidization in the goods producing sector
is dwarfed by agriculture and housing. And, while the share of money
going to agriculture declined, the rate of subsidization increased sub-
stantially. In 1984 subsidies for the service sector amount to DM4 410
per employee and DM14 650 for agriculture, but only DM2 010 for the
goods producing industries (Table 12).
41. For all that, the extent of promotion or discrimination within the
goods-producing sector is not uniform, and more importantly, has
changed over time (see Table 8). Coal mining, the iron and steel in-
dustry, and shipbuilding stand out as having received a much larger
share of subsidies in 1984 than in 1974. The share going to modern in-
dustries, particularly aerospace and electronic data processing, but also
fissionable materials, subsumed under chemicals in the table, fell.
Four fifths of the total volume of subsidies originate in budget items35

























































































- (b) At domestic
Source: See Table 5.
which were conceived for a single enterprise or branch of industry; only
nine percent originate in broad based schemes out of which 25 or more
industries obtain benefits [Jiittemeier et al. , 1977].
42. Noteworthy is especially the development of subsidization of the iron
and steel industry. Until the end of the 1970's, the steel industry only
occasionally received some assistance out of broad-based schemes. In
1978, however, the Federal Government and the government of the Saar
gradually started to subsidize the ARBED-Saarstahl Company to a large
extent by means of a so-called restructuring program for steel mills of
the Saar area. Meanwhile, subsidy programs covering all steel companies
came into existence. From 1974 to 1984 the steel industry's subsidies in-
creased almost twentyfold, thus exceeding the average growth of sub-
sidies in the economy as a whole (Table 5 and 6).36
There are also a few branches which can be regarded as the sprinters.
In the aircraft and aerospace industry the degree of subsidization fell
significantly and for data processing, assistance even decreased absol-
utely. Remarkable is the decline for data processing since it is one of
the rare cases where the Federal Government suspended its sector-
specific program due to the failure of the policy of "picking a winner".
The reasons for previously granting assistance were typical for infant
industries. Even though they received large sums of assistance, the
subsidized computers did not succeed in the market place, and the
Federal Government finally altered its policy towards a more broadly-
based innovation policy.
43. Does the German Government pursue an industrial policy, consciously
or unconsciously, then? An examination of policy pronouncements sug-
gests not. At least, the normative objectives of policy positively ob-
served are often difficult to discern. The law underlying the Federal
Government's biannual report on- subsidies prescribes that for every pro-
gram, policy objectives have to be listed. Actually, the objectives mostly
consist of descriptions of instruments, assessment bases, or the legal
regulations under which subsidies will be granted. In numerous cases
they simply say "cost reductions for agriculture", "improvement of
earnings and liquidity in coal mining", or even more simply state "pro-
motion of air transport", "of savings behavior", "of showmen's busi-
ness", or "social considerations", or "good for public welfare". By and
large, it seems that the grantors of subsidies do not really know them-
selves what overall social or economic goals they are striving for, at
least not on a coherent basis. In the recent past, some of the largest
programs (e.g. agriculture, coal mining, housing) are described as
sacrosanct matters of constitutional norms [Deutscher Bundestag, c,
p. 11], a description which sounds quite defensive.
44. Remaining at the level of pronouncements, something more coherent
can perhaps be said about policies towards individual industries (1). In
sectoral policy, emphasis is placed on two broad principles. Firstly, as-
(1) Cf. Deutscher Bundestag [b], which dates from 1968 but is still re-
ferred to today as a declaration of principles of sectoral policies.37
sistance is to be given to increase productivity and promote economic
growth. Secondly, problem industries are to receive assistance in re-
ducing capacity and avoiding the social problems associated with employ-
ment reduction in declining industries. Promotion of the aircraft indus-
try, data processing and nuclear energy fit in with the first goal, and
subsidies for shipbuilding, coal, and steel seem to follow from the second
goal. In addition, some element of maintaining a national strategic energy
reserve can be discussed in policy towards the coal industry. Agricul-
tural policies are said to be' based on the Treaty of Rome, and a corre-
sponding national law of 1955. However, - neither the Rome Treaty nor
domestic law requires subsidies, let alone the specific subsidy policy
actually carried out.
45. Regional considerations form another rationale for subsidization.
Since West Germany is a federation made up of eleven states and a high
degree of consensus among the states and the Federal Government is
constitutionally required, regional interests play a substantial role in
policymaking. Apart from some sectorally broad-based programs, the
territorial extension of which is limited to structurally weak regions and
West Berlin, a lot of sector-specific schemes might be interpreted as a
special kind of regional policy as well. Coal mining and the steel indus-
try play a dominant role in the Ruhr and Saar areas, shipyards are con-
centrated in four coastal states, and aircraft in Bavaria, Bremen, and
Hamburg. Agriculture is still important for some less developed areas in
some federal states, and quite often the Federal Railways are required to
maintain uneconomic routes there. There is always an incentive among
the states to "haul ashore" benefits for industries located on their
territory: receiving gifts, even if they are not in optimal form, improves
welfare.
46. Summarizing the comparison between policy pronouncement and policy
practice, one can fairly say that there is no coherent concept or system-
atic guideline behind subsidy policy. Normally, several distributional and
allocational goals are pursued simultaneously. In spite of a high focus of
subsidization programs on individual branches and even enterprises, a
consistent set of sectoral selection criteria seems to be absent. German
subsidization policy, probably like that of most other countries, appears38
as the sum of a wide range of ad hoc measures. Moreover, such criteria
as can be found tend to change over time.
3. Subsidies and Policy Institutions
47. Somewhat more light can be shed on the actual motives for subsidiz-
ation if one classifies subsidies according to the (roughly stable) insti-
tutions which grant the transfers. One can usefully distinguish among:
- research and development (R&D) policy;
- regional policy; and
- sectoral and ad hoc policy.
This classification is useful because the bulk of R&D subsidization
(80 percent in manufacturing) is carried out by one ministry - the Fed-
eral Ministry of Research and Technology, albeit within the framework of
a large number of direct and indirect promotion programs (of which a
small number are large). The bulk of regional subsidization is carried
out by a special joint federal state body which sets up regional and in-
dustrial criteria for granting aid to businesses. There is no intention of
discriminating against particular sectors here. In addition, a "Zonal
Border" Promotion Program targets aid to regions bordering the GDR. In
fact, two thirds of the surface of West Germany containing one third of
its population qualify. Finally, the separate budgetary and tax aids to
West Berlin should be subsumed under this heading. The sectoral policy
measures are the ones based on separate laws enacted in the Bundestag
and the state parliaments on an ad hoc basis, whereas there is more
central direction in R&D policy and more continuity in regional aid,
48. The volume of these three types of subsidies is shown in Table 13
for the early 1980's.
- Programs to promote research activities constitute one important source
(30 percent) of subsidies in manufacturing. The government prefers
financial assistance to individual projects framed for specific industries39
and products (direct promotion), while tax relief for general activities
(indirect promotion) is of minor importance. The sectoral pattern cer-
tainly specifies nearly all branches as recipients of research aids, but
actually only very few of them receive appreciable amounts (mechanical
as well as electrical engineering, aircraft, fissionable materials power).
Moreover, there is further intrasectoral concentration: a small group of
the largest German manufacturing companies absorbs most funds. For
1974 figures are available showing that 13 big companies obtained 70
percent of all such research aids to manufacturing industries which
were provided by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (80
percent) [Jiittemeier et al., 1977, p. 174].
The most important source of subsidies to manufacturing industries are
general programs which are meant to promote regions. Such programs
incorporate West Berlin, and an area along the border to the GDR and
Czechoslovakia, as well as other regions which have a per capita in-
come very much below the average of the Federal Republic. Regional
promotion is rather broad-based, that is to say, there are few regu-
lations concerning the exclusion of certain industries from regional-
related assistance. However, the sectoral distribution of such subsidies
suggests that there is a slight bias towards capital-intensive branches.
At the beginning of the 1980's, sectoral policy schemes were still of
minor significance (19.9 percent). Only shipbuilding, aircraft, iron
and steel, and fissionable materials power benefitted to any extent. Al-
locating public funds to aircraft and nuclear energy is part of a policy
to pick the winners, while assistance for shipyards and the steel in-
dustry is part of the maintenance of declining industries and unprofit-
able firms in order to avoid immediate sacrifices for the labor force.
Since shipyards and steel companies are still under heavy competitive
pressure from abroad, and since their regional concentration is very
high, the Federal Government and the respective state governments
have intensified their programs substantially since then.40
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Source: See Table 5.41
4. Subsidies and Factors of Production
49. Another typology whose elements could exhibit some stability are
subsidies to factors of production; at least some of the announced aims
of policy could be achieved by subsidizing factors of production. Table
14 shows the interindustry breakdown of subsidies by recipient factors;
- German subsidization policy is marked by the preference given to
physical capital. Almost 40 percent of all subsidies to the business
sector promote fixed capital formation in some way. Methods include
the promotion of entrepreneurial income formation (tax base reductions
for farmers and self-employed professions, tax exemptions on
dividends, interest payments, and rents); the compensation of deficits
(railways); and equity capital formation (in coal mining, railways,
communication, and small and medium-sized enterprises).
- Labor income related subsidies are generally of minor importance. Some
sector-specific programs, for instance, favor agriculture (takeover of
social security contributions by the Federal Government), coal mining
(wage-bonus for pit miners), and construction ("bad weather pay").
Sectorally broad-based programs exist for R&D-related personnel and
for employees working in West Berlin.
- An increasing share of subsidies is assigned to gross output promoting
sales or maintaining high domestic prices or compensating for them.
Subsidy programs intended to reduce sales prices are available for ex-
ports from West Berlin to the other parts of the Federal Republic
(reduced rates of value added tax), for specific goods and services
(e.g. reduced rates of value added tax for books and medical service,
preferential treatment of the income tax for some kinds of insurance
contracts) or for new ships and planes. Maintaining high prices is the
main duty of the CAP; it is also given for coal mining through defici-
ency payments to electric power plants (Coal Equalization Fund) and to
the iron and steel industry (consumption of domestic coke). Other
product related payments concern subsidies to German ship-owners, if
their ships are built in German yards.
- Intermediate inputs are favored through a wide range of measures.
This is especially true for most R&D programs of the Federal Ministry
for Research and Technology but also for most promotion of private42
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Source: See Table 5.43
nonprofit institutions. Selected inputs, on the other hand, are sub-
sidized through tax exemptions from excise taxes (e.g. gasoline).
50. In most cases rather small amounts of money are involved. Subsidies
are of minor significance for most branches; only a few industries are
subsidized to a great extent. This becomes obvious again when compar-
ing subsidies in relation to the aggregates subsidized. Thus, there is no
evidence for any prevailing overall strategy of channeling public assist-
ance to branches by means of subsidizing different aggregates. Rather,
it seems that some highly subsidized industries performing comparatively
poorly, like agriculture and coal mining, are assisted more than average
through all channels.
51. The promotion of investment is the main goal, particularly for most
manufacturing industries, which together obtain 43 percent of their sub-
sidies for investment activities (Table 14). Roughly 10 percent of total
investment of the private economy is financed through assistance out of
public budgets. Since the German tax system is often said to be less at-
tractive for capital formation than those of other countries [cf., e.g.,
King, Fullerton, 1980], the orientation of German subsidization policy
towards investment promotion might be regarded as a corrective. How-
ever, the intersectoral pattern of selective investment assistance does
not give much evidence for subsidization policy stepping in as a pro-
mising substitute for general tax measures: there is a negative rank-
order correlation to be observed between the ratios of investment pro-
motion of the different industries and their long-term economic perform-
ance (growth rates of real gross value added) which is strongest for the
subgroup of highly subsidized industries (r = -0,61). Thus, investment
promotion proves to be mainly a device for maintaining less successful
industries.44
5. Conclusion
52. A number of points characterizes German subsidization policy:
- The main institutional feature of the system is marked by its large
scattering and decentralization. Subsidies are distributed from roughly
10 000 different budgetary items in the federal and other budgets.
- The large number of programs may give the impression that many dif-
ferent objectives were pursued by the authorities. However, neither
the logic of economic goals and the ranking of their priorities is clear,
nor is there coordination among different grantors of subsidies. A co-
herent industrial policy all of a piece does not exist. At the level of
policy pronouncements a commitment to a growth-oriented subsidization
strategy is most consistently made.
- The package of subsidy programs has something in store for everyone.
Actually, each industry receives some kind of assistance, but only
very few branches receive remarkable amounts. Multiple subsidization
from different suppliers and programs for the same purpose and activ-
ity is quite often observed.
- From the interindustrial pattern of the distribution of subsidies there
is no evidence for an exclusive subsidization strategy of picking the
winners. More indications point to an overall strategy of maintaining
less successful industries, especially, since the biggest part of all
subsidies is spent for some declining industries. Subsidies are sup-
ported to do a bit of everything, which contributes to the policy's in-
coherency.
The complex and confusing system favors tendencies to look at it from a
partial point of view, i.e. the promotion of one product, one enterprise,
one region, or one production-line, and since many programs contain
rather small sums of money the issue of financing subsidies is mostly not
taken into account or is played down as a negligible fact at the margin.45
IV. The Political Economy of West Germany's Trade Policy
53. How can one explain why the mixture of industries receiving increas-
ing or continuing high support from economic policy was benefitted? As
the discussion of subsidization showed, there is apparently no coherent
centrally-directed industrial policy operating in West Germany. Changes
in tariff policy, in turn, were not hammered out in national isolation,
but through international negotiations, intermediated of course through
the EC. Nontariff border measures are mostly, but not strictly, unilat-
eral. Nevertheless, there is something systematic happening in the
policymaking process. Trade policy outcomes can be explained by the in-
teraction of a small, distinctive, and stable set of interest groups with a
limited number of stable and distinctive German, European or inter-
national institutions. The "political economy of protection" framework
perhaps goes further in explaining changes in present-day German trade
policy than for other countries with a more fragmented set of interest
groups, such as the United States, or a still more encompassing set of
interest groups, such as Sweden, because of this distinctiveness.
54. The politico-economic approach to trade policy specifies an economic
logic considering the costs and benefits to private agents in lobbying
for, or demanding protection, and to governments in granting, or sup-
plying protection. While the framework is plausible enough, it is often
difficult to predict results for the pattern of trade policy because the
constraints facing agents, or the costs and benefits they incur, are hard
to specify. Clearly, the constraints facing agents, though not their ob-
jectives, are to large part determined by the political system. Political
institutions are similar enough in western countries to warrant appli-
cation of a general politico-economic approach, but relevant details do
differ across countries. The salient institutions which have been ident-
ified in determining the demand for and supply of protection are elec-
tions and political parties [Downs, 1957; Brock, Magee, 1978]; the ex-
tent and size of interest groups [Olson, 1965; 1982]; the degree of ac-
ceptance of an ideology [North, 1983]; the power and structure of bu-
reaucracy [Tullock, 1965; Niskanen, 1971; Messerlin 1981]; and the state
of international relations [Borchardt, 1984].46
While it is easy to list the factors affecting the level and structure of
protection, it is sometimes hard to specify precisely how they affect
demand and supply, as Caves [1972] discussed. For example, in a single
member district election system to the representative body, an industry
concentrated in a single district will have an incentive to lobby for in-
creased protection in the face of adversity. Whether the industry is suc-
cessful depends upon the constraints on log-rolling imposed by political
parties or the representative body. Industry representatives know this.
Will demand be higher or lower in such cases? More to the point for the
German case, the supply side of the political economy approach is often
modeled along the lines of a median voter model with two parties compet-
ing for power [Brock, Magee, 1978]. But the potentially severe influence
of coalition politics has been left out of the picture. Well organized
groups are likely to have lower transactions costs in framing a common
platform for lobbying. Under normal circumstances such groups are
likely to be small, following the logic of Olson [1965], This severely
circumscribes the number of votes which can be mobilized in an election.
Ideology is also not easy to handle. According to North [1983], ideology
is a device for lowering transactions cost. Thus, it has a positive in-
fluence on both demand and supply of protection. If the role of ideology
is to be tested, and not merely assumed, one would have to examine the
cost of eliciting protection directly; quantity information alone would not
suffice. Similar problems apply to analyzing the influence of bureau-
cracy. Strict application of the Downs-Niskanen vision of the bureau-
cracy would suggest greater protection in sectors overseen by a bureau-
cracy because this leads to more for the bureaucracy to do. But bureau-
cracies are confronted with incentives the rulers make, and if the rulers
are free-trade oriented, presumably such bureaucrats will achieve
pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards who are successful in implementing
the rulers' vision (1).
Finally, it should not be forgotten that foreign economic policy is foreign
policy, as well as economic policy. How governments react to interest
groups demanding protection, or free trade for that matter, depends on
(1) See the example of the Prussian bureaucracy, discussed in the next
chapter.47
the political leadership foreign policy interests. This has been cogently
argued by Borchardt [1984]. In an economic analysis of the causes of
protection, this could be treated as affecting the costs of eliciting pro-
tection.
55. Some of these indeterminacies can be resolved with the help of a
perception by Waelbroeck [1986]. In Europe, at least, organizations are
in place and functioning. There is no free rider problem inhibiting the
effectiveness of lobbying groups. This applies even more to the situation
in West Germany, as will be shown below. These organizations are in
place, and often large, but not always so large as to make them so "en-
compassing" in the sense of Olson [1982] that they take account of the
social costs of their dysfunctional behavior and hence promote free
trade.
The same results from an application of Messerlin's [1981] views on
bureaucracy to the case of West Germany. Messerlin essentially applies
Olson's conception of the encompassingness of organizations to the
bureaucracy. If a bureaucrat has widely divergent interests to ad-
minister, he will be more free-trade inclined, essentially because he has
to take account of the deleterious consequences of granting one sectional
interest's demand for protection on other sectional interests.
56. Something not considered in the political economy literature so far,
but quite relevant to the German case, is the establishment of policy
automata. This means that support programs have been taken out of the
political sphere proper and are adjusted according to previously deter-
mined criteria, according to some prespecified formula. In such cases,
agents are even further removed from the awareness of any budget con-
straint, and protection can spiral under the given formula. Two such in-
stitutions exist in West Germany, one for a particular industry and one
for a large slice of support policy. Here, too, Olson's views on encom-
passingness are vindicated. The narrower interest has received increased
protection, and the broader-based support policy has been less distor-
tionary, but in turn, has lost out in the competition for resources.48
57. While consideration of European, or particularly German institutions
goes a long way to make this positive theory of the political economy of
protection operational, it throws cold water on an attempt to quantify an
important normative aspect of the process. Early on, it was recognized
that lobbying activity directed at eliciting protection would increase
estimates of the cost of protection by orders of magnitude [Krueger,
1974; Tullock, 1967; Bhagwati, 1982; Robert E. Baldwin, 1982]. The
reason is simple: private agents would invest in lobbying activities until
the rate of return from that activity equalled the competitive rate of
return on productive economic activity. Measurement of the deadweight
losses resulting from lobbying would have to be added to the static
losses from protection. Such quantification, Waelbroeck [1986] pointed
out, would be practically impossible for Europe because organizations
were founded long ago, in the nineteenth century, and the investments
they made were not in measurable physical capital, but often in the form
of personal and human sacrifice, as in the founding of trade unions.
Thus, the economic rationale for, and the social costs of lobbying are
made difficult to test by these institutions, but they do aid in oper-
ationalizing the positive theory of political economy for the case of West
Germany (1).
1. Interest Groups and Institutions in Manufacturing
58. At first sight, the existence of the observed special beneficiaries of
trade protection is difficult to square with widely-held beliefs about
trade policy making institutions and the pattern of interest groups in
West Germany. The country is strewn with a somewhat encompassing set
of organized interest groups, which find equally encompassing counter-
parts in government. Under such conditions, according to Olson [1982],
one would expect relatively efficient policy outcomes, that is to say free
trade. The reason is that large groups, were they to seek benefits at
(1) Magee [1987] reports simulation experiments of the social cost of
lobbying. It seems that lobbying can turn the economy into, as he
puts it, "a black hole".49
the expense of outsiders through imposition of distortions, would them-
selves bear a substantial share of the social cost of such measures.
Hence, they will refrain from lobbying for such measures.
59. Indeed, the bulk of manufacturing does come under a liberal trade
regime. All of West German industry is organized in one large organiz-
ation, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI - Federation of
German Industry). This association is organized along branch lines,
i.e., each industry has its own component organization. Important exam-
ples are the "Verein deutscher Maschinenbau Anstalten" (VDMA) for the
machinery industry, the "Zentralverband der Elektrotechnischen Indu-
strie" for the electrical equipment industry, and Gesamtverband der
Textilindustrie for clothing and textiles. The peak association represents
industry as a whole vis-a-vis the government bureaucracy on all issues
of interest to it, decidedly including foreign trade policy. Issues of work
and pay, however, are left to another all-encompassing organization, the
"Bundesverband deutscher Arbeitgeberverbande" (BDA - Federation of
Germany Employers). Each individual industry of course promotes the
policies it favors, but there is a fairly large degree of coordination at
the top of the BDI through its Au fienwirtschaf tsausschu R (Foreign Trade
Committee) on which all member industry organizations are represented.
The position of the BDI on trade policy is as one might expect - free
trade is a good thing. Because some members are under pressure from
lower cost sources of supply, the BDI tolerates special-trade policy
measures in their favor, but as exceptions to a general rule.
60. Another encompassing organization, which is important beyond the
mere weight of numbers, is the "Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag"
(DIHT - German Chamber of Industry and Commerce), the modern relic
of the guild system. Its membership comprises one third to one half of
all craftsmen and tradesmen. The significance of the DIHT arises from
its para-state activities, e.g. in setting standards and examinations in
vocational education; it is thus as much a state institution as a lobby.
Since its members do not compete directly with imports (bakers, plum-
bers, electricians) it is decidedly pro free trade, and articulates this
position in public.50
61. The government counterparts of these organizations in respect to
trade policy are all to be found in the Ministry of Economics. This
Ministry contains industry desks, and of course a certain amicability be-
tween these and the corresponding particular industry organizations can-
not be denied. But the industry desks are all in one department, where-
as other departments (AuBenwirtschaftspolitik - Foreign Economic Policy)
and particularly the "Grundsatzabteilung" (Basic Principles Department)
take the broad view. And, of course, there is the broad view which
emerges at the top of the Ministry. All of this is entirely consistent with
the hypothesis of Messerlin [1981], that the wider the area of responsi-
bility of a bureau the more it will tend towards free trade. In West Ger-
many, at least, even the internal departmental structure reflects the
desire to generate "the broad view".
62. It is the Economics Ministry which represents West German economic
policy interests to the European Commission in Brussels, so that this
broad view - for the bulk of manufacturing industry - gets tabled there.
Indeed, the BDI also does its broad-view lobbying directly to the Com-
mission in Brussels. On matters of trade policy for the bulk of manufac-
turing, no other German ministry has any substantive say, not even the
Ministry of Finance, though all interested ministries are formally involved
in interministerial committees on every measure at every level, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is titular head of any international negoti-
ations or treaties.
63. The situation is entirely symmetrical on the labor side. German labor
unions are highly encompassing organizations organized along branch
lines with a powerful enough center, the "Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund"
(DGB - Federation of German Labor Unions), though perhaps its power
is waning, and the branch unions are gaining at the expense of the top
(1). The largest individual union is the metal workers union (IG Metall),
with 1 500 000 members in 1985, purportedly the world's largest. This
union, as well as the central organization, knows that jobs depend on
exports in the highly open German economy. As late as 1982, an anti-
protectionist article appeared in the DGB's scientific journal [Kiihne,
(1) See G6bel [1988] for an overview of the postwar German union move-
ment and evidence for this decay of central authority.51
1982]. Thus, one cannot say that the union movement is protectionist.
Individual unions, such as the clothing workers, might be, but the
movement as a whole certainly is not. Protectionist tendencies at the
industry level will be tolerated as "exceptions" much as the BDI tolerates
them. On the other hand, a protectionist industry association can expect
effective support from the corresponding union.
64. German unions enjoy influence far beyond a mere reflection of their
membership size. They negotiate pay scales and working conditions for
all employees in an industry, members and nonmembers alike [Soltwedel,
Trapp, 1987]. They effectively negotiate minimum wages, for union rates
are regularly validated by the state governments and become statutory.
There is no closed shop, and union organizations are in place, so non-
members enjoy an effective free ride if they find employment at the legal
wage. Not least because of the quasi-automatic validation of union pay
scales by state governments, unions, like other really encompassing or-
ganizations in West Germany, are as much pillars of the state as they
are lobbies.
65. The encompassingness of institutions which are to deal with the
great bulk of manufacturing at the government level even in a formally
federal governmental structure is illustrated well by the way in which
regional aid is handled. This form of aid amounted to 30 percent of all
subsidies received by manufacturing industries in 1980, so that the illus-
tration is quantitatively significant. The single largest program of regi-
onal aid is the Joint Federal State Program (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe des
Bundes und der Lander) to improve the regional economic structure, half
financed by the states, half financed by the federal government. The
program is one institutionalization of a constitutional policy to equalize
living standards across West German regions.
66. Aid is distributed to individual regions (rather than to specific in-
dustries) based on criteria determined by the Federal and state govern-
ments jointly through a Planning Commission (1). This has an idiosyn-
(1) The criteria agreed upon proxy per capita income, provided there is
an industrial base of some kind. A brief description of the criteria
used is given in Adlung et al. [1979, pp. 171-179],52
cratic voting procedure: each state has one vote, but the Federal gov-
ernment has votes equal to the sum of the number of states. Further-
more, a three-fourths majority is required to carry a proposal. But this
institutional set-up implies that individual state interests can easily be
stymied: while an industry concentrated in one state may lobby at the
state level, and that state may very well desire granting that industry
regional aid, that state would have to overcome the opposition of all the
other states, as well as the federal government. State votes could surely
be traded, but a majority could never be achieved that way. Given per-
fect trading among states on each issue, the federal votes still constitute
a blocking coalition.
67. The issues decided in the Planning Commission within the framework
of this program are the specification of towns and cities, along with some
of their environs as potential "poles de croissance", eligible for receiving
direct subsidies, reduced interest loans, and loan guarantees on indus-
trial investment undertaken there. The subsidization base is capital in-
vestment. Noteworthy about the outcome of this procedure is that there
is very little discrimination between regionally-concentrated and uncon-
centrated industries on account of the blocking of the log-rolling pro-
cess. Furthermore, while there is a bias toward the promotion of capital
intensive industries, there is no conscious selection of specific industries
(1).
2. Features of the Highly Protected Sectors
68. Given these sorts of institutions, one would not expect much dis-
crimination among sectors of economic activity. Yet, the analysis in
Chapter II showed that the variation of effective rates of protection in-
(1) The second major regional aid program aims at maintaining the econ-
omic viability of West Berlin. The subsidy base is similar to that of
the Joint Federal/State Development Program, namely investment. But
this program does not really promote regionally concentrated indus-
try, as West Berlin's economic structure still corresponds quite well
to that of the dozen or so other major German cities.53
creased from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's. If one reviews the list of
highly favored industries (agriculture, food processing, coal and steel,
shipbuilding, aerospace, and textiles and clothing), all save shipbuilding
and textiles and clothing fall completely outside the encompassing insti-
tutional framework outlined above which applies to manufacturing indus-
try: agriculture and food processing are matters for the EC, as are coal
and steel. In addition, coal mining is in effect a nationalized industry.
Except for steel, but in addition to textiles and clothing, they have been
taken out of the formal jurisdiction of the GATT by international agree-
ment. Agriculture and food processing explicitly, and aerospace implicitly
have their own ministries. In addition, agriculture has its own estab-
lished lobby, der Deutsche Bauernverband.
a. Coal and Steel
69. The coal and steel industry fall completely outside the encompassing
institutional structure extant in the bulk of manufacturing. Tellingly,
these two industries received special treatment because of the state of
international political relations, aided and abetted by the ideology of
European unification prevailing just after the Second World War. In the
immediate aftermath of the war, the western allies directly controlled
German steel and coal output (International Authority for the Ruhr).
The French proposal - the Schuman Plan - to maintain control of the
European coal and steel industries jointly, was seen by the Federal Re-
public both as an easing of the occupation regime generally and a chance
at regaining international prestige [Harbrecht, 1984, p. 13]. For this
reason, and because accession to the Schuman Plan ameliorated French
designs on the Saar, the West German government welcomed the Schuman
Plan and signed the treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), which became effective in July 1952. This policy was of course
completely consistent with Adenauer's policy toward France [Feld, 1981,
p. 33], In fact, it is difficult to claim that much national authority was
delegated to the new High Commission. Internal trade barriers came
down, and external tariffs, but not other instruments, such as import
quotas, were harmonized by 1958.54
70. By that time imported oil was becoming cheaper, and the cost differ-
ence between American coal and domestic coal was growing. The response
of the by then EC member states was different enough to prevent the
emergence of a common coal policy [Swann, 1984, p. 246 ff.]. Italy has
almost no domestic coal production and had become a large importer of
petroleum. It was interested in a low coal price and a low oil price. Con-
sistent with a divergence of national interests, and the power invested
in the High Authority, a coal support program consisting of national
financial measures, granted by the Authority as exceptions to the pro-
hibition on most kinds of aids embedded in the ECSC treaty, was pro-
mulgated. It was financed nationally. In 1966, permission was granted to
national governments to subsidize coking coal down to the world level to
prevent new locations for steel making activity from becoming economic.
Thus even exports to EC member states may explicitly be subsidized.
Clearly, German steel was a great beneficiary of this program. The
mixed strategy that was implemented in the 1960's has been maintained in
its essential features to the present day.
It consisted mainly in (1):
- subjecting coal imports from non-EC countries to binding quantitative
import restrictions;
- assuring, by means of subsidies and compensation payments, coal con-
sumption on the two markets essential for it - coke supply in the steel
industry and furnace coal used in electricity generation; and
- adapting output capacities of the domestic coal mining industry to mar-
ket perspectives.
The latter indeed resulted in a reduction of extracting capacity from
150 million tons per annum by the end of the 1970's, to about 90 million
tons at the beginning of the 1980's.
71. The automatum built into protection results from a combination of the
first two elements. The steel industry was, of course, against border
(1) The following three paragraphs draw on Neu [1986]. See also Fels
and Neu [1980].55
protection of coke. So as not to tax the steel industry, an "Iron and
Steel Contract" was worked out in 1966 (amended in 1985) to the effect
that the steel industry promised to use exclusively German coke, but
that it would receive a subsidy equivalent to the difference between
world market price and domestic price. In addition, such a subsidy is
paid on coal exported to EC countries, so that steel industry relocation
in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp region, where coal could be cheap-
ly imported on account of low transport costs, for purposes of exporting
to West Germany, was made uneconomic (1). As the discrepancy between
German production costs and world market prices have increased, the
subsidies have soared. The 1985 change in the Contract foresees
quantity ceilings on coal eligible for subsidization.
72. Institutional arrangements for furnace coal use in electricity gener-
ation are similar, in that a portion of domestically-used coal is subsidized
down to the world market price. In another contract, the domestic elec-
tricity generating industry agreed to buy fixed annual quantities of coal
(47.5 million tons by 1985) under these conditions. In addition, some
liberalization of import quotas is foreseen.
73. Steel, like coal and agriculture, came under EC auspices (2). As in
agriculture, there was no legal necessity to intervene to preserve the
industry. As in coal, the first common measures taken may be see as re-
sponses to short-term business cycle problems: in contrast to coal,
where a re-nationalization of policy was allowed to develop, steel policy
from a very early stage was community policy. Perhaps the policy was a
common one, because European steel firms had long experience in trying
to work together in their Eurofer cartel.
74. The first steps of the European Commission were harmless enough.
In 1963 tariff and nontariff protection against imports from third coun-
tries was increased in response to a "temporary decline in sales". These
were renewed from year to year and, in 1967, a voluntary export re-
(1) These subsidies are to be phased out by 1991.
(2) The next four paragraphs draw on Dicke [1987] and Herdmann,
Weiss [1985].56
straint was negotiated with Japan. Throughout this period, the commis-
sion promoted the steel industry with financial assistance designed to in-
crease capacity.
75. By the mid-1970's, minimum prices for steel products were being
promulgated and export restraints negotiated with third countries.
National subsidization policies were beginning to proliferate. By 1980 a
"crisis" was apparent, and the detailed regulation of the steel market
became earnest. As in coal, Commission's role was not so much to dis-
tribute money to the member countries' steel industries, but to regulate
how the subsidies were to be granted. Production quotas were intro-
duced, presumably so that the subsidies - which are essentially trans-
fers to cover companies' losses - don't get out of hand. Since the early
1980's import quotas - negotiated and imposed - have been tightened.
76. For all that, the German steel industry is to an extent at least, a
victim of these measures. It is probably the lowest cost producer in the
community, as its industry representatives claim (1). Therefore, it ben-
efits from foreign trade protection, but is prevented from increasing ex-
ports to the other EC countries. Indeed, the industry has come out in
public demanding an end to production quotas and subsidies, and the
German government opposed the initial introduction of production quotas.
Furthermore, direct financial assistance to cover losses has only been
received by one German steel company.
77. Summarizing the coal and steel experience, it might be appropriate to
say that the center - the Commission - doesn't make any policy. Rather,
it makes rules all member states can live with, and imposes the least
common denominator of external protection. This last all community
members acquiesce in. If they do not, as the case of coal in Italy shows,
then no common external policy is made. Measures above the least
common denominator tend to get financed by national governments, with
the Commission keeping a watchful eye on measures so that they do not
end in too strong a policy competition, as shown by the case of steel.
(1) See also World Bank [1987].57
b. Agriculture
78. The agricultural sector clearly illustrates the primacy of politics in
external economic policy making. The economic order which emerged mir-
rored the balance of French and German agricultural interests (1).
France was willing to form a customs union for industrial products only
if an agricultural union was established at the same time. Other potential
signatories to the EEC treaties, particularly the United Kingdom, feared
that high agricultural tariff countries, like Italy, would work to raise
the initial common agricultural tariff, thereby reversing a low price pol-
icy oriented to consumers, and undermining Commonwealth preferences.
Aside from having different initial levels of protection for agriculture,
various potential members of the EEC had different structures of protec-
tion, as well. France and Italy had export surpluses in grains, Holland
in meat. It was clear that the establishment of a CAP was going to re-
quire sharp changes in each countrys' internal price structure and would
hence affect various interest groups noticeably. For this reason, and
because the common policy was going to be carried out by a supra-
national agency, most OECD countries refused to join. Only the six
countries already organized in the ECSC assented.
79. Interestingly, the Treaty of Rome did not prescribe the type of
agricultural policy to be followed. It left open three possibilities:
- common competition rules;
- international policy coordination; or
- common, binding pricing policies.
Somewhat paradoxically, France, the low agricultural price country, in-
sisted on long-term contracts at guaranteed prices. West Germany would
have preferred mere international policy coordination, even though the
existing German agricultural regulation system was highly dirigiste. The
French saw the danger of surpluses at a raised price level; the Germans
saw the high cost (potentially to them) of exporting their price level and
structure. The compromise that emerged was perhaps the worst possible.
(1) The next two paragraphs draw on Dicke et al. [1987].58
Important goods' prices would be set in common (grain, pork, eggs,
poultry, wine, beef, milk and sugar); the costs of agricultural policy
would also be borne in common, and the prices were subject to negoti-
ation .
80. The setting of common prices, along with common intervention in key
products, financed in common, nourish the belief that a common agricul-
tural policy actually exists. This is by no means the case, however
[see, e.g., Davenport, 1980]. Soon after the implementation of the com-
mon policy began in 1967, the French franc was devalued (in 1969). So
as not to exacerbate already apparent surpluses, the implied FF price
increase was not passed on to French farmers in full. In the same year,
the new upvaluation of the Deutsche mark was accompanied by wide-
spread farmers' protests at having to accept the implied cut in prices
[Feld, 1981, p. 69]. Thus, the monetary compensation amounts, isolating
each national economy's farm prices from the Community became institu-
tionalized. Such export levies and import taxes still exist, though they
vary from year to year [Swann, 1984, pp. 222 f.].
81. These national price differences, together with purely domestic fin-
ancial assistance formalized at the time of the initial Franco-German
compromise on the price of wheat, the lynch-pin of the agricultural price
structure, support the view that the agricultural price cum subsidy pol-
icy prevalent in each country is in fact a national matter [see, e.g.,
Marsh, Swanney, 1983, p. 60], As in the case of coal and steel, it
seems to be the least common denominator of any nation's policies that
gets institutionalized, with individual countries free to add on extra
benefits to particular constituent groups.
82. Nonetheless, separate ministries and lobbies, and international agree-
ments probably do not suffice to explain the great power of German far-
mers vis-a-vis their own government to first influence and then add on
to community agricultural support. Of course, the lobbying and ministe-
rial constellation is identical across European countries in the case of
agriculture. And the field of agriculture is one of the few in which an
effective European-wide lobby has emerged - Committee of Professional
Agricultural Organizations, COPA [Philip, 1983, p. 22; Michelmann,59
1981, p. 155]. These tend to emerge where the Community is strong, in
agriculture it is strong only relative to other areas of policy activity,
and not in the sense of determining the vast bulk of policy measures
carried out in any one member country. Instead, the common strength of
farmers in Community countries seems to result form the nature of coali-
tion politics in many European countries. Farmers and their interest
groups exploit their power to swing governments. Farming groups seem
to be large enough to matter at elections and cohesive enough to deliver
the vote. Fitzmaurice [1983] identifies this situation in France, where
there is competition for farmers support among groups on the right, in
Denmark and even in Britain at times. This widely held view [see also
Henig, 1979] apllies to West Germany a fortiori, because of its destinc-
tive political spectrum.
83. On the whole, German farmers, like all farmers, are fairly conserva-
tive people, so that the initial level of protection farmers received prior
to the founding of the EC may be said to correspond roughly to their
relative power in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the conserva-
tive party. Indeed, new aid to farmers during the 1960's, when the CDU
was senior partner in government, consisted of social welfare benefits,
such as subsidized pensions (Hocherl Plan). Since the farm population
was shrinking, this was an economically-efficient, eventually self-liqui-
dating subsidy program. It was also politically efficient - the CDU as a
large encompassing organization wanted no truck with supporting an in-
terest group whose members were going to vote CDU anyway and which
could only impose costs on the rest of its supporters. The Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD) and the Trade Unions (DGB) had always been for low
farm prices [Feld, 1981, p. 51].
84. Things changed fundamentally after the 1969 general election which
led to a coalition government with the SPD as senior partner and the
Free Democrats (FDP) as junior partner. The FDP was always in danger
of falling below the 5 percent of the vote required to enter the Bundes-
tag. It wanted, and received the Ministry of Agriculture, and promptly
went fishing for new voters to keep the party over 5 percent of the
vote. Economically, each extra vote had an extraordinarily high value to
it. By the same token, the SPD stood no chance of ruling alone, and the60
FDP was its only possible coalition partner. The value to the SPD of an
extra vote for the FDP was thus also extraordinarily high. Hence the
senior coalition partner readily acquiesced in a transfer in the form of
higher food prices and taxes from its supporters, the workers, to the
farmers, who voted more for the FDP than previously. It has been said
that the Ministry of Agriculture was virtually autonomous during this era
[Fitzmaurice, 1983, pp. 4-5; Michelmann, 1981, p. 158].
85. The change in government in 1983 did not bring back the coalitional
structure of the 1960's. A relatively stable left-right split means that the
three coalition partners have no alternative to each other, but one of the
coalition partners, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian wing
of the CDU, again depends heavily on farm support. Thus not only do
the farmers have a lobby, they also have a client party and a client
state government. In addition, farmers are no longer an intramarginal
group to the coalition as a whole. They express their resentment by
staying away from the polls, as in the elections to the Bundestag in
1987. This led to an overproportional rise in the agricultural budget
since 1983 - while the central budget rose by 6 percent the agricultural
budget climbed by 33 percent from 1984 to 1987. Nevertheless, the
"Deutsche Bauernverband" presented a catalogue of 50 new demands for
the next legislative period [FAZ, 1987]. Lest the cause of the resent-
ment be misunderstood, the nature of EC farm policy makes the resent-
ment legitimate. Price supports essentially increase the rent accruing to
intramarginal (large) farms. The many small farms, as in Bavaria, per-
ceive only costs. But the many small farms have more votes than the few
large ones. Put differently, the farmers' lobby has been representing
the interests of the larger farms rather than the small farmers. Even a
new small-farmers interest group has been founded, the Bauernbund. It
engages in anti-lobbying actively against the established Bauernverband,
and now competes with it in elections to governmentally-supported coope-
rative enterprises and institutions. This shift in the structure of inte-
rests, or even perceptions, means that possibly a lever can be found to
change German farm policy, and by extension EC farm policy in the near
future. Relevant for the political economy point of view is that aside
from the availability of more information for farmers as voters, the party
currently responsible for the Ministry of Agriculture, the CSU, is on the61
one hand a much more encompassing organization qua party than the FDP
is, and on the other closely tied to a still larger party, the CDU. For
ideological reasons it doesn't have the room for swinging coalitions the
FDP has. Most recent indications do point to a slight change in German
farm policy, at least at the margin. Early pension benefits to farmers,
coupled with land consolidation, are being expanded [Handelsblatt,
1988],
c. Shipbuilding (1)
86. As in coal and steel, protection for the shipbuilding industry started
during the late 1960's, as a measure against what was seen as cyclical
unemployment. On the other hand, that protection has endured is at
least partly attributable to the regional concentration of the industry.
The four coastal states, in which shipbuilding is concentrated (Bremen,
Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein) later took up the cud-
gels for the industry, both at the federal level and with their own sup-
port programs.
87. The first severe recession after World War II in West Germany in
1967 brought about unemployment, which in retrospect appears moderate.
But it was concentrated in the mining districts and some coastal regions.
The Federal government created a program to support investment, in
which the four coastal states participated. Under this program, yards
received subsidized credits if investment was undertaken for building big
ships, new types of ships, or for introducing new production tech-
niques. This program did not remain the only state intervention in in-
vestment in the shipbuilding industry. Contrary to their original inten-
tion, regional programs, which were meant to promote a wide range of
activities in specific regions, were used intensively to promote the ship-
building industry. Furthermore, the states became joint proprietors of
big yards in Kiel, Hamburg and Bremen.
(1) This section draws on Lammers [1984].62
88. In 1976, capacity utilization of German yards declined sharply.
Orders of oil tankers and bulk carriers had already dropped as a result
of the first oil crisis and the world recession in 1974. Especially those
yards that were supposed to have specialized on promoted types of ships
were hit. In response, ships exported to LDC's were declared "deve-
lopment assistance projects". Furthermore, the Federal Ministry of Re-
search and Technology set up several R&D programs for the yards.
Also, the Ministry of Defence ordered new ships earlier than originally
planned and in deference to the employment problems of the large yards
accepted substantial extra costs. But the decline of production and
orders could not be stopped, and yards reduced their work force: the
number of employees shrank from 73 thousand in 1975 to 59 thousand in
1979.
89. An "Auftragshilfeprogramm" (Direct Building Subsidy Program) was
in operation from 1979 to 1981. Only the construction of special vessels
was subsidized; oil tankers and bulk carriers were excluded. When the
Federal Government refused to participate in financing a second direct
building subsidy program, the coastal states decided to run such a
program on their own. But the interventions in favor of the shipbuilding
industry could not prevent large yards from running into severe dif-
ficulties. AG-Weser at Bremen closed down at the end of 1983 and the
remaining yards at Bremen were merged with substantial financial
support from the State of Bremen. The state of Schleswig-Holstein
covered losses of Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG, the biggest German
shipyard, located in Kiel and Hamburg; capacities for the building of
new ships were closed at Hamburg and reduced at Kiel.
90. The story of subsidization to the shipbuilding industry is remarkable
in the sense that state governments not only took up the lobbying initi-
ative at the federal level to obtain more funds as competitive pressures
increased, but also stepped in with their own resources. The Federal
government had aided the states, but not so much as necessary to ward
off substantial employment cuts. Regional concentration of an industry is
apparently hardly sufficient to obtain funds from central government in a
federal system. The situation in shipbuilding stands in sharp contrast to
the one in coal mining, which is also regionally concentrated, even more63
than shipbuilding, but the federal government essentially took on the
role of supporting the industry. Party politics cannot be used to explain
the outcome. At the beginning of the coal support programs, the federal
government was ruled by a different party than ruled North Rhine-West-
phalia, and throughout the shipbuilding support regime the four coastal
states were ruled by various parties.
d. Textiles and Clothing (1)
91. International restraints on the textile and clothing trade generally
predate World War II. As tariffs and restrictions came down generally
after the war, bilateral restraints were negotiated by West Germany with
Japan, India, and Pakistan in the 1950's. It was at the same time that
the US desired the restriction of Japanese exports of cotton textiles to
its domestic market. The textiles industry was the first to become com-
petitive in the developing countries, and had benefitted from quite high
protection in the industrialized countries. Cline [1987, p. 146] describes
the actions taken at that time as "initiating a cycle that has plagued
textile protection ever since: the spillover from controlled to uncontrolled
areas". Numerous other bilateral restraint agreements were negotiated by
West Germany within the multilateral framework provided by the STA
(Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles) from 1961 to 1962 and the first two phases of the LTA (Long-Term
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles), 1962-
1967 and 1967-1970 respectively. The import restrictions had two charac-
teristics in common: they covered only cotton products and they were
negotiated by West Germany rather than by the EC. The latter changed
in 1970, the year the LTA was extended for the second time: the EC of-
ficially took over commercial trade policy for all of its members, thereby
causing a gradual phase-out of previously negotiated bilateral agreements
starting in 1971. The import restraint agreements subsequently negoti-
ated by the EC were characterized by global EC-wide quotas that were
distributed among member countries according to some unwritten prin-
ciple of "burden sharing", a principle carried over to the MFA of 1974
(1) This section draws on a manuscript by Zietz [1986].64
and its four extensions in 1978, 1982, and 1986. Starting with LTA III
(1970-1973) it became clear, however, that several national quota allo-
cations were rather low compared to domestic demand thus leading to a
diversion of imports that legally entered the EC in one member country
to the more restrictive countries. Reacting to this undercutting of import
restrictions from within the Community, France and the Benelux coun-
tries stand out in that they have frequently resorted to Article 115 of
the EEC treaty. In practice this has meant that they obtained the
authorization not to apply Community treatment to products in free cir-
culation in other member states. (The trade in domestically produced
substitutes cannot be restrained, however.) In contrast, West Germany
has been among the EC countries using the most restraint with regard to
Article 115 (1). In fact, in 1973, still under LTA III, the German gov-
ernment even requested a substantial increase in West Germany's EC
quota allocations.
92. Starting in 1974, import protection in clothing and textiles took on a
new dimension with the introduction of the MFA and its four subsequent
prolongations. First and foremost, the MFA has meant an extension of
protection to fibers other than cotton, initially to synthetics and wool
(MFA I) , but eventually to all fibers that are of any use for mass mar-
keting in clothing and textiles (MFA IV). Secondly, the country cover-
age of import restrictions was greatly expanded so that by the middle of
the 1980's almost all exporting countries with the notable exception of
industrialized countries are subject to nontariff export restrictions.
93. Although in West Germany some segments of the administration, in
particular the Ministry of Economics, seem to be in favor of reducing
protection in textiles and clothing, there are strong opposing forces at
work: both unions and employers' associations as well as some fellow
member countries of the EC are vigorously opposed to any lessening of
the protectionist grip in textiles and clothing. This helps to explain
partly the staying power of the MFA in spite of its often repeated tem-
porary nature. The element of discrimination inherent in the MFA has
added to its political appeal and staying power. Since the import re-
(1) Compare Spinanger and Zietz [1986] for details and see Table 1.65
strictions are not directed against fellow industrialized countries, there
is no fear among restricting countries of retaliation from a potent trading
partner, an important factor normally helping to keep protection in
check. In these circumstances, it is difficult to identify any significant
domestic or foreign pressure that politicians who decide on protectionist
legislation in industrialized countries would have to reckon with, except
perhaps the People's Republic of China. On the domestic side, it seems
worth bearing in mind that the agency with broad interests to defend,
the Ministry of Economics, seems to be liberal-minded.
e. Aerospace
94. The German aerospace industry is the only modern sector which is
heavily protected. Its effective protection stands in sharp contrast to its
export orientation. The aerospace industry is special in several respects:
- due to allied prohibitions after World War II, the German aerospace in-
dustry was not rebuilt until the late 1950's.
- the German aerospace industry is to a large extent involved in cooper-
ation programs - civil and military - in the EC;
- a large part of aerospace output, i.e. most military and space prod-
ucts, is sold to the government.
These combined factors led to a unique institutional structure. The in-
dustries are concentrated; today there are essentially three producers of
large commercial aircraft worldwide, a few more military aircraft pro-
ducers and very few engine producers. Government involvement is heavy
if only because of military and security interests. Commercial markets for
aerospace products are dominated by large transport aircraft which ac-
count for the largest part of turnover.
95. When the ban on aerospace activity was partially lifted in 1955 upon
West Germany's accession to NATO, the first activities of the pre-1945
companies consisted of military subcontracts for the American Airforce.
Also contracts with the German Ministry of Defense led to a rapid ex-
pansion of the industry; its turnover rose from DM12 million in 1957 to66
DM410 million in 1961. In the early 1960's, the development of civil com-
mercial aircrafts was financially supported by the German government.
Finally, European cooperation with Airbus industries starting in the late
1960's led to a company structure comparable in size to the American
competitors Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed.
96. Heavy government involvement stems from the fact that a large part
of aerospace output never enters commercial markets. The military
content of the German aerospace industry has fallen from practically
100 percent in the 1960's. Mainly with the expansion in the production of
Airbus the military share of industry turnover has been reduced to
about 50 percent. One third of the aerospace industry's sales in 1981
stemmed from the Tornado warplane alone. Such military shares are still
very high when compared to other industries, but low compared to the
same industry in other countries. European space activities are still
relatively small, but these R&D-intensive activities are almost exclusively
financed by governments.
97. What stands out about the aerospace industry among other highly
protected industries is its closeness to defense and in the case of Ger-
many the presumption which was at least at one time reasonable that it
was only a question of time and resources before international competi-
tiveness could be regained. Therefore, one would not want to be too
quick to support a "capture" theory of government institutions in this
case. Initially, government ministries are often, though not always, the
instruments for carrying out government policy. Only after the policy
becomes less pressing are they captured. A case in point is the national-
ization of the Prussian railways for clear defense reasons [Laaser,
1983], Only in the course of time do rent seekers get to use the minis-
try for their purposes. Indeed, aerospace seems to be the one industry
in which government support has gone hand in hand with rising inter-
national competitiveness, though this statement is weakened, in turn, by
the recognition that the market for military aircraft at least, is of course
a restricted one.67
3. A Statistical Verification
98. Because interest groups have been practically institutionalized in
West Germany, discussion of group interests, or at least interests of the
group leadership, to the neglect of considerations of group organization
costs in studying lobbying effectiveness, is justified. Organizations are
in place, the costs of forming them having been paid in the past [Wael-
broeck, 1986]. Moreover, the organizations exist along branch-of-indus-
try lines. This makes a statistical test of these propositions quite
straightforward. In contrast to more pluralistic polities, one would ex-
pect a unique direction of influence between industry employment (as a
proxy for votes) and lobbying effectiveness, the usual free-rider
problem in organizing groups having been overcome. Labor unions along
branch lines already exist and are ready to disseminate information (ide-
ology) to workers. Similarly, the weight of entrepreneurs in their own
councils, and hence toward the government, would increase with greater
employment.
99. Regionally-concentrated industries should also expect to get more as-
sistance, from the subnational and national governments. While it is re-
cognized that low organization costs for regionally concentrated indus-
tries contribute to their lobbying effectiveness in pluralist polities, like
the United States, their politico-geographic isolation speaks against lob-
bying success. In West Germany, a high degree of consensus building,
explicitly including regional aid, is a constitutional matter, and the
identification of regional success or failure with the policies of a limited
number of political parties, suggests that no party can afford to let a
regionally-concentrated industry decline unassisted, though as dis-
cussed, the aid should not be expected to be forthcoming from the
broad-based regional aid programs, but rather as special industry as-
sistance policies.
100. Also implicit in the institutional discussion so far has been the
positive role of the possibilities for transnational policy trades in reduc-
ing protection. More broadly, the role of international affairs in allowing
governments to override some interest groups has been relatively
neglected in the political economy literature. Borchardt [1984] cogently68
argues that international relations must be taken into account to make
sense of the success or lack of success of interest groups in eliciting
protection.
101. Two other determinants of the structure of protection emphasized
by the political economy literature can also be applied to a structured
polity like West Germany's: firstly, the external motor driving interest
groups to bring forth demands for protection are declines in internati-
onal competitiveness. This should be no different in West Germany than
everywhere else. Secondly, concentrated industries should also be more
successful in driving home requests for aid, not because organizational
costs are lower (organizations are in place), but because interests might
be more homogeneous.
102. These ideas can be tested statistically for trade policy changes in
West Germany over the period of the Tokyo Round. Proxies for all the
variables save one (the international negotiating situation) are easy to
find and straightforward. One can try to explain the absolute change in
effective total protection (tariffs plus implicit tariffs plus subsidies)
across industries (in percentage points) between 1978 and 1985 (AERA)
by:
- voting power, proxied by the number of employees in each industry
(N), definitely expected positive in West Germany;
- regional concentration, measured by the coefficient of variation of each
industry's employment across the eleven Bundeslander (Reg) , ambig-
uous, even in West Germany;
- firm concentration, measured as the market share of the six largest
firms in each industry (CON6) , expected posititve in West Germany;
and the change in international competitiveness and the international
negotiating situation.
The change in international competitiveness (comparative advantage) of
industries can be usefully proxied by Liesner's [1958] and Balassa's
[1965] concept of Revealed Comparative Advantage, creating actual ex-
port and import flows as reflecting actual comparative advantage, subject69
to random shocks and policy biases. The change in RCA might be used
to capture the driving force behind changes in effective protection.
Here, however, the policy biases working actual export and import flows
are the objects of explanation. Hence, in order to avoid a simultaneity
problem, the causes of the change in competitiveness can be used. The
factor proportions theory of the commodity composition of international
trade works very well in explaining trade flows (between countries with
not too similar factor endowments), provided human capital as a factor of
production is somehow taken into account [Kenen, 1965] (1) in addition
to physical capital and labor. In a factor proportions context, the
change in competitiveness across industries over time is caused by the
same determinants as the structure of competitiveness at a point in time.
The reason is clear: given factor intensities of goods, only factor accu-
mulation changes competitiveness. A country accumulating human capital
faster than another will experience an increase in competitiveness in its
human capital intensive goods. Of course interindustry and intercountry
differences in the rate and direction of technological progress will also
play a role in determining changes in international competitiveness. But
there is no reason to suppose that the direction will vary across coun-
tries, or even that the rates will diverge noticeably across countries
much over a seven-year period. This holds even more when a main cor-
relate of technical process, human capital intensity, is explicitly taken
into account.
Therefore, the following are included in the regression equation
- human capital intensity, proxied by wages and salaries for employee
minus an unskilled worker's earnings for each industry (h), definitely
expected negative in West Germany,
- physical capital intensity, proxied by the capital stock per employee
for each industry (k), expected positive in West Germany,
How to include the international negotiating situation in such a regres-
sion is far from obvious. It is a particularly difficult problem for the ex-
planation of protection changes across industries, because the (vague)
(1) See Deardorff [1984], for a survey of US evidence and Weiss [1983]
for a survey of evidence from West Germany.70
concept of negotiating situation would seem to apply to all industries as
a package. Other authors have adopted the initial rate of protection in
each industry to capture various aspects of the negotiating situation or
of other determinants of changes in protection (1). During the Kennedy
Round, for example, tariffs were to be reduced proportionately; during
the Kennedy Round high tariffs were to come down proportionately more
than low tariffs. The sign and size of the estimated coefficient on initial
protection rate (ERA 78) would at least track to what degree intentions
were fulfilled.
The following regression was run:
AERA = 31.38 -23.28 In h + 8.26 In k + 6.00 In N
(- 3.53) (2.40) (2.81)
+ 14.78 In Reg + 0.32 In CON6 - 0.47 ERA 78
(1.84) (2.93) (- 5.11)
F = 8.31; R
2 = 0.61; n = 29; t-statistics in parentheses.
All coefficients save the one on regional concentration are easily signif-
icant at the 1 percent level and all save one (k) show the expected sign
(2). In addition, experiments with a small number of alternative specif-
ications showed that the influence of the explanatory variables is robust
provided the past level of protection is included.
103. By and large, the regression vindicates the political economy ex-
planation for trade barriers, but two issues to interpret do arise. The
first, which is relatively straightforward, is the role of an industry's
regional concentration in eliciting protection in a federal state. Theoret-
ical considerations are ambiguous here. What this econometric evidence
for West Germany shows is that there seems to be some weak (as shown
by low precision of the estimate) tendency for regipnal_concentration to
(1) Cheh [1974] and Riedel [1977] adopted this proxy, but their inter-
pretation is different.
(2) Data sources for the regression are Table 8; Baumgart et al. [vari-
ous issues]; Statistisches Bundesamt [a; c; j].71
promote protection. This weakness can be viewed as the juxtaposition of
nondiscriminatory broad-based regional programs with discriminatory
state and national government programs. The second issue is the unex-
pected sign on the physical capital intensity coefficient which bears in-
terpretation. Because both human and physical capital intensity are sup-
posed to capture the causes of an industry's international competitive-
ness, and most empirical tests of the structure of trade flows show the
unexpected sign on physical capital intensity, one could say that the re-
gression is at least consistent with other such tests. If one takes the
regression seriously as data analysis, though, the results are suggestive
and challenging: physical capital intejn^ty^pjejrjsj^jsj^
protection. This occurs even when industry concentration is controlled
for. Nothing in the political economy literature suggests that physical
capital intensity should play this role; indeed, it is difficult to think of
a reason why this should be so. If the description should be correct,
however, it attests to the backward focus of overall protection and
assistance policy. Industries whose competitiveness at high wage lo-
cations is in serious doubt seem to get an extra measure of state aid, (
given all other political considerations. «
104. As it stands, then, the regression equation underlines the role of
the international negotiating environment in trade barrier reductions.
Might this not amount to an overinterpretation or incorrect interpretation
of a detected statistically significant influence of the initial level of
protection? Consider how alternative hypotheses have fared. Cheh [1974]
suggested that trade policy makers act to minimize short-run labor ad-
justment costs. At the same time he postulated that the tariff structure
at any one point in time is the product of a host of historical influences,
or that the tariff structure is hysteretical. Consequently, to test his ^T
hypothesis, he allowed for hysteresis by focussing on changes in the
tariff structure and including the initial level of protection as an ex-
planator of the observed change. Cheh tests his proposition on US trade
barrier reductions (in percentage points) associated with the Kennedy
Round of multilateral tariff cuts. Using various proxies for labor adjust-
ment costs, the political power of an industry (total employment), and
the initial level of protection to capture hysteresis, Cheh found that only
total employment in each industry and the initial level of protection were72
statistically significant explanators of tariff reductions, and then only
for changes in nominal protection. Tariff reductions were indeed lower in
initially highly protected industries. Hysteresis seemed confirmed, his
own hypothesis refuted, and political power vindicated.
105. Riedel [1977] sought to test Cheh's labor adjustment cost minimiz-
ation hypothesis for West Germany's (implicitly, the EC's) tariff reduc-
tions during the Kennedy Round. While Riedel took pains to replicate
Cheh's econometrics, his own interpretation of the causal process was
decidedly politico-economic. In contrast to-Cheh's results, Riedel found
no evidence for hysteresis: a quantitatively small, but statistically quite
secure effect was found going in the other direction - high protective
levels were reduced slightly more than low protective levels. In addition
a large industry labor force and low human capital intensity made for
small reductions in protection. These results suggest that what is ob-
served may be attributable to differences in the appropriateness of vari-
ous hypotheses to different countries, rather than to any fundamental
flaw in Cheh's approaches.
106. More worrying for the political economy approach as a whole is the
broader international comparison of econometric results carried out by
Anderson and Baldwin [1981]. Both for changes in the structure of pro-
tection over time, as well as for the explanation of the structure at a
point in time, some measure of unskilled or low-wage labor intensity is
consistently carrying the burden of explanation in most countries. This
also applies to the study for the United States' protective levels under-
taken by Fieleke [1976], but not for German protective levels under-
taken by Glismann, Weiss [1983] and Witteler [1986]. Other variables,
especially proxies for industry concentration, switch sign from country
to country, and measures of export or import performance are consist-
ently good explanators, but are difficult to square with the underlying
theory once political factors have been taken into account.
107. Additional evidence that a politico-economic logic at work in West
Germany is given by Witteler [1986]. Border measures and subsidies
affect organized and unorganized groups in different ways. Consumers
are the least organized and least powerful, even in West Germany.73
Hence, resistance to a price raising measure should be small. In con-
trast, price raising measures affecting inputs to businesses can be ex-
pected to evoke organized resistance. Therefore, subsidies would be the
promotion instrument of political choice in such cases. A regression
equation explaining the ratio of the effective rate of border protection to
the effective rate of subsidization in West Germany in 1982 with a cubic
function of the share of output going to consumers is easily significant
at the 1 percent level of significance.
108. A comparison of the present results with those for United States
tariff concessions during the Tokyo Round [Baldwin, 1985b, pp. 165-
168] is also revealing. In estimating a "demand" for protection equation,
Baldwin finds that the previous tariff level is positively associated with
demand whereas in the final outcome (reduced form demand and supply
equation) the initial level of tariffs played no role. This could mean that
forces working to maintain "hysteresis" in the United States were ameli-
orated, but not reversed, by the international tariff-cutting process.
109. The role of the international political climate quite apart, the
present results strongly support a political economy interpretation for at
least part of the changes in protection in West Germany. Firstly, they
confirm Riedel's results for a previous round of tariff cutting in Ger-
many and Europe. Secondly, in contrast to the United States, a single,
questionable variable is not bearing the burden of explaining changes in
protection, but more of the factors suggested by the political economy
approach contribute. In Baldwin's US regressions, a measure for un-
skilled labor intensity essentially explains tariff changes. Yet, Baldwin
[ibid., p. 165] rightly points out that "Since unskilled, low-income
workers are poor pressure group organizers and advocates, the signif-
icant negative relationship between these variables and the magnitude of
duty cuts ... strongly suggests that demands from pressure groups
based on short-run self-interest are insufficient to explain protection
reductions". Similar views are also to be found in Finger et al. [1983].
While this may be true for the United States, it is decidedly untrue for
Europe. Societal groups on this continent are highly organized, often on
the basis of past investments in organizing activity [Waelbroeck, 1983].74
Hence, the factors included in a regression equation can more readily
than for the United States be associated with either the demand (interest
groups) or the supply (government) sides of protection in a unique way
with a unique direction of influence. Put differently, the high degree of
group organization in Europe solves (almost) the identification problem.
4. Implications for the Uruguay Round
110. If the outcome of international trade barrier reduction negotiations
depended upon domestic political economic or interest groups alone, one
would have to be mildly pessimistic about a German contribution to that
process. This would be particularly true if the kind of cross-section re-
gression shown above were stable for all time; it is not. Still, the exo-
genous variables driving the change in protection are all slowly changing
variables, but they do change. Important is employment, the proxy for
voting power. Employment in highly protected industries has shrunk in
West Germany (Table 15). Because, as was explained, political influence
is highly institutionalized, mere voting power isn't everything, but it
does matter. Hence, one can fairly count on some loss in power on the
part of the highly protectionist interest groups. If this were the only
effect at work, one would expect a desire for moderate movement towards
freer trade for the great bulk of manufacturing, in line with what
emerged through the Tokyo Round.
111. But the international negotiating environment plays an important
role. While the possibility of a hegemonic power conceding more than
necessary and thus assuming a role of leadership in moves towards freer
trade is less relevant today than a generation ago, or a century ago, a
large country making demands and offering concessions, like the United
States today, can still promote movement. The positive demand has been
the widening of the negotiating agenda to include agriculture. There is a
happy coincidence with a state of flux in the German domestic interest
group structure. This could allow West Germany to play a more decisive
role - within the European Community - in movement towards freer trade
at the multilateral negotiations. The costs of farm policy, both for the75
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budget and in terms of votes has become extraordinarily high. EC farm
policy has essentially benefitted large, i.e. intramarginal farms. Their
owners are not the ones who deliver the votes. This has been meanwhile
recognized by the small farmers, who have responded by staying away
from the polls during the Bundestag election of early 1987, and
threatening the ruling coalition. They have further founded a new farm
lobby set against the entrenched Bauernverband. Tellingly, the BDI has
broken its century of silence on farm policy: it, too, sees that farm
policy has become too expensive [BDI, 1987]. It proposes a system of
direct income supports. The mid-1980's thus present the ruling coalition
government with the following situation:
- the farm vote is needed to stay in power;
- the other EC countries will not accept the demands for higher prices
tabled by the German Ministry of Agriculture;
- the German federal budget cannot bear the cost of supporting farmers
by supporting output prices in the present way;
- the farm lobby, propounder of past policies, is under attack from the
farmers.
A particularly hard line on agriculture on the part of the United States,
provided always there is a willingness to make concessions in other
fields, would be quite helpful here.76
112. This analysis does not overrate West Germany's influence in the EC.
A resolution of agricultural trade issues cum weakening of German
farmers would shift the whole balance of economic influence in the
European Community toward more free trade. West Germany uses up
much of its politico-economic capital in Brussels urging increased agri-
cultural protection. The German position in agricultural policymaking in
Brussels is the opposite of that for industry; it is generally the most
protectionist country in the EC. If that issue were removed from the EC
agenda the country could defend its free trade ideology and free trade
interests far more credibly and would have to make fewer concessions to
protected trade on other issues. A pronounced shift in the standpoint of
the EC would have repercussions for more free trade throughout the
world economy.77
V. German Trade Policy in Historical Perspective
1. Introduction
113. Germany's rich and subtle tariff and trade policy history illustrates
the point that a political economy of protection explanation for ordinary
changes in level and structure of protection goes far, particularly
during stable times, but that large swings in protection go hand in hand
with major political, institutional or technological changes, usually ac-
companied by a different ideology. Interest groups do have an influence
on protection, but they are constrained by the state. This is particu-
larly pronounced when the state's own foreign policy interests are di-
rectly involved, as emphasized by Borchhardt [1984], but extends to
major domestic upheavals as well. In Germany, such events have often,
but not exclusively, been associated with the aftermath of (lost) wars.
2. The Prussian Reforms
114. The defeat of Prussia in 1806 and the Napoleonic Wars left Germany
in an economically as well as politically backward situation when com-
pared with other European countries. "Voltaire had declared that Ger-
many was condemned to eternal poverty" [Henderson, 1959, p. 2].
Trade was hampered by insufficient transport facilities, by "a grotesque
system of duties and dues" [Dawson, 1904, p. 8] in each state. Some
1800 customs frontiers existed in Germany in 1790 [ibid., p. 21] and the
situation was improved only slightly by the territorial consolidations of
Napoleon. In several states imports of many commodities were prohibited,
which resulted in large scale smuggling. Not even state revenues, large-
ly tariff revenues, could be raised efficiently by such a trading system.
As King Frederick William III of Prussia noted: "I am shocked at the vo-
luminous excise and customs tariffs" [Dawson, 1904, p. 9].78
115. The hopes for economic and political reforms inside the Germanic
Confederation were disappointed because of the divergent interests and
economic conditions of the member states. Yet, parallel to the unsuccess-
ful attempts of liberals in the "Bundestag" (Federal Diet), the Prussian
bureaucracy under the intellectual leadership of Stein and Hardenberg
prepared "the reorganization of the State" as Hardenberg wrote in his
Memorandum of September, 1807. The proposed program aimed at giving
Prussia the greatest possible amount of freedom - in thought, in speech,
in action, in trade, in industry, in government [Dawson, 1904], In this
overall program of political and economic liberalization trade policy was
just one element, albeit an important one. Stein's "Instruction to the
Royal Governments of the Prussian Provinces", dealing with trade policy,
shows deep economic insight: "Together with this liberty, facility of
communication and freedom of trade both at home and abroad are also
necessary if our industry, trade, and welfare are to thrive. Thus those
industries will naturally come into being which can be carried on to the
best advantage, and which are the most suited to the economic condition
of the country and the civilization of the nation. It is a mistake to
believe that it is advantageous to a State to produce itself articles which
can be bought more cheaply abroad. The increased costs of production
caused by manufacturing them are an absolute loss, and had they been
employed in another industry would have given abundant gain. It is a
distorted view that one should in such a case seek to keep the money in
the country, and rather not buy at all. ... It is not necessary to favor
trade; it must simply not be obstructed. Freedom of trade and of indus-
try creates the greatest possible competition between the producing and
consuming public, and protects the consumers most effectively against
scarcity and excessive prices" [cited in Dawson, 1904, p. 11].
116. When in May 1818, the new Prussian tariff law was promulgated,
tariff rates were just one part of the reform. Most importantly, it "abol-
ished the ancient Akzise in favor of a border tax on trade and so ended
the collection of duties at the town gate; it eliminated the legal distinc-
tion between town and country side and provided for free movements of
goods between them as well as of occupations." [Dumke, 1977, p. 248].
Thus it created for the first time a national free trade area within
Prussia. It is likely that the positive economic effects of the tariff law79
were at first gains from an internal free market and a lower administra-
tive burden. The tariff was a specific tariff designed mainly under two
premises:
- It should provide sufficient funds to the government while, at the
same time, it should not injure Prussian business interests.
- Moderate effective protection was desired for manufacturing - the
infant industry argument was already known.
117. These goals were thought to be met by a tariff structure of zero
tariffs for raw materials, a 20-30 percent ad valorem equivalent tariff on
"Kolonialwaren" (tropical and subtropical products), and about a 10 per-
cent tariff on other commodities [Henderson, 1959, p. 40]. Free traders
in other countries consequently praised the Prussian tariff law.
Huskisson said in the House of Commons: "I trust that the time will come
when we can say as much for the tariff of this country" [Henderson,
1959, p. 43]. It was generally regarded as the lowest tariff in Europe
[Kindleberger, 1978, p. 56], However, falling world market prices in the
1820's led to considerable increases in ad valorem equivalent duties.
Rough estimates for selected goods reveal large variations in duties with
a level well over 10 percent. Rates over 80 percent for manufactures are
reported [Henderson, 1959, p. 4], Ohnishi [1973] calculated ad valorem
equivalent duties of 9-35 percent for fine cotton goods, 9-84.3 percent
for woollens, and 15.6-91.6 percent for rough iron goods [Dumke, 1977,
Table II, p. 93].
118. In interpreting the Prussian reforms, one should distinguish be-
tween the intention and the outcome of policy. Intentions were probably
focussed more on internal liberalization and administrative reform. The
reform led to a liberal trade policy in addition to a common market and
fiscal unity inside Prussia. Free internal markets without the Akzise
made it necessary to design an external tariff. Tariff policy, in turn was
dominated by revenue considerations. But since the previous system con-
sisted of prohibitions and immensely inefficient duties, a move toward a
rational tariff with moderate effective protection for manufactures and
high revenues resulted in a low average nominal tariff when compared to
the rest of the world.80
119. There are many reasons why Prussia was among the first countries
to design a new tariff after the Napoleonic Wars. As already mentioned,
the new tariff was just a part of several economic reforms which them-
selves were determined not only be economic considerations. The political
and ideological climate surely contributed to its success. The ideologi-
cally moving force was the Prussian bureaucracy which, after becoming
exposed to the writings of Adam Smith, favored market oriented solutions
to overcome economic backwardness. Kindleberger [1978, p. 190] reports
that a "provincial leader wrote in 1796 that he made it a practice to start
each day by reading a passage from The Wealth of Nations". Aided by
the Prussian hierarchical structure and a lack of alternative proposals
these ideas were soon adopted by the rulers.
120. The ensuing years give evidence of the remarkable success of the
Prussian reforms. True, internal economic growth was moderate at best,
yet this was mostly due to a lack of capital, communications, and tech-
nology - factors which develop with a considerable time lag only. The
government's budget situation, however, improved noticeably, to a large
extent due to higher than expected tariff revenues [Ohnishi, 1973,
p. 122 ff.]. With these funds, increased investment in infrastructure
became feasible, and Prussia's foreign influence improved parallel to her
financial situation. Numerous treaties with neighboring states and en-
claves resulted in the geographic expansion of the Prussian customs
system.
121. There were several reasons for these states to enter into such
agreements:
- smuggling, a substitute for legal trade, became more difficult with the
new tariff borders;
- the internal liberalization in Prussia seemed to work like a customs
' union, leading to internal trade creation and external trade diversion
such that, despite relatively low tariff barriers, market entry became
more difficult;
- falling world market prices led to rising ad valorem tariffs - an effect
the Prussian government did not compensate.81
Those states that did not come to an agreement with Prussia attempted to
initiate internal economic reforms by themselves and to form customs
unions with others. By 1828 three customs unions existed in Germany:
the Prussian-Hessian Customs Union dominated by Prussia; the South
German Union; and the Central German Union consisting of small states
mainly in central Germany. The latter's common objective hardly
amounted to more than keeping roads open and preventing the two other
unions from expanding.
3. The Zollverein (The Grerman Customs Union)
122. When in January 1834 the treaty of the Deutsche Zollverein came
into effect almost twenty years had passed since the first proposal for
giving customs authority to the Germanic Confederation in 1815. It then
took until 1885 for Germany to complete the common political and customs
frontier; in this year the City of Bremen joined the customs system of
the German Empire. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the German external
tariff from 1834. The whole period was characterized by intense negoti-
ations in the Germanic Confederation and by opposition of Germany's
neighbors to the formation of the Zollverein. Fischer [1972, p. 128]
characterizes the Zollverein as an "example of political circumspection in
a world of emergencies demanding relief". Considering the advantages of
a customs union it is surprising why it took so long to reach the agree-
ment of 1834. The economic benefits to the member states of the Zollver-
ein were so large that one must attribute the 15 years of negotiation
more to conflicting political interests and tactical maneuvering than to
the difficulty of achieving an economically-acceptable compromise. From
the formation of the Zollverein two main effects can be isolated: It
dramatically increased state revenues and it led to some internal trade
creation.
123. Internal trade creation was induced by the changes in internal and
external trade barriers. The common uniform external tariff - basically
the Prussian tariff of 1818 - was the highest in any German state so far.
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1800 customs frontiers existing in 1790 [Henderson, 1959] this change
should have large welfare effects. Because of the large number of states
an empirical assessment of static and dynamic welfare gains is difficult.
Dumke [1977] estimated an increase in real income of about 1.5 percent
for the southern German states. This rather low gain is not surprising if
one considers that only 16.6 percent of total Zollverein trade was intra-
trade and that the south's extra Zollverein imports comprise 80 percent
of its total imports [ibid., p. 315-317].
124. Economies of scale, accelerated diffusion of technology, greater
competition, and risk reduction are all factors which are generally
considered to accompany the formation of a customs union. Without wish-
ing to stress causal relations too far, the period of the Zollverein can be
characterized as a time of large-scale investments in infrastructure and
human capital - made possible, e.g., by increased state revenues. Tech-
nical universities were established in Karlsruhe (1825), Darmstadt
(1826), Munich (1827), and so on. Also extensive visits of specialists to
Great Britain were initiated to facilitate technology transfer. The intro-
duction of railways and an extensive road building program accompanied
trade liberalization. For some smaller states the threat of locating roads
around their territory induced their first steps in entering larger
customs areas [Henderson, 1959, p. 75 f.]. Although one cannot assess
these dynamic effects quantitatively, their combined impact surely led to
more competition and better allocation of resources.
125, The most important effect of the Zollverein, however, was the in-
crease in net state revenues. This came about through a combination of
reducing transaction costs and reducing smuggling by a cheaper policing
of the Zollverein borders more carefully. Prussian civil servants, such
as Ludwig Kuehne, director general of taxation in Prussia from 1842-
1849, were well aware of this relationship [Dumke, 1976, p. 41 f.].
Kuehne's prediction for the savings in administration cost came very
close to those actually realized. The Zollverein resulted in the elimination
of 781.5 "Meilen" of customs borders. Given estimated administration cost
of 2000 taler per "Meile" of border, Dumke [1976, p. 43] estimated a
yearly saving of 1.56 million taler per year, equivalent to just under one
percent of Zollverein National Income.84
126. Not only reductions in administration costs due to shorter custom
borders are important for tariff revenues. The net gain also depends on
the geographic size of a state. Since higher tariffs induce more smug-
gling, which in turn requires higher enforcement expenditure, net
revenues and protection cannot be increased just by raising tariffs. On
the contrary, Dumke [1976, p. 45] found that only 10 out of the 35 in-
dependent states in Germany were able to maintain a tariff system that
yielded positive net revenues. Of those, only two - Bavaria and Prussia
- were able to provide protection and revenues at the same time (1).
The other states had no customs system at all or relied on a variety of
relatively low charges. It is apparent that especially the smaller states
gained from joining the Zollverein in two ways: they increased their
revenues and their protection against non-Zollverein states. This rev-
enue increase brought, according to Dumke [1976, p. 46 f.], another
2.95 million taler per year from 1835 onwards to the Zollverein treasury.
"This is 24 percent of the average net customs revenue of the Zollverein
of the years 1834 to 1845" [ibid., p. 47]. The importance of revenue
considerations is further illuminated by comparing the total tariff rev-
enue gain of 4.51 million taler per year to the total real income increase
of 6.74 million taler per year in South Germany attributable to trade cre-
ation .
127. These financial aspects constituted overwhelming incentives for
smaller states to join the Zollverein. For the first time many were able to
obtain tariff revenues at all. This fact was also important in the political
considerations of the monarchs of these states. On the one hand they
undoubtedly lost sovereignty to the Zollverein, i.e. to Prussia as the
hegemonic power. On the other hand, tariff revenues collected by the
Zollverein gave them more internal freedom, as a British source stated in
1835: "[The Zollverein] assured to the princes their revenue without the
trouble of collecting, and without the inconvenience of applying to tur-
bulent chambers for their supplies. It might be thought that the
(1) But even Bavaria had a disadvantage compared to Prussia. The
South German Customs Union only had per capita customs revenues
of 9.5 silver groschen compared to 24 in Prussia. Also administration
costs amounted to 44 percent of gross revenue, whereas Prussia lost
only 15-20 percent [Henderson, 1959, p. 63],85
chambers would have resisted to the death this fatal blow at their na-
tional independence; but no! the members were landed proprietors, or
manufacturers; to the first was pointed out that the taxes were now to
be be taken off the land, and laid upon commerce; to the second, that
domestic, that national, that their produce was to take the place of
foreign manufacturers" [cited in Dumke, 1976, p. 57].
Purely economic factors as well as political economy therefore point to
the princes of the smaller- states favoring the Zollverein. Henderson
[1958, p. 95] summarizes the attitude of the majority of states: "The
states concerned fought for their own narrow interests and many of them
joined the Zollverein only when economic depression and empty ex-
chequers made further resistance to Prussia impossible" .
128. Whereas state finances were the decisive argument for joining the
Zollverein for small states not able to administer a profitable tariff
system, for the larger states, especially Wiirttemberg and Bavaria,
financial pressures were less important. They could afford to foster their
political independence. Only a common enemy, the Central German
Customs Union, finally brought the Prussian-Hessian Customs Union to-
gether with the South German Customs Union [Fischer, 1972, p. 113].
But Bavaria and Wiirttemberg still retained the right to negotiate com-
mercial treaties with foreign countries after joining the Zollverein
[Henderson, 1959, p. 93].
129. The historical studies of the pre-Zollverein era and the economic
consequences of the Zollverein lead one to conclude that the advantages
of a customs union with more than marginal economic benefits to all par-
ticipants cannot account for the lengthy and hard negotiations before the
Zollverein materialized. Rather, political considerations in the German
states slowed down a process whose economic dynamism could hardly be
stopped. With Prussia negotiating commercial treaties in the name of the
Zollverein, these states could not be sure that Prussia would act in the
interest of the Zollverein. In addition, the threat-potential of Prussia
was immense. A collapse of the Zollverein would completely strip the
small states of their tariff revenues. The southern states also would ex-
perience severe losses, since they had increased the share of tariffs in86
net state revenues from about 7 percent to about 15 percent (1819-1849),
[Dumke, 1972, p, 96]. Prussia, on the other hand, had only an increase
from 14.5 percent to 17.3 percent over the same period [ibid.]. Finan-
cial prosperity of the state treasures and economic prosperity of
business were therefore paid for by giving hegemonical power to
Prussia.
130. The years of the Zollverein from 1834 to national unification in 1871
were governed by this relationship. Several crises ended in a deadlock,
leaving the Zollverein essentially unchanged. With the political power of
Prussia growing, the conflict with Austria was inevitable and became one
of the decisive factors of Prussian politics in the 1860's. The natural
enlargement of the Zollverein would have been the inclusion of Austria.
The Austrian Minister of Commerce (1848-1851) and Finance (1855-1860)
Freiherr von Bruck made several unsuccessful attempts in this direction
(1). The only positive result was the Austro-Prussian treaty of 1853,
where Prussia - in the name of the Zollverein - and Austria granted
each other Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment [Henderson, 1959,
p. 223]. The political rivalry between these two states also became an
important factor in Germany's move towards free trade from 1860 on-
wards.
4. The Rise and Fall of Free Trade
a. The Move towards Free Trade
131. All over Europe, the 1860's mark the breakthrough towards free
trade. It started in Great Britain and - by a coincidence of favorable
factors - spread to France and its neighbors. This historically remark-
able process was facilitated by prosperity in Europe. The increasing
spread of industrialization on the continent promoted trade relations and
free trade sentiment at the same time. In this climate, national trade
(1) See Henderson [1959] and Bohme [1966] for a historical survey.87
policies underwent considerable change, reflecting evolving internal pol-
itical structures.
132. The revolution of 1848 already marked a change in the political
climate. Liberal ideas and nationalism were introduced with increasing
force in public as well as in parliament. In 1858 the "Kongress Deutscher
Volkswirte" (Congress of German Economists) was founded. It was a na-
tional organization which brought together intellectuals and businessmen
in their endeavor to achieve freedom of trade and freedom of movement
[Erdmann, 1968, p. 242], Many of its members in turn were members of
various parliaments, influential leaders in political parties and associa-
tions. Their combined influence inside and outside the parliaments in-
duced a change in public opinion towards liberalization in internal eco-
nomic policy as well as in trade policy. Opposing groups such as the
"Industrie-Borsenverein" (founded in 1859) were not nationally or-
ganized. The "Industrie-Borsenverein" was a loose association of south
German cotton industrialists allegedly founded as a reaction to the
establishment of the Kongress Deutscher Volkswirte [Erdmann, 1968,
p. 207]. Regional orientation was its main handicap, since it had no
backing from the powerful Prussian politicians. In this situation the lack
of political unification in Germany prevented other protectionist groups
from organizing a successful opposition against the free traders.
133. This free-trade-oriented internal climate was accompanied by the
continuing struggle for German political unity, either as the "Small Ger-
man" solution excluding Austria or the "Great German" solution including
Austria. In this political struggle, Prussia and Austria competed for
hegemony in Germany. Trade policy, and in particular the Franco-
Prussian Commercial Treaty, became objects of this dispute (1).
Bismarck, for whom trade policy was always subordinated to power poli-
tics, had several reasons to promote free trade in the 1850's and 1860's.
The majority in the Federal Diet was pro-free trade as were the influ-
ential Prussian Junkers, the rural aristocracy. At the same time high-
tariff Austria was still negotiating her membership in the Zollverein.
(1) A detailed and careful account of this struggle can be found in
Bohme [1966]. The present summary draws on this book.88
Yet, Austrian industrialists successfully blocked any tariff concessions
proposed by Bruck. A free trade position by Bismarck therefore under-
mined attempts by the southern states to balance Prussia's hegemonic
position with Austrian membership.
134. When the Franco-Prussian Commercial Treaty was initialled in March
1862 (see Figure 1) it was clear that - in the case of agreement by the
rest of the member states of the Zollverein - there was no chance for
Austria joining the Zollverein in the foreseeable future. In the ensuing
negotiations between Prussia and the Zollverein states in 1865, Bismarck
even threatened to let Prussia's membership lapse in case the treaty was
not signed by the Zollverein. In addition, in this treaty Prussia granted
MFN treatment to France, thus violating the 1853 treaty between Austria
and the Zollverein in which the signatories granted each other prefer-
ential treatment. The political struggle finally ended with the renewal of
the Zollverein in October 1865 on the basis of the Franco-Prussian
Treaty of 1862.
135. Purely economic considerations, of course, were present in the
Prussian and Zollverein decision to liberalize its tariff. Treaties similar
to the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty were signed by France with Belgium
(1861), Italy (1863), Switzerland (1864), Sweden, Norway, the Hanseatic
Cities, Spain and Holland in 1865. These treaties threatened the competi-
tive position of German producers in those markets and led to more
pressure" for trade liberalization in the Zollverein. These economic and
political changes led to the reorientation of the Zollverein's trade policy.
In addition to the Franco-Prussian Treaty similar commercial treaties
were signed by Prussia in 1865 with Great Britain, Belgium and Italy
[Henderson, 1959, p. 273], Transport on rivers and at sea also became
liberalized. Together with the removal or mitigation of transition duties,
the foundation for a strong expansion in foreign trade was set.
136. In 1867 the "Zollparlament" (Customs Parliament) and the "Zollbun-
desrat" (Customs Council) were established. In this reform unanimous
decisions were not required anymore, thus making trade policy more
flexible. Free-trade sentiment grew among the public and increasingly
influenced the members of these bodies. A tariff bill brought before the89
Zollparlament by the Zollbundesrat had to be withdrawn several times
upon the reproach of not being liberal enough. After several revisions,
the new tariff bill, a compromise between extreme free traders - the
northern Hanseatic Cities, the "Handelstag", the Prussian agrarians, and
so on - and moderate protectionists - mainly special interest groups such
as the "Verein der Zollvereinslandischen Eisenhiitten" (Union of Iron-
works of the Zollverein) as well as some southern states - passed the
Zollparlament on May 7, 1870 [Lambi, 1963, ch. 4].
137. This action by the Zollparlament was .not yet the final step towards
free trade. Although grain had been duty free since 1865, even in the
1870 tariff bill, pig iron and rough iron and textiles still had consider-
able protection, of which the former was strongly opposed by the agrari-
ans. These questions were overshadowed by the Franco-Prussian war of
1870/71 and the founding of the German Empire. But in 1872 the free
traders continued to press for the abandoning of all tariffs. Their case
was eased because revenue considerations became less pressing as
French reparation payments were received. Only a few iron industrialists
opposed the abolition of iron duties. In 1873 the new tariff passed the
Reichstag with a repeal of duties on pig iron (see Figure 1). Iron
goods, nets for fishing and soda were to become duty free on January
1, 1877 [Zimmermann, 1901, p. 228].
This final triumph of the free-trade movement already showed that the
peak was past. The political climate was changing. Germany's free-trade
policy in the late 1860's and early 1870's had not been honored by reci-
procal tariff concessions from other countries, the economic crisis of the
mid-1870's was already expected. Most important, however, the defeat on
the 1870 tariff bill convinced protectionists that they needed a national
coordination of their interests just like the free traders had in the "Han-
delstag" and the "Kongress der Volkswirte".
b. The Rise of Nationwide Interest Croups
138. The 1873 decision to postpone repeal of the iron tariffs until 1877
was considered a defeat by free traders. And rightly so, the "Verein90
Deutscher Eisengie Bereien" (Union of German Iron Foundries) which had
fought against free trade before 1873 and the "Verein zur Wahrung der
gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen in Rheinland-Westfalen" (Union
for the Promotion of the Common Economic Interests of Rhineland-West-
phalia) or "Langnamverein" (1) which was founded by the former union,
were convinced that for successful agitation their interests must be re-
presented on a broader basis. In November 1873, a number of West-
phalian iron masters formed the "Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahl-In-
dustrieller" (Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers), the
first nationwide protectionist lobby.
139. Meanwhile the boom after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 came
to an end in 1873. It had started with a rapid monetary expansion due
to French reparations, which were paid faster than expected. The in-
creased financial resources of the government were used for infra-
structure and military consumption. The rapid expansion is illustrated by
the increase in the production of the iron and steel industry; its output
increased from 1527 thousand tons in 1870 to 2440 thousand tons in 1873
- a quantity not reached again until 1878 [Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt,
1882, p. 33]. The turning point was the Vienna stock market crisis in
1873, which soon spread to stock markets all over the world. It was fol-
lowed by a worldwide recession and falling prices. "On all iron products
other than agricultural machinery the prices of 1878 were 50-60 percent
below those of 1873" [Lambi, 1963, p. 76].
140. This course of events undoubtedly helped the iron and steel indus-
try in their agitation by attributing the recession to the free trade
decision in 1873, a political trick described by Corden [1987] as "guilt
by association". Yet, their first attempts to infiltrate the free trade
organizations such as the "Kongress Deutscher Volkswirte" and the
"Verein fur Socialpolitik" failed [Lambi, 1963, Ch. VII; Bohme, 1966,
p. 359 ff.]. In 1875 a repeal of the iron tariffs was defeated as well
[Bohme, 1966, p. 377 ff.]. One of the major obstacles to successful agi-
tation of the protectionist lobbies was their lack of unity. Each interest
group propagated its own narrow interests, in many cases neutralizing
(1) Bismarck called it this because of its long name: "lang[er] Nam[e]".91
each other. Leading members of the "Langnamverein" therefore tried to
broaden the base of the protectionist movement [see Lambi, 1963,
Ch. VIII]. The widening economic crisis meanwhile had affected the
traditionally protectionist southern textile industry as well as other in-
dustries. When in 1876 the "Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller
(CDI)" (Central Association of German Industrialists) was founded it was
dominated by the "Langnamverein" and the "Verein Siiddeutscher Baum-
wollindustrieller" (Union of South German Cotton Industrialists). The
"Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller" joined in 1877. In the
following years the CDI expanded to become the dominating interest
group of German industry. It included neither agriculture nor commerce.
141. A second attempt to pass protectionist legislation in the Reichstag
in 1877 was rejected by the coalition of agrarians, commercial and polit-
ical laissez-faire liberals [Lambi, 1963, p. 130]. It became clear that
without some sort of agreement with agrarian interests the free trade
majority in the Reichstag and in the bureaucracy could not be defeated.
The political power structure in the Reich gave overwhelming influence
to Prussian politicians in the parliament as well as in the bureaucracy
[Fischer, 1972, p. 202](l). In Prussia a semi-governmental agricultural
organization, the "Landesokonomiekollegium", had already existed since
1842 [Fischer, 1972, p. 196]. The representatives (Landesokonomierate)
fulfilled both governmental duties and agitated for the interests of agri-
culture. Dominated by the Junkers, their activities were all free-trade
oriented since this group accounted for the majority of grain exports.
External shocks to German and especially Prussian agriculture helped to
turn their stand on trade policy matters.
142. The signs observed in Germany were falling grain prices and a de-
terioration of the trade balance in grain, and later in temperate zone
foodstuffs in general. Rye prices fell most, from 175 marks/ton in 1873
to 132 marks/ton in 1878. In particular, Prussian farmers were adversely,
affected by the drop in rye prices, since they were growing rye on
about one third of their cultivated land [ Statistisches Reichsamt, 1881,
p. 25]. The underlying reasons for this development were first of all the
(1) Eschenburg [1955], however, questions such influence.92
rapid expansion of agricultural output in the United States, and second-
ly, the loss of the natural protection of high transport cost. For ex-
ample, US wheat production almost doubled between 1870 and 1879, while
exports almost tripled [Lambi, 1963, p. 132], In 1878 US wheat exports
of 4 096 678 tons [ibid.] compared to a total wheat production in Ger-
many of 2 278 696 tons [Statistisches Reichsamt, 1881, p. 24]. The
North American railroads made the export of Midwestern grain to Europe
profitable. These developments did not so much lead to increased German
imports of American grain as to diminishing market shares on the British
market. By 1879, the United States and Canada supplied 68.2 percent of
British grain imports, while Germany's share had fallen to 2.9 percent
[Lambi, 1965, p. 133].
143. The bad harvest of 1876 illustrated another effect of a free trade
policy on agricultural incomes. Under autarky small harvests go hand in
hand with higher prices, thus stabilizing agricultural incomes. World
market prices, however, are determined almost independently of such
regional variability in yields. In all cases of domestic supply fluctua-
tions, incomes fluctuate more under such a regime. Therefore the ex-
perience of 1876 made the farmers who were oriented towards local mar-
kets more inclined to switch to a protectionist policy than the export
oriented large estates in the east. The first agricultural association that
joined the demands of the iron and steel industry was the "Volkswirt-
schaftlicher Verein fur das Rheinland" (Economic Union for the Rhine-
land) . Not only its proximity to the industrial center but also the easy
transport channels for American grain explain this change in policies.
The export-oriented estates in the east, organized in the "Vereinigung
der Steuer- und Wirtschaftsreformer" (Association for the Reform of
Taxation and the Economy) of 1876, turned protectionist only slowly. To
this group the first goal was a reorientation of taxation away from fixed
capital to other sources. Increased tariff revenues seemed a worthwhile
alternative for raising government revenues [Zimmermann, 1901, p. 273].
144. Even though there was no unanimous support for protection policies
in their respective clientele the agrarian as well as industrial organiza-
tions became increasingly dominated by protectionists. The general93
agreement on both sides to favor a reinstatement of tariffs for iron as
well as for grain was however contrasted by the inability of both groups
to settle on the proposed tariff structure. The protectionist sentiment
was still contrasted by the economic insight that each group should sup-
port free trade for the others and protection for their own commodities.
The final return to a protectionist trade policy, then, was merely pre-
pared by the lobbies. They did not get beyond protectionist propaganda
until 1879. It was, again, changing interests in foreign policy which
made it feasible to write and pass the tariff reform law in 1879.
c. The Return to Protection
145. The founding of national interest groups in Germany changed the
political climate. In the late 1860's and early 1870's public opinion was
dominated by the free-trade agitation of the liberal associations; after
1876 protectionists first gained influence in their respective industrial
organizations such as the CDI and in the agrarian unions. Free trade
oriented industries and farmers were outvoiced in public debate. This
process then carried over to political parties and elections. In 1878 pro-
tectionists for the first time had a majority of votes in the Reichstag.
146. Nevertheless, the "iron and rye" coalition of the CDI and the Jun-
ker-dominated "Vereinigung der Steuer- und Wirtschaftsreformer" could
not agree on a compromise for the proposal of a new tariff, despite their
common interest in passing such a legislation. Again it was Bismarck who
saw a coincidence between protectionist interests and his own. He was
not interested in the welfare aspects of alternative trade policy frame-
works as becomes evident from his writings [see, e.g., Lambi, 1963,
Ch. XI; Dawson, 1904, Chs. IV, V]. Trade policy Bismarck regarded as
"a part of internal policy of the German Empire, connecting it to the
problem of Imperial strength and unity, the issue of taxation, the rela-
tionship between the executive and the legislative powers, and the bal-
ance of political parties in the Reichstag" as it is characterized by Lambi
[1963, p. 163].94
147. Protectionist interests of "iron and rye" coincided with Bismarck's
interest in revenues which the Reich could raise without depending on
the Bundestag and the states. In favoring a more or less uniform tariff,
he hoped for consensus among the diverging interests of industries and
agriculture. In several other political decisions collaboration with the
protectionist majority also seemed more advantageous to him. Just as he
had backed free traders in the Zollverein to further his political inter-
ests for the Small-German solution twenty years earlier, he switched to
protectionist policies. In his mercantilist attitude he supported high
tariffs as a bargaining chip for trade negotiations with France, Austria,
and Russia.
148. Each actor in this situation had different objectives in mind, but all
were united by the belief that increased tariffs would achieve their
goals. In July 1879, the "almost" free-trade era of Germany came to an
end. Grain and iron tariffs were reintroduced and other tariffs raised
(see Figure 1). Ad valorem rates were approximately at their 1868 levels
with industrial products facing a 10-15 percent tariff [Lambi, 1963,
p. 226]. The average tariff doubled from somewhat below 3 percent to
about 6 percent (see Figure 1). According to the estimates of effective
rates of protection by Webb [1977], the winner was the cartellized iron
industry with 12 percent, followed by rye and wheat with 9 percent,
whereas hogs had a negative effective rate of protection of -1 percent.
149. The tariff of 1879 was considered a success of the CDI [Bohme,
1966, p. 562]. The tariff on wheat of 10 marks per ton amounted to only
a 5 percent ad valorem rate whereas raw iron was protected by an ap-
proximately 15 percent ad valorem rate [Fremdling, 1987, p. 36]. This
unsatisfactory situation for the agrarian interests was changed in the
following years. Due to increasing influence of the East-Elbian aris-
tocracy in the "Vereinigung der Steuer- und Wirtschaftsreformer"
[Bohme, 1966, p. 401 f.] and in the parliament [Gerschenkron, 1943,
p. 148] grain tariffs rose to 30 marks in 1885 and 50 marks per ton in
1887. Effective rates of protection in 1889/90 went up to 48 percent
(rye) and 35 percent (wheat), whereas those for iron remained constant
[Webb, 1977, pp. 349 and 355].95
150. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the German economy
underwent rapid structural changes which was only partly reflected in
the development of interest groups and their internal and external pol-
icies. One would expect increasing influence of more innovative, modern
industries in the CDI. In the agrarian groups farmers producing food-
stuffs for local markets, such as vegetables and dairy products, also
should have become more influential. Both of these groups favor low
prices on their inputs, i.e. on grain. Therefore their interests should
be directly opposed to the "iron and rye" coalition of CDI and the "Ver-
ein der Wirtschafts- und Steuerreformer". -
Yet, the reaction in industry differed from that in agriculture. The
growing dissatisfaction of the export oriented light industry led to a
split up of the CDI. With the encouragement of the "Chemieverein"
(Chemicals Union) which in 1889 had already left the CDI, the "Bund
der Industriellen" (Bdl, Union of Industrialists) was founded in 1895. It
united small and medium size firms and was organized under the prin-
ciple of one vote for each member combined with low membership fees
(1). Without contacts to the administration and working with little re-
sources, the Bdl gained little influence [Blaich, 1979, p. 35 ff.].
Chances for coalitions in trade policy questions were slim mainly for
political reasons. In the Reichstag only the SPD and left-wing liberals
were still supporting free trade policies and these groups had no other
common political ground on which to cooperate with the Bdl.
151. The Junkers, on the other hand, boosted their dominating role as
representatives of agriculture without loosing the support of the small
farmers. After having complete control over the "Verein der Wirtschafts-
und Steuerreformer", they founded the Bund der Landwirte (BdL -
Agrarian League) in 1893. It was a reaction to the slight lowering of
grain tariffs in bilateral treaties with Austria, Russia, and others which
Leo von Caprivi, the Imperial Chancellor, had concluded in 1891. In
(1) The Bdl had a membership fee of 5 marks per year. The CDI mini-
mum fee was 100 marks. With higher payments, however, a member
could buy more votes. Specifically, 100-299 marks admitted one dele-
gate, 300-599 marks admitted two delegates, and for each additional
300 marks one extra delegate was allowed.96
order to mediate the opposition of the Junkers, Caprivi abolished the
certification of origin which was needed to get a tariff refund for reex-
ported grain. This amounted to a considerable export subsidy to the
Junkers. Yet, they further increased their demands. In the "Antrag
Kanitz" (Kanitz motion), as it has become known, they asked for a state
grain-import monopoly which should fix grain prices at the average of
the 1850-1890 prices. As a consequence German grain prices would have
been about 100 percent above world market prices [Gerschenkron, 1943,
p. 53]. Although the bill was repeatedly defeated in the Reichstag, it
was introduced again and again.
152. These events shed an interesting light on the form in which trade
policy disputes were conducted in Germany at the end of the 19th cen-
tury. The agitation against free trade more and more turned into an
amalgam of political ideology and demagoguery. Antisemitism went hand in
hand with opposition to stock markets, futures markets, and industrial-
ization in general. Overall, one can conclude that the Junkers succeeded
in turning the trade policy debate which was discussed as an economic
question into a political debate on nationalism and on the preservation of
the old society [Barkin, 1970, Ch. 4], Reichskanzler von Bulow, for
exemple, told Emperor Wilhelm II: "I hold increased protection for agri-
culture absolutely necessary out of economic, and still more out of so-
cial, political, and national grounds ... The cities are swelling into a
hypertrophied state, the land is being depopulated. Therein lies the
great danger, not only from the standpoint of our military strength, for
the land delivers, all in all, better soldiers than the cities, but for our
whole social structure" [cited in Barkin, 1970, p. 220].
153. The coalition between the Junker-dominated BdL and the iron-in-
dustry dominated CDI on trade policy against free traders in the "Deut-
sche Handelstag" (DHT, German Trade Council) and the Bdl entailed a
mixture of economic and political compromises. Contemporary writers such
as Naumann emphasized the power politics of the tariff policy debate:
"All economic debate is only the accompaniment of a bitter struggle for
power in the state. The present leaders of the tariff movement were
themselves free traders thirty years ago. At that time free trade was the
path to power ... The tariff is not to be conceived of as an economic97
measure; as such it is and must remain incomprehensible. It is a foray
of political will into the economy. As an old, tested ruling class, the
grain nobility knows the limits of its power, and would rather share it
with the iron barons than give it up" [cited in Barkin, 1970, p. 202].
It also was a compromise between economic interests. The agrarians used
their opposition against the "Mittellandkanal" (1) and the naval program
as a bargaining chip. The CDI proposed backing the BdL in its demand
for higher tariffs in return -for agrarian support for the state investment
programs noted [Blaich, 1979, p. 27 ff.].
The "von Bulow" tariff of 1902 (see Figure 1) then incorporated in-
creased protection for grain from 25-30 percent to 40-50 percent
[Fremdling, 1986, p. 37]. The decrease in comparative advantage of
grain growing in East Germany was mitigated but not solved. Even
though the Junkers' economic influence was deteriorating, they estab-
lished their political power. Similarly, the large-scale iron and steel in-
dustry benefited from the demand boost of the naval and canal projects.
5. The Interwar Period
154. In the Treaty of Versailles (Art. 268) Germany had to grant MFN
treatment to all signatories of the treaty for five years. Tariff rates
were fixed at their 1914 levels for six months, except for grain and veg-
etables, whose tariff rates were fixed for three years. Under the treaty,
the practical prohibition of foreign trade which had been introduced in
1917 ("Verordnung iiber die Regelung der Einfuhr, vom 16. Januar
1917") for imports, and during 1914/15 for exports, was repealed. The
more important decision, however, concerns what later became the famous
"Loch im Westen" (hole in the West). In the occupied territories west of
the Rhine, German tariff laws were not enacted. This hole - it was be-
lieved - made Germany practically a free trade area [Haberland, 1927,
(1) It was to connect the Rhine with the Elbe and thus allow shipping
from the Atlantic into eastern Germany.98
p. 38 ff.]. Therefore, wartime administrative controls were reinstituted
at all Rhine crossings. In 1920 the import controls were extended to
almost goods entering Germany. Very little statistical information on
Germany exists for the period 1914-1925. From the sketchy information
available one can conclude that foodstuffs, especially grain imports were
allowed [Ropke, 1934, p. 56]. But devaluation together with internal
price controls led to a grain price level below world market prices
[Gerschenkron, 1943, p. 107], and hence, pressure to export, not im-
port.
155. The German Government reacted to the beginning of the hyperin-
flation and the devaluation of the Reichsmark with export controls in the
same way as they had been used during World War I. Export duties were
introduced because it was feared that the devaluation of the Reichsmark
would lead to the "Ausverkauf Deutschlands" (sellout of Germany)
[Haberland, 1927, p. 51]. These tight controls and interventions re-
mained in place until 1924, when hyperinflation was stopped and a return
to a normal trade policy seemed appropriate to political decision makers.
156. In the meantime, a general trend towards more protectionist trade
policies in most countries became evident. As a consequence of World
War I many industries had been built which - under peacetime prices -
turned out to be uncompetitive. Naturally, the demand for protection
from such industries increased. Already in 1920 Great Britain had im-
posed the "Dyestuffs Act" directed mostly against German exports. Other
industries were protected by over 30 percent tariffs in the "Safe-
guarding of Industries Act" in 1921 and 1925 [Blaich, 1985, p. 29]. The
United States, through the Fordney-McCumber Tariff in 1922 imposed
tariff barriers of 50 to 80 percent, in some cases of up to 200 percent
These were raised even further in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 [Blaich,
1985, p. 30].
157. Already in 1921 the "Reichswirtschaftsministerium" (Imperial Minis-
try of the Economy) had started to design a tariff which was to replace
the Biilow tariff of 1902 by 1925. The "Reichsverband der Deutschen In-99
dustrie" (RDI) (1) established a trade policy commission which was in-
fluential in the design of the tariff reform. Still, the old conflicts be-
tween the export-oriented modern industry and the protectionist basic
industries remained. In 1924 inside the RDI the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
Eisenverarbeitenden Industrie" (AVI-Working group of the metal working
industries) was formed with the intention of counterbalancing the influ-
ence of the revised solidarity bloc of 1902 between agriculture and heavy
industry. In the presence of rising trade barriers imposed by most of
Germany's trading partners and under the pressure of protectionist
groups, the AVI settlement of 1925 ended in a protectionist compromise
with special treatment for AVI members. They were reimbursed the dif-
ference between world market and domestic price for any raw materials
or half-finished products which were imported for the production of ex-
port goods [Blaich, 1979, p. 76],
158. The tariff reform of 1925 raised tariffs considerably over their 1913
levels for textiles, automobiles, and instruments (see Table 16). Duties
on semi-manufactured goods were slightly lowered. The increased selec-
tivity in manufacturing products went by largely unnoticed. The public
debate concentrated on agricultural tariffs. Whereas grain prices were
below world market prices in the early 1920's and after the stabilization,
the demand for tariff protection by agricultural lobbies came at a time of
already rising grain prices which reached their peak in 1925. The op-
position of the center and of social democrats who represented consumer
interests was not strong enough to block the reinstatement of grain
tariffs, but their level was below the 1902 Bulow tariff.
159. In the period 1925-1929 tariff policy changed very little. Falling
world market prices at constant specific tariffs, however, constituted
rising grain protection [Gerschenkron, 1943, p. 133]. Costs of produc-
tion declined in the United States and Canada through the introduction
of the tractor, the combine, and dry-farming. Together with increasing
(1) The RDI, founded in 1919, was the overall umbrella organization of
German industry. It arose from the unification of CDI and Bdl. The
conflicts between the previous two organizations continued inside
RDI, however.100
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Source: Liepmann [1938, p. 383].
exports from Russia, prices reacted strongly especially after 1928
[Ropke, 1934, p. 57]. In 1927 agricultural protection in Germany was
higher than in neighboring countries [Liepmann, 1938, p. 113]. This
development ended in an ad valorem equivalent tariff of over 80 percent
in 1931, for some grains such as rye of up to 300 percent.
160. The world economic crisis brought about the final turn of German
trade policy toward near autarchy in foodstuffs, while semi-manufactured
goods protection was raised from 10.4-18.6 percent in 1927 to 19.0-
27.8 percent in 1931 and industrial goods protection remained about
constant at 15.5-22.8 percent in 1927 and 15.0-21.6 percent in 1931.
Again, a coincidence of several factors made this trade policy change
possible. Because of the increasing world production of grain and the
beginning decline of grain prices most governments - including the
United States with the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 - resorted to protection
in order to help their agricultural clientele, thus increasingly turning
world grain markets into residual markets with accelerating downward
movement of prices. As ad valorem grain tariffs started to rise, world-
wide surplus grain pressed prices down. Subsequently governments in-
creased tariff levels to maintain internal grain price stability.101
161. In this spiral tariffs were raised to unprecedented levels, but agri-
cultural incomes could not be maintained in Germany. In 1929, the lead-
ing agricultural organizations got together and formed the "Griine Front"
(Green Front). For the first time since World War I, a united agricul-
tural lobby - organized across party lines - started to influence the
parliamentary process. The intense agitation - inside and outside parli-
ament - of the Griine Front did succeed; not least since the SPD, in its
1927 congress in Kiel, abandoned its strict advocacy of consumer in-
terests in favor of a grain monopoly which would "serve the interests of
both consumers and producers primarily by pursuing a policy of price
stabilization". The underlying idea of the program was that an under-
standing between industrial workers and peasants was a necessary safe-
guard of democracy [Gerschenkron, 1943, p. 128 f.]. Although the
agrarian program did not explicitly support agrarian tariffs, the social
democratic government during the second half of 1929 increased grain
tariffs by almost 100 percent.
162. Whereas the East-Elbian Junkers were for a short time relieved from
international competition, effective protection of cattle and dairy farmers
diminished drastically. In order to prevent the collapse of farmers pro-
ducing high-grade products parallel tariff increases became necessary for
virtually all agricultural products. In addition, quota regulations and
other measures such as the "Vermahlungszwang" which forced German
flour-mills to use a certain percentage of German wheat, the government
monopoly of maize, or the dying of rye to prevent it from entering the
market for human consumption had been introduced [Ropke, 1934,
p. 58]. With this host of interventions, the German Government isolated
the domestic grain market almost entirely from the world market; home
production increased to make Germany practically self-sufficient in bread
grains.
163. Agrarian protection, however, did not succeed in stabilizing
domestic grain prices or agricultural incomes. After early attempts of
open-market interventions failed due to a lack of financial resources, the
measures mentioned dramatically increased the price differences between
German and world-market prices to over 200 percent for wheat and al-102
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most 200 percent for rye in 1934 (1) (Figure 2). Nevertheless, the down-
ward trend in domestic prices was not be stopped. Between 1927 and
1933 wheat prices fell from 27.33 RM/1000 kg to 19.18 RM/1000 kg and
rye prices fell from 25.03 RM/1000 kg to 15.73 RM/1000 kg. Between
1925 and 1933, on the other hand, industrial wages remained about con-
stant. The average salary for one shift in coal mining was 6.90 RM in
1925 and 6.92 RM in 1933. In the same period, annual per-capita incomes
in agriculture fell from 582 RM to 447 RM [Statistisches Reichsamt, 1925-
1933]. The relative position of agriculture deteriorated during this
period. This may also explain, why - despite the dramatic sectoral pro-
tection of agriculture - farmers were not satisfied with the governments
at that time and in large portions turned to the National Socialists in
1932.
(1) Measured as the difference between the German average price and
the price in Rotterdam in percent of the Rotterdam price [ Statisti-
sches Reichsamt, 1936].103
164. When Hitler came to power in 1933 international trade relations were
already at a low ebb. Protection proliferated and bilateralism became the
dominating form of conducting trade relations. The American Reciprocal
Trade Agreement Act (1934), the British Import Duties Act (1932), and
the "Neue Plan" or "Schacht Plan" (1934) (noted in Figure 1) by the
German government are evidence for this swing to bilateralism. In Ger-
many, the National Socialists completed what previous governments had
started: the total control of foreign trade. Industrial and agricultural
organizations became centralized. The control of agriculture was taken
over by the "Reichsnahrstand" (Reich Food Estate) which at the same
time was a government monopoly administrating foreign trade and domes-
tic prices and it was the unified organization of farmers.
Soon the logic of "Kriegswirtschaft" (war economy) took over and bilat-
eral trade was conducted according to the preferences of the National-
Socialist leaders. Export subsidies and export cartels were introduced to
promote the export of finished products in order to finance imports of
raw materials and strategic military goods. A complex administrative
structure developed which added to the inefficiency of administered
prices. Germany's import share of GDP dropped from some 15 percent in
the late 1920's to about 6 percent after 1934. Economic considerations
more and more disappeared. Hitler commented at the annual party con-
vention in Nuremberg in September 1936: "I consider it necessary that
now 100 percent autarky will be established with iron resolution in all
areas in which it is feasible ... . The German economy must be ready
for war in 4 years." [Cited in Fischer, 1961, p. 76: authors' trans-
lation] .
6. Germany's Return to the World Market
165. There are only a few cases in history where there is a chance to
redesign thoroughly trade institutions and trade policy. The end of
World War II provided this chance internationally, as well as nationally
for Germany. Why did Germany not establish a free-trade system? After
all, the autarchic prewar policies were discredited. In this case too, a104
mixture of domestic and foreign policy goals conflicted. On the national
level one would expect ample opportunities for a rational new beginning
after the unconditional capitulation. Yet, interest groups formed faster
than administrations and the parliamentary system. Consequently the
constellation of domestic interests came out similar to that before World
War II (and even World War I), but of course the international con-
straints facing Germany were far different.
a. Allied Objectives
166. When an end to World War II came in sight in 1944, the govern-
ments of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR had already
decided to put the authority over Germany in the hands of the Allied
Control Council, composed of the chiefs of staff of the three countries -
it was joined by France on May 1, 1945. The Allied Control Council was
designed to decide on matters concerning Germany as a whole - under
the directives of the national governments. The division of Germany into
occupation zones, the principle of unanimity for decisions in the Allied
Control Council, and the provision that in cases of disagreement each
occupying force could act independently in its zone, were crucial de-
cisions on Germany's way back to sovereignty. Apart from the measures
taken in the Allied Control Council, each country became active in its
own zone.
167. American interests and goals were laid down in three documents:
the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive (JCS) 1067, the Executive Committee
on Economic Foreign Policy (ECEFP) D-61/45, and the Informal Policy
Committee on Germany (IPCOG) 2 [cf. Jerchow, 1979, Appendix]. The
central document is the JCS 1067, in which the political goals as well as
the immediate measures to be taken after the occupation were formulated.
With respect to foreign trade the Americans expected the Control Council
to "establish centralized control over all trade in goods and services with
foreign countries" (JCS 1067, § 40). For the American zone foreign trade
was- restricted so as to ensure that "imports which are permitted and
furnished to Germany are confined to those unavoidably necessary to the
objectives stated in paragraphs 4 and 5", and that "exports to countries105
other than the United Nations are prohibited unless specifically autho-
rized by the Allied governments" (JCS 1067, § 41).
168. Whereas JCS 1067 was concerned with the immediate postwar situa-
tion, the ECEFP prepared a document outlining the long range perspec-
tives on German foreign trade. In the so-called ECEFP D-61/45, the main
objective of American economic policy in Germany consisted of preventing
the participation of Germans in international cartels, which was thought
to be a safeguard against any quick economic recovery of Germany. The
ECEFP expected a complete breakdown of German foreign trade after the
capitulation. Later - it was expected - any emerging trade should be
conducted between the administration of the Occupying Forces and for-
eign governments. An agency under allied control which could administer
and control Germany's foreign trade in the interest of the Allied nations
was proposed. The Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) realized this idea
for the Bizone (the British and American zones combined) in January
1947.
169. Finally, the IPCOG, which had drafted JCS 1067, prepared a doc-
ument containing the American objectives regarding reparations and res-
titution. This document - IPCOG 2 - made very it clear that, parallel to
the political interests of the United States with respect to Germany, the
economic interests of American export industry were to be secured in all
decisions on foreign trade. The provisions of IPCOG 2 were designed to
limit, as far as possible, the flow of German finished products, in the
form of reparations or commercial exports, to the world market. Yet, at
the same time, the cost of the Occupation Forces and any US shipments
- mainly foodstuffs - should be financed by Germany through exports.
These two conflicting provisions reflected diverging interests in the
American administration and eventually forced new and clearer policy
decisions upon the US government.
170. The British government was faced with the same dilemma, though
more directly than the US government. It was believed that an eco-
nomically strong Germany was essential for a well-functioning and
profitable European market, favorable to the British export industry and
the British treasury. On the other hand, the administration did not want106
Germany's exports to compete with the British. The compromise was es-
sentially the same as the American decisions: Germany should be allowed
to export just enough to pay for the expenditures of the Allies.
171. France was not so much concerned with concrete economic objec-
tives, since she was focusing on dividing Germany into small independent
units. With such a policy de Gaulle had expected to lay the ground for
France to become a hegemonical power in Western Europe and, at the
same time, to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to
French interests, military or economic.
172. These were essentially the ideas and objectives of the Western Allies
when they took command of their respective zones. However, when con-
fronted with reality in Germany and with the policies of other countries,
each had to adjust her objectives as well as her policy measures over the
following months and years.
b. After Capitulation
173. The Allied Control Council issued Proclamation No. 2 in September
1945; it took away Germany's sovereignty for all external contacts, eco-
nomic, political and diplomatic, foreign trade had already begun under
Allied Control. The first investigations, ordered by OMGUS (Office of
Military Government United States, Berlin), predicted starvation, epi-
demics, and disorder. By broad interpretation of JCS 1067 §5, General
Clay, the Deputy Military Governor for Germany, ordered the import of
more than 950 000 tons of wheat from June to December 1945 [Jerchow,
1978, p. 149] for the American and British zones. In Washington there
were obvious misconceptions about the extent of destruction in Germany.
Members of the OMGUS in Berlin, however, clearly saw the need for ini-
tiatives beyond the spirit of the political directives coming from Washing-
ton. Since food imports were expected to continue in 1946 and 1947, the
allied authorities in Germany had to find ways of financing these im-
ports. To use American of British taxpayers' money was not feasible
politically. Therefore OMGUS made clear to the newly founded "Lander-
rat": "For payment of imports, balance of exports are essential." [ibid.,107
p. 353]. The "Landerrat" was asked to prepare an export-production
program and submit it to OMGUS "to provide sufficient funds to meet the
obligations arising from imports of food, merchandise, raw materials and
supplies currently required for minimum subsistence" [American Military
Government Regulations, Title 13-302, cited in Jerchow, 1978, p. 369].
174. Not only the immediate financial interests of the United States as
the main food supplier were important. France depended on imports of
German coal. Ninety-four percent of all exports from the British zone
between August and December 1945 consisted of coal [Jerchow, 1978,
p. 341]. Exports from the French zone were also dominated by raw
materials and intermediate inputs [ibid., p. 166]. All foreign trade was
conducted through the allied military administrations and export prices
were set significantly below world market levels. Whereas France and
Britain, at least in the short run, seemed to benefit from such a situa-
tion by buying below world market prices, the United States lost. That
country had to supply the food aid which was only to a small extent paid
for by German exports and she did not gain from their underpricing.
This apparent discrepancy between economic and political interests was
immediately recognized in the OMGUS and much later in Washington.
Consequently, the OMGUS was more favorable towards an expansion and
liberalization of German exports than the Allies and Washington, but
would not precommit itself to a unilateral solution.
c. The Joint-Export-Import Agency (JEIA) Era
175. Despite ongoing negotiations in the Control Council and by the
Allied Foreign Ministers for a unified Germany, "by the spring of 1946
much of this optimism has gone" [Gimbel, 1968, p. 52] as General Lucius
Clay wrote. In spring and summer 1946 the United States went ahead to
establish the Bizone. In the Bevin-Byrnes Treaty of December 2, 1946,
balanced trade by 1949 was envisaged. The JEIA was founded and be-
came responsible for the administration of foreign trade. In the beginn-
ing, all contracts with foreign countries were made by the JEIA. The
Dollar Clause required that all German exports be paid in US dollars, a
condition under which many countries - short of dollars themselves -108
were not willing to trade with Germany. This policy Erhard called the
most damaging for German recovery [Erhard, 1954, p. 81]. In the
course of the next two years the JEIA increasingly delegated authority
to German exporters and to the German administration.
176. After the Currency Reform of 1948 artificial export and import
prices - set by the JEIA and the French administration in their own
favor - were replaced by the exchange rate DM3.33 per US dollar and
partial convertibility. In December 1948 the JEIA permitted direct trading
negotiations of German businessmen with their foreign customers. Foreign
trade expanded considerably in this period [Gimbel, 1968, p. 230].
177. The political factors leading to this change are manifold. Severe
economic problems in Britain and France naturally made the United States
an economic and political leader. The political process in the United
States, therefore, dominated Allied policies in the western zones. In
Washington, economic policies were discussed in a wider political context.
The beginning of the Cold War on the one hand and the financial burden
of the economic recovery program for Western Europe on the other hand
became the background for decisions regarding the Bizone and later the
Trizone. One cannot single out any one argument as being decisive for
this policy change from JCS/1067 and other documents to active recovery
programs and liberalization. Yet, economic as well as political consi-
derations pointed in the same direction:
- The establishment of civil governments and administrations in the
Soviet zone as early as in summer 1945 was feared as supportive of
socialist tendencies in the western zones. To stop the communist threat
economically and politically, decentralized zones were seen as the ap-
propriate measures. Economic policies, therefore, were oriented
towards the establishment and strengthening of a market economy with-
out cartels or large conglomerates. In general, European recovery - it
was hoped - would lead to the "eventual unification of Germany by
drawing the Soviet zone into the West with the economic magnet of
higher production, better living standards, and the like; possible
attraction of Czechoslovakia and Poland by this same economic magnet"
[Gimbel, 1968, p. 163/4].109
Economic considerations were dominated by the overwhelming interests
of all Western Allies in a quick European recovery. The concerns of
American taxpayers were sharply formulated in Congress. The adminis-
tration, therefore, designed the Marshall Plan so as to achieve a quick
recovery. Gimbel [1968, p. 166] summarizes the view of the Presi-
dent's committee on Foreign Policy that "the American desire for Ger-
man recovery and the economic needs of Europe dovetailed neatly, pro-
vided that political-military factors were not ignored. It said that, in
the main, other countries needed German metals, machinery and chemi-
cals to attain self-sufficiency". During the Marshall Plan hearings in
June 1948 Marshall himself stated that German recovery was so es-
sential for the rest of Western Europe that the United States would go
ahead without a four-power agreement.
d. Constrained Sovereignty
178. When the Allied High Commission returned de facto sovereignty in
trade policy to the German Federal Government in November 1949 (1),
West Germany's return to the world market was already prepared by
several decisions under JEIA authority. Although the von Bulow tariff of
1902 remained in force, the completely centralized trade contracts by the
JEIA had resulted in bilateral quota systems laid down in trade treaties
with almost 50 countries by late 1949. Only in rare cases were tariffs
charged on the price-controlled imports. This system was used by the
German government to conduct bilateral trade policy.
179. During the first GATT Round in Geneva the occupying countries
granted unconditional MFN status to all imports on the basis of the old
von Biilow tariff. This "Statement of Annecy", amounting to a unilateral
liberalization, was harshly criticized in the German public. Even Ludwig
Erhard called it a "servitude" comparable to the treatment of Germany in
the treaty of Versailles: [Erhard, 1954, p. 210]. Yet, even before the
"Statement of Annecy", the Bipartite Control Office (BICO) had already
(1) De jure, the AHC still signed all trade treaties. This was abandoned
in March, 1951, with Directive No. 6 of the High Commission.110
warned that the conditions for West Germany's entering the GATT - the
Geneva Agreement - were not met, since "some of the existing German
tariff rates do constitute significant barriers to trade and, therefore,
the assumption on which the agreement is based are to that extent not
satisfied" (1). This initiated several rounds of haggling over a list of
tariff preferences between the BICO and the "Vereinigte Wirtschaftsrat".
Finally, in April 1950, the BICO succeeded in pushing through the list
of tariff preferences for West Germany.
180. Parallel to West Germany's integration in international organizations
the JEIA had designated the Bizone as a leader in trade liberalization
inside the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). On
November 2, 1949, the member states agreed to remove quotas on
50 percent of their imports within six weeks. Germany continued in lead-
ing liberalization and reached - interrupted by the "Liberalisierungsstop"
in early 1951 - a "Liberalisierungsquote" of 90 percent in spring 1953.
Overall, about two thirds of German imports were free of quotas by 1952
[Erhard, 1954, p. 116]. Whereas Erhard attributed this leadership role
to the free-trade orientation in the German government, others point to
the political pressure of the JEIA Administration as the moving force.
181. In this situation of limited sovereignty for West Germany and a lack
of consensus inside West Germany about the principles of a future trade
policy, a new tariff code had to be written for economic as well as pol-
itical reasons. A prerequisite for Germany's participation in the GATT
conference on trade liberalization in Torquay was the enactment of a
tariff code which was not to be a bargaining tariff. The von Biilow tariff
of 1902 was inappropriate for several reasons:
- It was a specific tariff. Since relative prices and industrial structure
had changed, the ad valorem equivalent rates could not represent any
trade policy interests at all.
- Most countries' tariff schedules used the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.
For tariff negotiations West Germany needed a comparable tariff
schedule.
(1) BICO/Memo (48) 84; cited in Jerchow [1979, p. 259].Ill
- A new tariff would allow Germany regain room for manoever, since un-
conditional MFN treatment had been granted to third countries in the
Statement of Annecy on the basis of the von Biilow tariff. The "Zollta-
rifausschuss" (Tariff Commission) explicitly stated: this Statement
"kann nur durch einen neuen Zolltarif uberwunden werden." [BMWi,
a, p. 8].
182. The other member states of the OEEC naturally expected Germany
to be the leader in tariff concessions because of her lack of political in-
fluence. They also watched very critically the formulation of the new
tariff schedule. The open-door policy of the US Administration nicely
matched European interests. The "Zolltarifausschuss", therefore, faced a
number of constraints, some explicitly written down, some implicit:
- According to the Geneva agreement (November 1949) the new tariff was
not to be a bargaining tariff. The German government, therefore,
decided to design the new schedule roughly according to the tariff
levels of 1937. This constraint alone would not have been very strong,
since 1937 tariff levels were extraordinarily high (Figure 1).
- The prohibition of a bargaining tariff also forced the " Zolltarif-
ausschuss" to consider other European countries' tariff levels. It was
to stay below the average European tariff level [ibid., p. 13]. An in-
dication of the political force of this constraint is the 180-page ap-
pendix the Zolltarifausschuss added to its proposal with a tariff-line-
by-tariff-line comparison of the new German tariffs with those of the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Benelux
[BMWi, b].
183. The "Zolltarifausschuss" was set up by the federal governments and
it consisted of 13 members [BMWi, 1950a, p. 8]: seven representatives
from federal and state governments, three from the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft
AuSenhandel" - one each from industry, retailers, and crafts - two from
agriculture, and one from the trade unions. The unequal representation
of certain sectors is evident. Three representatives were directly pro-
agriculture; two state government representatives came from rural
states. Consumers were not represented officially, but the representative
of the trade unions supported consumer interests. In general, the DGB112
favored tariff levels about 50 percent lower than those of the proposed
tariff schedule [Jerchow, 1979, p. 270].
184. Given the international constraints, the formulation of the tariff was
dominated by special interest groups with a protectionist bias. The aver-
age European tariff level was not surpassed, but some sectors obtained
above average protection. Agriculture succeeded in getting high tariffs,
yet her effective protection was lowered by high tariffs on fertilizer
supported by the chemical industry and trade unions. Similarly, the
textile industry, the steel industry, and the chemical industry were able
to establish their desired tariff levels.
185. Consequently, the AHC, whose approval was required, accepted the
average tariff level as sufficiently low, but criticized the too frequent
use of the maximum tariff of 35 percent; the "ZoUtarifausschuss" had
chosen to underline "the liberal nature of the tariff reform" [BMWi, a].
The AHC specifically ordered lower tariffs for several agricultural
products, for iron, aluminum, and steel products, for several textile
products, and for all chemicals. Subsequent negotiations between the
German Government and the AHC were accompanied by intense lobbying
of the criticized industries. In its first statement, even the Ministry of
Economics hinted that, if the AHC were to insist on its demands, West
Germany might be as well off renouncing participation in Torquay and
keeping its new tariff schedule [ibid., p. 273 f.]. Finally the German
Government made a few concessions and the tariff was sent to the
member states of GATT with the proviso "to reexamine certain of the
proposed rates." [ibid., p. 276].
186. It is evident that the politico-economic process inside Germany
resulted in a tariff which "is more strongly protectionist than was the
old even in its prime" [Wallich, 1955, p. 258], given the international
constraints set by GATT rules and the AHC. Of course, from this one
cannot deduce that West Germany was protectionist. After all, the tariff
was considered a bargaining tariff only. Yet, there were protectionist
groups in Germany, most notably agriculture, textiles, steel, and the
chemical industries. For them, the tariff code can be considered a suc-
cess. Even, if there were major tariff concessions in the GATT negotia-Bibliofhek
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tions, the sectoral structure of protection would most likely favor then,
although at a lower level (1). The discussion in the German government
and the German public during the formulation of the tariff and thereafter
made clear that there was no consensus on a truly liberal trading
regime. A majority was for modest liberalization, and proponents of a
unilateral move towards free trade could not find resonance in the gov-
ernment, nor the parliament, nor the public.
e. Reintegration
187. The last steps towards reintegration into the world trading system
came in April, 1951, when the protocol of Torquay was signed, and in
October, 1951 when West Germany became an official member of GATT.
During the ensuing years, the quota system was abandoned step by step
as planned in the OEEC. German trade policy during the Korea Boom was
determined by the unexpected success of her export industry. Unilateral
liberalization steps were believed to be the best form of export promotion
[Erhard, 1955, p. 244]. Agriculture, however, was exempted from this
process, as was the coal and steel complex. This liberalization was not
only considered a sign of goodwill, it also was forced by the constrained
convertibility of the Deutsche mark where trade was conducted on bi-
lateral trade accounts. The large surpluses on some of these accounts
amounted to a waste of resources. Since convertibility was not in sight,
lower import barriers saved export credits and facilitated bilateral trade.
(1) Incidentally, there has not been that much change in the tariff
structure over the last 40 years. See Chapters I and II.114
VI. Trade Policy and International Competitiveness of Industries
1. Introduction
188. Whatever the motives for the mixed assortment of trade and indus-
trial policies actually undertaken in West Germany, the question naturally
arises whether the policies have had any impact on trade flows. Because
the policies quantified in this study do discriminate among industries,
they can be expected to exert an influence on the international competi-
tiveness of industries located in West Germany. In order to isolate their
effect, the natural, or nontrade policy, causes need to be controlled.
Interindustry trade among countries with noticeably different is relativ-
ely well explained by the factor proportions hypothesis provided human
capital is recognized as a separate factor of production (1).
189. As poorer countries have grown faster than richer ones since World
War II, relative factor endowments of countries have become more similar
(2). At the same time, intraindustry trade has grown faster than inter-
industry trade [see Balassa, 1966; Grubel, Lloyd, 1975]. This empirical
phenomenon has been one element motivating a research program seeking
to explain the commodity composition of international trade among similar
countries. That program - the Strategic Trade Theory Program - focuses
on scale economies internal to the firm, and hence market structure, as
an independent explanation of trade flows. It has antecedents in what
Krugman [1987] approvingly calls the "counter-culture" of international
trade, such as Vernon's [1966] product cycle explanation for trade,
(1) This emerged in the wake of Leontief's [1954] famous paradox,
especially through the work of Kenen [1965]. An early survey of
empirical results in Stern [1975], See Weiss [1983] for a survey of
research on West Germany's trade, and Deardorff [1985] for a
survey of research on the United States' trade. Learner [1984]
throws cold water on the strict consistency of the empirical evidence
with a more than two factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, but it still holds
up as an empirical regularity and may not be so far from what the
model predicts in any case [Anderson, 1988],
(2) The facts are not in dispute. The "catch-up" hypothesis attributes
part of the more rapid growth to the lower initial level of income of
the poorer countries [see Abramovitz, 1986; Baumol, 1986; Heitger,
1987].115
which eventually pointed to R&D expenditures as determining competi-
tiveness. Trade theory pointing to economies of scale and market struc-
ture as determinants of trade flows has been thin on prediction of the
precise commodity composition of international trade, but thick on pre-
dictions of other characteristics of industries and firms that determine
the gains from trade.
190. Following Markusen and Venables [1986], it might be fair to sum-
marize the results of strategic trade theory according to two criteria
(1). One is that if markets are segmented a trade barrier can improve
welfare by driving down import prices and expanding domestic output
while driving firms down their average cost curves. Another, perhaps
more relevant criterion, is that under free entry of firms, trade policy
measures - be they tariffs or subsidies - tend to cause entry and so
lead to the dissipation of rents. More firms produce so that they move
"up the average cost curve" [Horstmann, Markusen, 1986]. In contrast,
if the number of firms is fixed, a policy measure targeted to one of the
firms can increase the firm's output and profits (2). It would be wrong
to think that strategic trade theory implies that governments should use
trade policy in this manner. On the contrary, the theory identifies and
formalizes additional sources of gains from trade in the presence of scale
economies when trade is liberalized [see especially Helpman, Krugman,
1985], namely the pro-competitive effect of trade. Thus the case for
multilateral trade barrier reductions to improve world welfare is
strengthened. For present purposes, the predictions of the theory about
firm size and a few other industry characteristics in the presence of
policy measures can be confronted with the facts for West Germany.
Thus, there is no attempt here at competitive testing of trade theories,
as factor proportions theory still has much to predict in the presence of
differences in factor endowments and in the absence of imperfect com-
petition in some industries [Helpman, Krugman, 1985]. Besides, as
Johnson wrote of another set of seemingly rival trade theories and "the
artificiality of the rival-hypothesis-testing approach" [Johnson, 1975,
(1) See also Venables [1985], Grossman and Richardson [1985],
Deardorff [1985], and Venables and Smith [1986].
(2) Especially clear examples are Brander and Spencer's R&D subsidies
[1983] and export subsidies [1985].116
p. 47]: "Every blind man who touches a part of the elephant learns some
of the truth about it - but not the whole truth; and only the rare un-
fortunate is unlucky enough to be caught in generalizing about the
elephant from an unrepresentative handhold on the tip of its tail".
2. Protection and Comparative Advantage
191. The interindustry structure of industries' competitiveness needs to
be measured in such a way that the effect of macroeconomic variables
which impinge upon the trade balance is allowed for. One such measure
is Liesner's [1958] and Balassa's [1967] concept of Revealed Comparative
Advantage (RCA). The version chosen here is:
RCA=ln[(xi/mi) / (j^/^)]
where x and m refer to exports and imports respectively, and the in-
dices run over industries at a point in time.
192. These values were calculated for West German industries trade with
the total world and for selected regions in the mid-1970's and the mid-
1980's. The results are shown in Table 17. It is immediately apparent
that - overall - the interindustry structure of competitiveness changed
very little. This even applies to the industries identified in Chapter II
as objects of pronounced trade or industrial policy - coal mining, iron
and steel, aircraft, data processing equipment, and textiles and clothing
- changed but little in RCA values. Indeed, some gained and some lost
in competitiveness. Traditionally strong German export industries, such
as mechanical engineering and road vehicles declined slightly, but pre-
cision mechanics, ceramic products and electrical engineering declined
more noticeably. The relative changes in each industry's position is much
more pronounced in trade with Japan and trade with the LDC's than in
trade with the total world.117











































































































































































































































































Source: Calculated from Statistisches Bundesamt [d].118
193. The factor proportions approach to explaining interindustry trade
flows works where factor proportions differ substantially among countries
and human capital is recognized as a separate factor of production
[Kenen, 1965]. Here, this factor was computed as the capitalized differ-
ence between wages and salaries per employee and the wage of unskilled
workers [Fels, 1972]. The results of regressions to explain the interin-
dustry pattern of competitiveness by human and physical capital inten-
sity are shown in Table 18. They are - not without reason - only partly
convincing. The evidence is certainly consistent with the observation
that West Germany is still a relatively capital rich country, but in trade
with the world as a whole the explained variation is low. Factor pro-
portions alone explain nothing about German-Japanese bilateral trade.
Only in trade with the LDC's do the hypotheses have any explanatory
power worth noting, a by now often found result [see, e.g., Fels,
1972], This outcome should not be too surprising given the relatively
small difference in per capita incomes and hence relative resource endow-
ments between West Germany and the larger trading partners.
194. While this is an unpromising start in trying to control natural de-
terminants of the interindustry structure of trade flows, German effec-
tive protection rates were added to the regressions. These were statis-
tically insignificant and of an unexpected sign, another by now common
result. One cause for this problem may be that other countries' struc-
tures of protection are codetermining trade outcomes in a systematic
way, and if these could be included in the analysis, the statistical
results would be more convincing. For the case of West Germany's bi-
lateral trade with Japan this was made possible by the availability of
Shouda's [1987] effective tariff protection calculation for the pre-Tokyo
Round and the post-Tokyo Round periods. The statistical analysis was
undertaken not because relative bilateral trade balances have any welfare
significance, but because it seems like a conceivable way to isolate the
effect of trade policy on trade flows. These rates, insofar as they could
reasonably be assigned to the German industrial classification, are shown
in Table 19. The interindustry structure of effective tariff protection in
Japan is not so different from that of other mature industrial countries.
Raw material intensive good, including food and beverages, are protected
more than most industries. The usefulness of the tariff protection119
Table 18 - Revealed Comparative Advantage as a Function of Selected


































+0.80 HUM CAP -0.14 PHYS CAP 0.09
(2.12*) (-0.50)
+0.28 HUM CAP +0.46 PHYS CAP -0.04
(0.34) (-0.72)
+3.40 HUM CAP +0.08 PHYS CAP 0.37
(3.87*) (0.11)
1985
+0.71 HUM CAP -0.12 PHYS CAP 0.13
(2.46*) (-0.54)
-0.63 HUM CAP -0.06 PHYS CAP -0.04
-0.87) (-0.10)









(a) Cross-section of industries; manufacturing industries, oil refining
excluded (N=28); t-values in parentheses; * significant at the 5 per-
cent level. - (b) All variables in natural logarithms; Revealed Com-
parative Advantage (RCA), see text; HUM CAP = human capital, PHYS CAP =
physical capital.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [d; e]; Baumgart et al. [various
issues].
estimates for further analysis might seem to be limited by the widely dis-
cussed apparent prevalence in Japan of other border measures and fin-
ancial assistance. This is not the place to enter into that discussion (1).
Suffice it to say that industrial policy measures in Japan appear to be
uncorrelated with tariff protection across industries [Heitger, Stehn,
1988] (2). The results of the new regressions are shown in Table 20.
(1) See e.g. Balassa [1987] and Saxonhouse [1984] for opposing views.
(2) Staiger, Deardorff, Stern [1987] present some tariff equivalents of
NTB's in Japan. A comparison of their Table 2 with Table 19 above
confirms this impression.120
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Firstly, for the early period, the factor proportions theory cum human
capital is confirmed. Secondly, the respective levels of effective protec-
tion exhibit the correct sign. Protection does hold out imports, and it
holds out imports more than it hinders exports. For the later period,
factor proportions break down, but this is entirely consistent with
Japan's rapid catching-up process relative to Germany and other coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the German effective protection structure hinders
exports from Japan. Finally, the change in Germany's interindustry com-
petitiveness is consistent with the change in Germany's industrial policy
(1). The significant negative sign on human capital is - once again -
consistent with Japan's relatively rapid growth.
(1) The change in Japanese tariffs has no discernible effect, perhaps
because of the increase in the relative importance of NTB's in that
country.121
Table 20 - Protection and Human Capital as Determinants of West





RCA 78 = -25.28 +2.16 HUM CAP +0.93 ERA G78 -0.35 EFF PROT J78 0.70 19.67*





-0.21 HUM CAP +0.71 ERA G85 -0.39 EFF PROT J85 0.20
(-0.32) (2.43*) (-1.52)
3.01
24.16 -2.17 HUM CAP +0.61 AERA G
(4.56*) (-4.40*) (2.89*)
+0.15 &EFF PROT J
(0.36)
0.47 8.00*
(a) Cross-section of industries (N=25). Observations are for those industries for
which Japanese tariffs are available; t-values in parentheses; * significant at
the 5 percent level. - (b) All variables in natural logarithms. RCA, revealed com-
parative advantage; HUM CAP, human capital (1978); ERA, total effective assistance
in West Germany, EFF PROT J, effective tariff protection in Japan; G, West Ger-
many; J, Japan; A change in 1978-1985.
Source: See Tables 8, 17, 18 and 19.
195. The technology-based hypotheses of Vernon and others fared uni-
formly poorly in explaining the interindustry pattern of competitiveness
Statistical tests of the influence of R&D intensity of industries were un-
successful. Vernon himself [1979] suggested that rapid dissemination of
innovations from one country to the next through the channel of the
multinational corporation would tend to produce this result for inter-
national flows of manufactured goods.
196. The newer theories of international trade are difficult to test across
industries on trade data. In the more competitive versions a domestic in-
dustrial policy improves welfare by getting domestic producers to move
down their average cost curves, i.e. to expand output, attaining a more
efficient scale of production. Specific predictions about which country
produces which commodity or which product variant, on the other hand,
are scarce [Krugman, 1983]. The oligopolistic versions of the newer the-
ories, in turn, do not make predictions about trade flows in all indus-
tries, but only in such industries that are characterized by few pro-
ducers and, by necessity, limited entry.122
3. Trade Policy and Industry Characteristics
197. But instead of confronting changes in trade and industrial policy
with trade flows, they can be correlated with changes in average firm
size across industries. It has been argued that a rise in protection
favors inefficient entry by new firms [Horstmann, Markusen, 1986], i.e.
these firms move up the average cost curve. The same may be true if
competitive pressures from abroad force distinct industries to reduce
capacities and discharge employees. If in such a situation industrial
policy raises protection, the process of shrinkage is held up and firms -
perhaps especially those on a smaller scale - which otherwise would have
to stop producing now operate in a less economical range of production.
Thus, in analogy to Horstmann and Markusen [1986] one might conceiv-
ably speak of "insufficient exit".
198. That such tendencies - less efficient scale of production in highly
protected industries - have been at work in West German manufacturing
industries is illustrated in Table 21. As can be seen (Equation [1]), the
change in average firm size, measured in percent changes in real sales
per firm, has been lowest in those industries which have received the
highest additional effective assistance since the late 1970's. In addition,
another observation is in line with the above hypothesis of inefficient
Table 21 - Firm Size, Efficiency and Effective Rates of Assistance, 1978-























(a) Cross-section regression analysis; t-values in parentheses; * sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. - (b) AFS, percentage change in real
sales per firm, 1978-1985; AREL PROD, relative growth of labor
productivity of small to large firms, 1978-1985. - (c) AERA, change in
effective rate of assistance 1978-1985 in percent.
Source: Calculated from Table 8; Statistisches Bundesamt [b; g].123
entry (or exit). If one compares labor productivity changes in small
versus large firms by industries, the relative productivity growth of
small firms in an industry turns out to be smaller, the greater the
increase in protection. Both empirical results lend support to the above
hypotheses, according to which increases in protection lead to an
inefficient scale of production, be it by the entry of new inefficient
firms or the insufficient exit of redundant firms.
199. Results for Canadian manufacturing industries support this view
[Baldwin, Gorecki, 1983]. They call this the "rationalization effect" of
firm exit. Remaining firms expand output and move down the average
cost curve. A similar, though not identical, effect may be captured by
investment motives of entrepreneurs. For years, the Ifo-Institute in
Munich has surveyed German manufacturing firms about the intended
consequences of their investment activities, much as McGraw-Hill does




A literary juxtaposition of Baldwin and Gorecki's "rationalization effect"
with the "rationalization" intent of investment in the Ifo survey would
suggest a correlation of changes in protection across industries with the
corresponding change in the share of firms reporting a rationalization
motive, with the expectation that such a correlation turns out positive.
This would be hazardous, however, because rationalization in this
context is ill defined (1).
Examination of the survey results shows, however, that the "replace-
ment" motive for investment is rarely reported. The obverse of rational-
ization, then, is "capacity expansion". While this motive does not neces-
sarily correspond to a static move down the average cost curve, for
(1) The concept emerged in Germany in the 1920's (Rationalization Move-
ment) when businesses sought changes in technique which lowered
costs, usually administered labor costs. As such, it is always a good
thing.124
Table 22 - The Relationship between Changes in Effective Assistance
and Industry Characteristics (1978-1985)
Characteristic
Technology
change in capacity expansion motive (1978-1985)
change in rate of process innovation (1979-1982)
change in rate of product innovation (1979-1982)
change in R&D expenditures per employee
Skill intensity (1978)
share of high-skilled employees
share of craftspersons
share of low-skilled employees
Physical capital
physical capital intensity (1978)
rate of return (1983)
change in the rate of return (1978-1983)














Source: Calculated from Table 8 and Statistisches Bundesamt [a; e; f ];
Baumgart et al. [1986]; Schmalholz [1985]; Schmidt et al.
[1984]; Echterhoff-Severitt [various issues]; IfO-Institut [1980;
1986].
which investment would not be required, it seems to be a relatively
straightforward concept which might correspond to an intention of in-
creasing optimum plant size, or at least not reducing it. It would seem
to correspond better to the Baldwin and Gorecki [ibid.] concept of
rationalization.
200. Theory is not so well developed here that there is any guidance for
the functional form a test could take. Therefore, Spearman rank corre-
lation coefficients will be used to see whether changes in protection go
hand in hand with changes in cost cutting investments. The striking
results are shown in Table 22. The change in protection is positively
correlated with the change in the share of rationalization investment, and
the size of the correlation means that the result is unlikely to be due to
chance.125
201. The Ifo-Institute has recently supplemented its regular annual
survey of investment motives with special questions about the extent of
product and process innovations [Schmalholz, 1985], No series long
enough for testing the effect of changes in protection on the change in
the extent of innovation are available: only the change over a short-
period can be correlated with the change in protection. Unsurprisingly,
the size of the correlations indicates it could well rest on chance. The
same applies to changes in R&D expenditures per employee. This is con-
sistent with Vernon's [1979] observation that the location of production
and the location of R&D spending no longer have much to do with each
other.
202. Apart from these ill effects, the protective system may breed other
inefficiencies in factor allocation. In Chapter III it was shown that a
large proportion of subsidies was specifically directed to physical capital.
Is this institutional bias observable in the data? The answer is yes.
While only a low positive correlation between physical capital intensity of
industries and the change in protection is discernible (1), increases in
protection seem to have gone hand in hand with the decline in the rate
of return on physical capital. It is hardly conceivable that increases in
protection have caused declines in profitability. One is on surer ground
interpreting the causality as running from declining rates of return to
increased demand for and supply of protection. This result is entirely
consistent with the results of the political economy analysis, though it
bears reemphasis that no plausible explanation for so much support of
physical capital has emerged.
203. Another set of correlation coefficients seeks to describe how the
change in the protective system has been related to the skills of the em-
ployed (2); as in the case of physical capital, the results are somewhat
surprising. There is weak evidence for discrimination against unskilled
labor; weak evidence for the promotion of highly skilled labor; and
stronger evidence for the promotion of medium, i.e. craft, skills. Here,
too, societal groups are supported by policies which do not fit the
(1) The situation is probably typical for Europe. Quantitative evidence
for the United Kingdom is given by Metcalf [1984],
(2) This kind of typology rests on Keesing [1965] and Waehrer [1968].126
ideology used to justify support. These results are consistent with the
observation that it is not the poorest members of society who are being
helped, but others. Aside from the social aspect of this problem, this
course as a long-run economic proposition is either unsustainable or will
go hand in hand with relative, and perhaps absolute, economic decline.
Craft skills, old skills, and physical capital are not the factors which
lend Europe, least of all Germany, a comparative advantage in any-
thing.
4. Trade Policy in the Steel Industry
204. If one leaves the broad-brush cross sectional examination, some-
thing more can be said about the effects of trade policy in individual in-
dustries, particularly industries organized in large production units. The
steel industry is an important case in point, both in West Germany and
in Europe as a whole. It has been made clear that this is a much sup-
ported industry, but it is also characterized by a peculiar subsidy cum
production quota system. To understand the effect of subsidies, some-
thing has to be known about the industrial organization and pricing
strategies of the industry. The contention here is that the steel industry
can be characterized as a contestable market in the sense of Baumol et
al. [1982], This means that because there are no barriers to entry,
pure profits cannot emerge, so that in turn price equals average cost. If
there were low enough fixed costs, contestibality would converge to per-
fect competition; if fixed costs were high enough, one firm would supply
the world market [Helpman, Krugman, 1985, Ch. 6]. This monopolist
could earn no rent because the threat of entry forces him to charge no
more than average cost for his product.
205. This description of the steel industry may seem farfetched; hit and
run competition, a requirement of contestability, seems difficult. But it
should be considered that technology in most steel-making operations has
become fairly ubiquitous. In addition, the success of mini-mills suggests
that optimal plant size has tended to fall. Thus, if there is sunk cost
upon entering steel making, it is likely to be fairly low. Explicit tests of127
the structure of the steel industry undertaken by Lont and Mathiesen
[1983] and Mathiesen and Wergeland [1986] with a simulation model come
to the conclusion that the international steel industry is actually perfect-
ly competitive. Their results are summarized by Haarland and Norman
[1987]: "[A simulation model] was constructed on the basis of micro-data
on cost functions for different steel-processing techniques in various
countries throughout the world. The model was then used to simulate
production and trade patterns under alternative assumptions regarding
market structure - perfect' competition, a general Nash-Cournot equi-
librium and a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for some producers with the rest
as a competitive fringe. The predicted patterns were confronted with
actual world production and trade. The conclusion was that, despite ap-
parently high concentration in the industry, the assumption of perfect
competition gave the best fit".
For the present analysis, the weaker form of competition, contestability
only, is required.
206. The subsidization cum production quota system that has become
prevalent in Europe has another peculiarity that must be recognized.
The subsidy is not a subsidy on product output or factor input, but a
subsidy on losses. The subsidies are paid by national governments; the
EC Commission only legalizes their payment. This makes the subsidy
open ended. Firms would have an incentive to produce as much as poss-
ible. To limit the extent of subsidization at all in this setup, a system of
production quotas is required. The quotas are not allocated to firms on
the basis of efficiency considerations, but rather as the outcome of a
bargaining process where historic output is an often used argument.
207. This peculiar institutional feature of the steel protection system has
important consequences for the social cost of intervention, as illustrated
in Figure 3. The average cost curves of two firms are shown, the effi-
cient firm, AC,, which incurs minimum average cost at world market
price p , and the inefficient firm, AC?, which incurs minimum average
cost even above the domestic price p (1+t). For simplicity each is as-
signed an identical production quota q*. Firm 2 requires the subsidy q*
(AC2* - pw(l+t)) to maintain operations. Firm 1 is earning a private128
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profit of q* (p (1+t) - AC,*). The social cost of such an institution is
very large by the standards of an equivalent per unit output production
subsidy of the most efficient firm: all of firm 2's output could be pur-
chased at world market price p ; the extra social cost of production is
(AC_ p ) , which can be decomposed into the absolute subsidy
amount plus the firm's output times the difference between domestic and
world prices. In addition, this institution is forcing firm 1 to impose a
loss on society, namely the extra cost incurred by operating above
minimum average cost (q* (AC^ - p )) plus the extra output and cost
reduction foregone (surface abc). Lost consumer surplus attributable to
the NTB's in steel should be added as a minor footnote to this social
loss.
208. The German steel industry is generally thought to be efficient at
domestic prices, and perhaps at world prices [World Bank, 1987], but
one German company is not. It is the only one to have received the type
of cost transfers analyzed here. It produced 10.3 million tons of rolled
steel during the period 1981-1985. The firm received DM3.4 billion in
subsidies, or about DM330 per ton [Herdmann, Weiss, 1985]. Had the
company ceased production, and had its quotas been transferred to other
German firms, so that they could expand output and move down the129
average cost curve, this would have saved a total of DM5.7 billion. This
would have been sufficient to bribe the company's workers not to work
to the tune of DM250 thousand, instead of the DM45 thousand which the
laid off workers actually received. The situation in the other European
countries is more pronounced still. Six firms, producing 55 million tons
of steel in 1981, which received most of the subsidies, received
DM46 billion in the five year period to 1985. Had they ceased produc-
tion, other companies could have produced the steel at a total cost of
DM50 billion less. This adds up-to a social loss of DM105 billion for the
five year period, and ignores consumer surplus, which is dwarfed by
these figures in any case.
209. Does it pay (socially) for the government of the low cost producer
to subsidize its steel industry? First of all, it does not pay the govern-
ment of the low cost producers to subsidize the one firm which has high
cost by international standards at all. Secondly, there is no point in
subsidizing national producers which have minimum average costs above
world market prices. In a contestable market without quotas, it does not
matter who produces. The only rationale for a subsidy is a political one
- keep your own producers afloat until the other, higher cost pro-
ducers, have cut capacity or gone out of business, or at least use the
threat potential to keep down domestic prices below what they otherwise
might be. It always pays the low cost producer's government to fight for
a higher quota, and if minimum average cost is truly at or below world
market prices, to press for liberalization. This has in fact been the
strategy of the German government, in accord with the producer's
interest organization. The quota system was dismantled from July 1988,
but the issue of subsidies is by no means cleared up yet [ The Econ-
omist, 1988, p. 58]. If this episode is repeated either in steel or in
other industries high costs will be incurred through the obverse of
Horstmann and Markusen's "inefficient entry", namely insufficient exist.
This episode also illustrates well how sensitive strategic trade policy
results are to entry and exit conditions, which must lie behind firm's
choices of strategies. It is not enough to observe a concentrated indus-
try and infer from that observation that government intervention would
lead to gains from trade.130
210. While West Germany shows a distinct pattern of change in total ef-
fective assistance to industries, it is difficult to map out many implica-
tions of that pattern. It seems reasonably certain that the change in as-
sistance impeded externally-induced structural change, as could be
shown for the important case of trade with Japan. If one accepts the
evolution of the trade structure with Japan as a proxy for the cor-
responding trade structure of the rapidly-growing economies, then one
can infer that the change in protection was generally designed to ward
off externally-induced structural change. This observation is consistent
with the change in protection favoring physical capital intensive indus-
tries and medium-skill intensive industries. At the micro-level, the
change in protection inhibited the exit of firms, and so contributed to
higher costs. While rationalization investment was observable in indus-
tries which received more assistance, this kind of investment is wasted if
too many firms remain in the market. Thus, this picture of recent
changes in effective protection in West Germany seems to be neither con-
sistent with the aims of industrial policies nor with the necessary adjust-
ment to the international division of labor.131
VII. Liberalizing German Trade Policy - General Equilibrium Simulations
211. The previous chapters have discussed various aspects of trade and
industrial policy and have sought to summarize their economic impact in
part by measures such as the implicit rate of nominal protection and the
effective rate of protection including effective subsidization. The ex-
planation for their structure was then investigated through the political
economy approach. The objective of the present chapter is to extend the
analysis by considering the overall effects of the trade and industrial
policy regime. This is done by considering the benefits of a full liberal-
ization, the costs or effects of the present system being the reverse.
1. The General Equilibrium Approach
212. The need for a general equilibrium approach when one is consider-
ing the costs of the present trading system can be illustrated by briefly
reconsidering the theory of effective protection. As normally derived,
the system interactions are taken into account by the input-output tech-
nology. However, both balance-of-payments equilibrium and full employ-
ment are assumed. The former effect was discussed by Corden [1971]
under the heading of "net effective protection". This involves calculating
the equilibrium exchange rate, something which can be neglected when
one is dealing with a relatively insignificant commodity but which in-
volves general equilibrium calculations when this is not the case. The
latter effect is essentially covered by the concept of "true protection"
developed by Clements and Sjaastad [1984]. In its simplest form, it in-
volves the transmission of protection across sectors via the reaction of
wages to developments in the consumer price index. The labor market
and the demand system is thereby taken into account, once again neces-
sitating a general equilibrium approach.
213. An additional factor increasingly stressed is the interaction of the
public finance system with trade and industrial policy measures. In the
single "small" sector approach to protection, the consequences for gov-132
ernment finance of tariff revenues or subsidy outlays can be safely
ignored. This is clearly not the case for the trade system as a whole, as
can be seen by the fact that in 1980, subsidies amounted to some
DM102.6 billion or about 5.5 percent of GNP (Chapter II).
214. In order to take account of these complex interactions, the Kiel In-
stitute's applied general equilibrium model of West Germany was utilized
(1). Given the problem at hand a model with 13 sectors was specified.
The salient features of the government subsidies they enjoy are docu-
mented in Table 23. Apart from the agricultural and food processing
sectors, seven manufacturing and three service sectors are modeled. In
terms of total protection, the "Gang of Four" are thus explicitly re-
presented: agriculture, coal mining, iron and steel, and clothing and
textiles. Not only are those sectors with both much and little protection
handled, but also a variation in the nature of protection is considered:
for example, agriculture relies to a great extent on subsidies, whereas
clothing and textiles are protected in ways which do not directly involve
budget transfers (through the MFA).
The allocation of subsidies by sector and use, including the CAP pro-
duction and export subsidies, is shown in Table 23. Not only is the al-
location of subsidies across sectors uneven, but the purposes of the
subsidies differ. Whereas in agriculture the bulk of the subsidy is pro-
duction-oriented, in other sectors it relates primarily to investment and
capital. This coupling of subsidy disbursements to a specific base such
as output or factor use is potentially important for the factor and com-
modity composition of trade so that four categories of subsidies are ex-
plicitly incorporated.
215. The interested reader is referred to Dicke et al. [1988], for a list-
ing of the model equations. Here a thumbnail sketch of the more impor-
(1) The model is derived from the Orani work of Dixon et al. [1982] and
an earlier version is documented in Gerken and Gross [1985], Pre-
vious applications include studies on steel subsidies [Gerken et al.,
1986], subsidy reductions [Gerken et al., 1985], trade liberalization
[Kirkpatrick, 1987a] and agricultural protection [Dicke et al.,
1988]. It is currently being further refined and extended
[Kirkpatrick, 1988].133


























































































































Source: Calculated from Tables 6 and 14.
tant features of the model is given. The model belongs to the Johansen
class of general equilibrium models; it is linear in percentage changes
(i.e. behavioral equations have been log-linearized about a 1980 base
year). The equation system can be represented by:134
Az = 0 ...[1]
where A is an m-n matrix of coefficients and z is an n-1 vector of vari-
ables written as percentage changes. For a solution, n-m variables must
be declared as exogenous allowing the model to be partitioned as:
A^ = 0 ...[2]
and solved as:
y = -A^ AjX ...[3]
where y is an m»l vector of endogenous variables and x an (n-m)-l vec-
tor of exogenous variables.
216. The appropriate choice of exogenous variables and of their values
depends on the purpose of the simulation; this is discussed more fully
below. However, two categorizations are carried through all simulations.
Firstly, all trade barriers and subsidies are represented as exogenous ad
valorem instruments which are to be eliminated. The problems involved
with representing NTB's by tariff equivalents are well known and much
the same problems arise with the treatment of subsidies. However, it is
probably beyond the capability of any modelling effort to faithfully rep-
resent the diversity of instruments which governments and interest
groups have invented. Secondly, the choice of exogenous variables is
also governed by the time period under consideration. This chapter is
concerned with the medium to long run which is defined as the time re-
quired for complete intersectoral mobility of capital and labor. Sectoral
capital and labor stocks are therefore endogenous, the exogenous factor
being either an aggregate factor rental or an aggregate stock.
217. The model's behavioral assumptions are: domestic commodities are
produced by three primary factors (aggregate labor, capital and a sector
specific factor called "land") in addition to domestic and foreign inter-
mediate inputs. Labor is further disaggregated into a skilled and an un-
skilled category, the substitutability between the two being represented
by a CES function. Substitutability between the primary factors is rep-135
resented by a CRESH (1) production function, but between value added
and intermediates, fixed coefficients (Leontief technology) are assumed.
The differentiation by skills is important given comparative advantage
considerations and the observation that unemployment in West Germany
(as in other West European countries) is primarily concentrated in un-
skilled (or wrongly skilled) groups [Donges et al. , 1988]. The medium-
skilled groups of Chapter VI are lumped together with high-skilled
groups. But despite the model's long-run nature, there is no mobility of
labor between skill groups. Given the technical relationships, factor de-
mands are derived through the assumption_of cost minimization by firms.
218. The international aspect of the model is conditioned by the assump-
tion of imperfect sub stitutability between home and foreign goods in con-
sumption, capital formation and intermediate use. Substitution possibil-
ities are represented by an Armington CES system. Household budgeting
(i.e. the allocation of expenditures across composite goods) is represent-
ed by a linear expenditure system (2). German import demands do not
affect world prices, but foreign demand for German exports is governed
by finite elasticities; in other words, a large country is being modeled.
Protection for German exporters afforded by the EEC is not recognized.
The balance of trade is derived in the model by summation over exports
and imports, and equality or a predetermined surplus is enforced in the
model solution by price changes or exchange rate adjustments. The me-
chanism behind Corden's net protective rate [Corden, 1971] is thereby
explicitly included: Other things equal, protection will lower imports,
resulting in an incipient trade surplus. The real exchange rate will
appreciate, and choke off exports, both directly and through induced
wage increases.
219. The fiscal system incorporates direct and indirect taxes together
with subsidies which also include EEC programs. The level of real gov-
(1) Constant Ratio Elasticity of Substitution Homothetic; in contrast to
the CES function, CRESH does not restrict all elasticities of substi-
tution among pairs of factors to equality. For a description, see
Dixon et al. [1982].
(2) This implies the absence of goods complementarity.136
ernment expenditure on goods and services is exogenous and held con-
stant. The government budget is balanced, the endogenous policy in-
strument in all reported simulations being the direct tax rate. Direct
taxes will therefore decline as an immediate consequence of budget sav-
ings arising from a dismantling of subsidies.
220. With a prespecified balanced government budget and balance of
trade, savings and investment behavior requires specification. For this
purpose, a procedure from the Orani model [Dixon et al., 1982] is adop-
ted: the ratio of real investment to real consumption is held constant.
Investment, in turn, is endogenous, both in the aggregate and in inter-
sectoral allocation, being determined by rates of return.
221. With respect to the labor market, the main simulations undertaken
also utilize a non-Walrasian closure: a constant after-tax consumer real
wage together with given interskill wage relativities are assumed. This
implies that the level of employment is solely determined by labor demand
so that either the labor supply curve must be infinitely elastic or there
exists an unlimited pool of unemployed. The consumer price index is in
turn a function of foreign and domestic goods prices. Thus, two inter-
sectoral transmission mechanisms for trade and industrial policy are in-
corporated. Along the lines of Clements and Sjaastad [1984], an increase
in protection will raise consumer prices, increasing nominal wages and
thereby taxing other industries. Similarly, increased taxes to support
subsidies will call forth compensating wage changes.
222. This closure is chosen as the reference point because
- current announced policy concerns are directed overwhelmingly towards
employment,
- the weight of the evidence points to both structural and real wage
rigidity (1) and
(1) Evidence of rigidity is given by Knoester and van der Windt [1987],
Gundlach [1986], and Trapp, Soltwedel [1988]. Causes for rigidity
are increasingly sought in the institutional structure of the German
labor market: it lies in the middle of the liberal-to-corporatist spec-
trum. See especially Bruno, Sachs [1985], Calmfors, Driffill [1987],
and DeLong, Jonung [1988].137
- a politically feasible reform package will probably have to avoid real
wage decreases.
That being said, the shadow price of these assumptions are investigated
by comparison to a Walrasian closure.
Finally, domestic goods prices are determined through the zero profits
condition. Unless otherwise stated, the capital market is assumed to be
integrated both nationally arid internationally so that the after tax rate
of return is fixed by the world market (i.e. exogenous). Rental prices
for sector specific factors completely adjust so as to ensure full utili-
zation.
2. Trade Liberalization
223. The general features of the trade regime are apparent from Simu-
lation 1, Table 24. In this simulation, all implicit tariffs and subsidies
are removed. For a linear model individual effects are additive, so that
simulations for the removal of tariffs and subsidies alone are also re-
ported. The table indicates that the removal of all subsidies and tariffs
would increase output by 4.6 percent and employment by more. However,
skilled employment increases by 6.8 percent in comparison to a change
in low-skilled employment of 5.3 percent. With given wage relativities,
the current trade regime actually seems to discriminate against skilled
employment. If at the given wage, this increased supply of skilled labor
is not forthcoming, then the implied complementarity of labor types would
serve to reduce greatly, if not eliminate, the income gains from liberal-
ization. A notable feature of Table 24 is the contrasting factor propor-
tion effects of the tariff and subsidy systems. Whereas the former
appears to favor capital and low-skilled employment relatively, the latter
seems to favor capital and high-skilled employment relatively.
224. The factor usage implications are of course difficult to analyze
under a regime of perfectly elastic supply, which implies a cheapening of
labor relative to capital. Therefore, in Simulation 2 a Walrasian closure,138
Table 24 - Effect of Trade Liberalization on Sectoral Output and Aggre-
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(a) In this model, GDP is calculated as the initial income share of each factor times each factor
supply. Where factor supplies do not change, as in the Walrasian simulation, GDP does not change. This
result is an artifact of the models linearity and obviously has no welfare implications. - (b) Nominal
exchange rate divided by consumer price index. - (c) Exports grow by 7.3 percent. The balance of trade
consequently deteriorates by DM112 billion in 1980 prices. In this base year the balance of trade was in
fact in surplus by DM10 billion. - * exogenously fixed. - + ratio exogenously fixed at unity. - Simu-
lation 1 - Exogenously set at zero change are real after-tax consumer wages, after-tax rate of return on
capital and real government expenditures. All tariffs and subsidies are reduced to zero. For the simu-
lation "tariff", only ad valorem tariff rates are eliminated with subsidies remaining. The simulation
"subsidy" eliminates subsidies but keeps tariffs. In all three simulations the consumer price index is
endogenous, the numeraire being the exchange rate. Simulation 2 - As for Simulation 1 with the exception
that the aggregate capital, skilled employment, and unskilled employment are exogenous and set at zero
change. Consequently the own factor prices, held constant in Simulation 1, are now endogenous. Simu-
lation 3 - As for Simulation 1 but now the two labor quantities are set exogenously, the two associated
wages being endogenous. Simulation 4 - As for Simulation 1 but the consumer price index is set exogen-
ously at zero change. Consequently the balance of trade, exogenously set at zero in the other simu-
lations, is now endogenous.
Source: Own calculations.
in which the aggregate capital and employment stocks are held constant,
is reported. Liberalization in this case reduces the returns to capital and
low-skilled labor, and raises the returns to high-skilled labor, support-
ing the impression gained from Simulation 1.139
225. Simulation 2 also clearly illustrates the sectoral consequences of the
trade regime. Under liberalization, the capital and unskilled labor in-
tensive sectors, agriculture, food processing, coal mining and clothing
and textiles all sharply contract, expansion being concentrated in basic
commodities, electrical and mechanical engineering. In Simulation 1 these
latter sectors expand more strongly because the relative price of skilled
emplyoment actually falls. A similar effect for unskilled labor reduces the
contraction in other sectors and leads to an expansion in the iron and
steel and market services sectors. However, the sensitivity elasticities
are quite high. Also apparent from Simulations 1 and 2 is the transmis-
sion mechanism. Thus the trade expansion effects of liberalization induce
a real exchange rate depreciation of around 5 percent. In contrast, a
pure subsidy leads to an appreciation.
226. As to be expected, the trade regime has a rather substantial impact
on the commodity composition of trade. Table 25 indicates substantial de-
creases in the net exports of agriculture, coal mining, iron and steel
and clothing and textiles. The gainers are basic commodities and the two
engineering sectors, in other words those normally regarded as best re-
flecting West Germany's comparative advantage. Interestingly, market
services also strengthens its net export position under both Simulations
1 and 2 even though under the latter simulation market service output
decreases. That trade and subsidy policy may inadvertently tax the
classic export industries is clearly illustrated by these two simulations.
227. If Simulation 1 represents an infeasible solution due to the implied
expansion of skilled employment, then Simulation 2 represents a non-
optimal solution due to the presence of unemployment. Simulation 3
therefore reports an external liberalization which is accompanied by an
internal liberalization of the labor market to make possible an 8 percent
expansion of employment of unskilled labor. Such a combined attack on
the problem of unemployment (and growth), justified by labor market
rigidities, has been forcefully put forward by Giersch [1986]. Thus, at
the same time as reducing unskilled employment through trade liberaliza-


















































































































































































228. Relative wages are quite sensitive to the trade regime: the unskilled
after-tax wage falls by 7.4 percent, while the skilled wage rises by 2.1
percent (i.e. a relativity change of around 10 percent). The capital
stock falls even though aggregate output increases by around 1.2 per-
cent. The interindustry composition of output, however remains similar
to that of Simulation 1. An exception, however, is market services which
declines, apparently due to the increased cost of skilled labor. Table 25
also shows a similar development in the commodity composition of trade.
229. The reported simulations have utilized the usual assumption of bal-
anced trade. As a consequence, Simulations 1-3 all indicate an important
equilibrating role for the real exchange rate. The consequences of this
implicit assumption can be investigated in a little more detail. Simulation
4, Table 25, therefore repeats the full liberalization Simulation 1 but
with the real exchange rate now held constant. As a consequence, im-
ports rise by 40 percent in comparison to 25.7 percent for Simulation 1.
The growth in exports is restricted to 7.3. percent so that a trade de-
ficit of DM112 billion (1980 prices) emerges. The expansion of GNP is
now much smaller (0.4 percent as opposed to 4.6 percent). However, of
particular interest is the contrasting pattern of factor utilization. Capital
and skilled employment both expand by around 1 percent but unskilled
employment falls by 0.5 percent.
230. The changing pattern of factor usage is reflected in industry com-
position. In comparison with Simulation 1, the three service sectors
strongly expand, the expansion in the export industries being relatively
weak. Production decreases in agriculture, food, coal mining and textiles
somewhat more than for Simulation 1, reflecting the absence of the in-
duced depreciation. The structure of the economy (in comparison with
Simulation 1) has therefore shifted away from tradeable to nontradeable
goods and services. Put another way, the factors which have led to
strong surpluses in the German balance of trade (and therefore a de-
preciation of the real exchange rate) are the very same factors which
have led to a relative underdevelopment of services and an expansion in
the engineering sectors. One cannot be discussed independently of the
other.142
3. Sensitivity Analysis
231. Something about the uncertainty associated with general equilibrium
exercises must be said. Two issues are important. Firstly, the exogenous
changes in tariffs and subsidies for some sectors are quite large, there-
by introducing linearization error. Exactly how important this is cannot
be determined a priori but Dixon et al. [1984] report simulations in
which the errors average around 40 percent. In their particular example,
the macro benefits arising from a complete reduction of tariffs in a single
sector were overstated. The present reductions affect many more sectors
so that the errors may to some extent cancel. However, the experience
of Dixon et al. shows that the qualitative results remain essentially un-
changed. Secondly, general equilibrium simulations are functions of the
chosen parameters. How to interpret results will therefore depend both
on the sensitivity of the endogenous variables to a parameter and the
uncertainty with respect to the chosen value of the parameter itself (1).
In order to give some feel for the relationship between qualitatitve and
quantitative results, Table 26 reports the sensitivity elasticity of en-
dogenous variables (the sectoral size changes as well as the macro-
aggregates) with respect to two types of parameters: the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods in consumption, intermedi-
ate use, and investment (39 parameters altogether) and the elasticity of
export price with respect to export volume (the inverse of the price
elasticity of demand for exprots, 13 parameters altogether). The result
are only somewhat sensitive to other parameters; these two categories
are especially important.
232. In order to assess sensitivity, the elasticities in Table 26 are con-
sidered. An example is useful. The elasticity of GDP with respect to
changes in all parameters governing goods substitution in the case of
full liberalization is -0.62. This would imply that a 100 percent increase
in all these parameters would decrease the change in GDP by 62 percent
or from 4.6 percent to 1.84 percent. By contrast, the elasticity for GDP
in the case of a pure subsidy liberalization is -1.74 so that the GDP
(1) For a fuller discussion see Kirkpatrick [1988].143
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Source: Kirkpatrick [1988].
change of 0.9 percent is totally eliminated by a 100 percent change in
the parameter. Similar sensitivity elasticities also hold for the export
demand elasticity.
233. With respect to goods substitution, the elasticities used are by con-
ventional econometric standards high, so that if anything, income gains
are understated. Also, the export price demand elasticities are high,
which again means that bias with respect to income and employment ef-
fects is towards understatement. One can conclude that full liberalization
or pure tariff elimination would surely lead to employment and income
gains. However, for subsidy elimination alone the output effect is less
robust; the primary effect seems to be on factor intensities. Although
the sensitivity elasticity of the capital stock with respect to substitution144
and export demand elasticities is quite high, the signs differ between
the tariff and subsidy removal experiments. Qualitative judgements about
each component of the protective system taken by itself would then be
robust. The factor returns implication also appears quite robust.
4. Conclusions
234. The most important result to emerge from this analysis is that trade
and subsidy policy do matter both for the level of employment and out-
put and for the pattern of factor use and trade. This may seem rather
trite so it should be stressed that many studies do in fact find only
very small gains to trade liberalization [see, for example, some of the
studies in Srinivasan and Whalley, 1986]. The reason for this difference
must be sought in several areas.
235. Firstly, whereas many studies examine only the effects of tariffs,
here total assistance to the business sector was analyzed. Whereas the
former is usually quite low, the latter, reflecting a range of NTB's, is
quite high. Moreover, most studies either fail to take account of sub-
sidies, or when they do, utilize rather low official figures. As noted in
Chapter II, the present data show subsidies much higher than those of-
ficially reported. On these two grounds alone one would expect higher
gains from liberalization than is usual.
236. Secondly, there are important differences in model structure. Per-
haps of most importance is, however, the model closure. Whereas most
studies seek to model a pure efficiency gain through Walrasian closures
(i.e. all markets including labor clear and the balance of trade is zero)
the present model allows to presumed rigidities. The choice of model
structure is not merely based on theoretical considerations but reflects
the judgement that the labor market in West Germany is characterized by
rigidity in both the level and structure of wages. Within this framework,
one must judge the effects of trade and industrial policy (here under-
stood as subsidy and taxation expenditures). In this respect, the gains145
from liberalization (or the costs of the present trade regime) were shown
to depend crucially on the supply of skilled labor. To be effective, ex-
ternal liberalization must be accompanied by labor market liberalization
which either makes relative wages flexible or promotes the supply of
skilled labor. Seen from the political economy of protection perspective,
the trade regime is an important flanking measure to particular labor
market institutions.
237. If the trade regime has resulted in significant overall losses then it
has clearly also resulted in important gains for particular groups. Thus
both tariffs and subsidies have had substantial effects on both the sec-
toral composition of production and trade and with, it returns to sector
specific factors. Even where liberalization does not result in great over-
all gains, the intersectoral shift is clearly significant although numerical-
ly imprecise.
238. Not only is sectoral output affected but also the factor content, al-
though here there seem to be important differences between the effects
of tariffs and subsidies. At the cost of reduced overall levels of employ-
ment, the tariff system appeared to protect capital and unskilled labor
relatively, whereas the subsidy system was strongly oriented towards
capital, and to a lesser extent skilled labor. Indeed, the subsidy system
was shown to have significantly increased the overall capital intensity of
production.
239. Finally, the influence of variation in the real exchange on the sec-
toral composition of employment, output and trade was investigated.
Rather unsurprisingly, the very factors which have led to large sur-
pluses in the balance of trade would also have led to a smaller service or
nontradeable sector and larger engineering and basic commodity sectors.
However, the trade regime as such has not caused this development
since it was shown that these classic German export industries have in
fact been taxed and therefore restricted.146
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
240. The systematization and quantification of trade policy measures
taken by itself has already produced pronounced results. While tariffs on
the bulk of manufacturing trade have declined through the efforts of the
Tokyo Round, where protection and assistance have gone up or remained
high, there has been a vengeance in the process. A small, distinctive
group of industries has been the main beneficiary of protection:
- agriculture and food processing,
- coal mining,
- the steel industry,
- shipbuilding, and
- textiles and clothing.
These are old, declining industries based on ubiquitous technologies.
New industries which have been exceptionally promoted are
- electronic data processing, and
- the aerospace industry.
But assistance to the first industry is high only by the standards of
manufacturing as a whole and assistance to the second industry, while
remaining high, has declined.
241. As far as subsidies are concerned, they certainly have increased
over the last decade and a half. However, industrially broad based sub-
sidy programs, which were only somewhat distortionary through an influ-
ence on factor allocation, were displaced by more sector-specific pro-
grams. Moreover, the targeted industries consisted of most of the indus-
tries already listed. Nothing dramatic happened to subsidization in any
other traded goods industry. Quite the contrary, the one high-tech in-
dustry which received much in the way of subsidization declined in the
degree of public assistance received. Aside from these sector specific
programs, however, the diverse ways in which subsidy programs are in-147
stitutionalized strongly suggest that there is no centrally-promulgated
industrial policy with a coherent set of aims.
242. What have been the consequences of these trade and industrial pol-
icies? Are there any patterns in interindustrial patterns to be detected
in support policy? For one thing, they have been unsurprisingly effec-
tive in what is their underlying aim - to redirect trade flows. The em-
pirical evidence is quite convincing on this score, even for trade flows
so notoriously difficult to predict as bilateral ones. Otherwise, very few
systematic things can be said about the pattern or the consequences of
trade and industrial policy. One is that declining industries have been
supported most; another is that policy has not prevented decline. If the
protection granted was to lower (social) adjustment cost, alternative pol-
icies would have been more successful and less costly. More tellingly,
aid to industries increased most that use relatively intensively workers
with medium skill levels - crafts persons. The low skilled are not pro-
tected and the high skilled are not promoted, but traditional skills in
traditional industries were aided most.
Most importantly, on average across industries, trade and industrial
policy has promoted "inefficient entry" or "insufficient exit". Average
firm size increased least in those industries gaining most from policy. In
addition, labor productivity of small firms increased least in those in-
dustries where industrial assistance increased most. This is evidence for
protection creating high cost producers, inducing them to move "up the
average cost curve", but going up backwards.
One specific market where this occurs with a vengeance is the steel in-
dustry. An institutionalized system in the EC of granting subsidies to
cover firms' losses while imposing production quotas on firms to prevent
the losses from getting out of hand has enabled high cost producers to
stay in the market. In such a situation, social cost on the production
side is greater than the amount of the subsidy. Therefore, the govern-
ment should not subsidize its high cost producers, of which West Ger-
many has but one.148
243. Given the important, perhaps unintended, but above all few dis-
cernible features of the interindustrial pattern of industry assistance,
the question arises as to what can explain the pattern. Political economy
approaches to explaining changes in trade and industrial policy work
particularly well for West Germany. Interest groups are in place, even
institutionalized, and are able to alter the protective structure in their
favor if they are large, or if they have access to government in the
form of their own ministries. Moreover, protection has increased most in
those industries which have been able to subject themselves to policy
automata, where a change in support need not be negotiated and renego-
tiated year after year through the bureaucratic and political processes.
Political economy explanations for changes in the protection structure
work better for West Germany than for countries with more pluralist sets
of interest groups, because the free rider problem in organizing the
groups in the first place has been overcome - a century ago.
244. Nonetheless, interest group interaction with government alone does
not explain enough about changes in protection to be entirely convinc-
ing. Taking into account national governments' interactions with each
other improves the explanation significantly. Governments override the
interest groups when it is opportune for them to do so, and it is op-
portune particularly when the larger issues of foreign policy, but even
the more mundane issues of economic policy, are at stake. While this is
difficult to show statistically, it can be easily shown historically. Major
changes in West Germany's tariff levels and structures have almost al-
ways been associated with important foreign policy issues. In this, the
founding of the "Zollverein" was no different than the founding of the
EC. It is also consistent with Bismarck's moves towards - and away
from - free trade, to say nothing of Hitler's move towards autarky.
Finally, the emergence of post-World War II Germany's tariff schedule
can be understood in no other way, since it was thrashed out between
domestic interest groups and foreign governments.
245. The effects of liberalization crucially depend on labor market condi-
tions. Given flexible real wages, the income effects of complete liberal-
ization (though not necessarily partial liberalization) were great, whereas
under fixed real wages they were smaller. There is reason to believe149
that in West Germany it is the real wage which is the subject and object
of negotiation by large established groups, that is to say more or less
exogenous with respect to labor market conditions. This book could not
investigate labor market conditions, but different assumptions about the
labor market were simulated. As expected, the change in income and em-
ployment in response to complete liberalization is greatest when wages
are completely flexible. This result is obtained if budgetary savings of
cutting subsidies are passed on to employers; net wages do not fall.
246. While these results are believed to be firm, some major lacunae in
research remain which need to be closed before more confident assess-
ments of the effects of trade policy can be tabled. The most important
one is a better integration of new political economy with new industrial
policy considerations. It would be important to find out whether recog-
nition that rents can be redistributed internationally through industrial
policy leads to activity on the part of firms and organized groups to
capture those rents. More concretely, a better assessment of the effects
of trade policy - positive or negative - urgently requires more sys-
tematic information across firms or industries. One or two case studies
are insufficient to establish the efficiency of policy. Moreover, as the
case of the steel industry in this study has shown, assumptions on ease
of entry into an industry crucially determine policy results. As the steel
industry shows, appearances may be deceptive. Therefore, entry condi-
tions must be explicitly addressed, because they surely affect firms'
strategies which in turn determine the effects of policy intervention. On
the political economy side, a better understanding of the conditions
under which governments override interest groups is required. While
some effort has gone into studying how members of legislatures will vote
on particular issues, or even what stances political parties take at elec-
tion time, it is probably fair to say, that the supply side of protection
is understood less well than the demand side. Lastly, it is probably also
fair to say that there exists a tendency for theory to outstrip fact. More
attention needs to be given to generating systematic facts. Such tasks
will have to be undertaken repeatedly, because the facts collected are
crucially codetermined by the theoretical spectacles through which one
views the world. Put more positively, as theory gets more refined, so do
the facts needed to validate or contradict that theory.150
247. Whatever policy conclusions one would or would not draw because of
these caveats, perhaps one will bear up and endure: policies actually
undertaken have been singularly ineffective when outcomes are compared
to announced intentions or even any reasonable interpretation of what
intentions could be. This applies to promotion of employment in parti-
cular. If the analysis in this study is correct the reason for that out-
come is that policies are eventually captured by interest groups. If this
is recognized, and policies have to be undertaken at all to help indivi-
duals, then the policies should not preserve the interest groups behind
the policies. They should aim at the eventual extinction of the groups.
The obvious answer to structure preserving policies is direct income
transfers, even if these cannot be uniform for everybody. Yes, such a
policy will induce lobbying for additional transfers. But this activity is
unlikely to be as effective as the lobbying of groups tied to particular
places and technologies. The recipients of direct income transfers are
likely to live eventually in diverse places and to hold diverse interests.
The important thing is to avoid the resource waste of the trade policies;
the resources to finance transfer payments would become readily avail-
able from trade liberalization, in West Germany albeit predicated upon a
concurrent internal liberalization.
Because the supply of protection is relatively poorly understood, these
policy conclusions may be beside the point. But some expectation that
the domestic and international dynamics of industry support schemes may
eventually self-destruct is justified. Firstly, nowhere has protection
succeeded in protecting. As employment declines in an industry, so will
its power. Secondly, protection has become costly in the visible, bud-
getary sense. This bodes good, because such measures have more direct
information value than do nonbudget measures for politicians and for the
general public. Thirdly, interest groups are sometimes inept in the sense
that only subgroups benefit much from policy.
248. An important example with international ramifications is agriculture.
The workings of EC farm policy have led to what may be the beginning
of the dissolution of the solidarity of the farm bloc. The many small,
marginal farmers have received no economic rents from farm policy as im-
plemented. They are forming countervailing lobbies. At the same time,151
the small farmers understand they would be better off under a system of
income, rather than price, supports. It is fortuitous that pressure from
the United States to liberalize international trade in agricultural products
comes at the same time. It would be particularly helpful for the United
States to maintain a hard negotiating line on agriculture, but offering
concessions in manufacturing, of course. This, together with pressure
from somewhat less protectionist countries in the EC could result in the
farm problem being solved more economically in West Germany. Then,
within the EC, West Germany could defend its free trade interests and
free trade ideology far more effectively and far more credibly, shifting
the balance in the Community and the world as a whole towards freer
trade.
249. The overall evaluation of trade policy in West Germany is that it
- does not lead to policy pronounced outcomes;
- has many unintended, costly consequences;
- has been - on average - ineffective in promoting or retarding struc-
tural change in output and employment;
- probably by design effectively distorts trade flows.
One might object that the reason for this outcome is the poor design of
policies. Be that as it may, policies do not follow technocratic blue-
prints, but they follow the vagaries of the domestic and international
political process. Indeed, in pluralist societies, it could not be other-
wise. While free trade has been objected to in specific cases and for
particular reasons, the alternative general rule - follow industrial
policies - can be expected to perform a lot worse, if the evidence for
this one country carries any weight.152
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